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Abstract 
 
In spite of the prevalence of rural-urban interactions in developing countries, much 
remains to be learnt about their welfare impacts. This thesis extends the discussion on 
rural-urban linkages by examining – for Ghana – two of the main forms of such 
interactions: migration and remittance flows. The study explores factors influencing 
migration and remittance flows, and also evaluates the impacts of these linkages on 
poverty and consumption welfare, using data from the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards 
Survey. A key feature of the analyses is the construction of counterfactual scenarios and 
the application of a methodology that adjusts for selectivity bias. 
 
The estimates of migration gains show different mean welfare impacts on our two types 
of in-migrants. Although some urban-to-rural in-migrants derived welfare gains from 
migrating, urban-to-rural migration generally had a negative impact on the welfare of 
in-migrants. In the case of rural-to-urban migration, a small percentage of in-migrants 
incurred welfare losses, but on the whole, migration enhanced considerably the welfare 
of in-migrants. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that on the whole, rural non-
migrants would have incurred a reduction in welfare if they had migrated to urban areas. 
 
In the analysis of remittances, a number of influences on these flows have been 
identified. These include employment income, the presence of an in-migrant, kin-
fostering, the relationship between remitters and recipients, and gender. Our results also 
provide support for the presence of both altruism and self-interest in remittance 
decisions. Even though rural-to-urban remittances had little impact on the welfare of 
recipients, our estimates suggest that rural recipients of urban remittances derived, on 
average, considerable proportionate welfare gains. 
 
According to the findings, both migration and remittance flows often affect the poverty 
status of participants. For many of these migrants or remittance recipients, these 
linkages constitute an important route for escaping poverty. Finally, relative to inter-
sectoral migration, inter-sectoral remittances had a more favourable direct impact on 
aggregate poverty and inequality. 
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Chapter One:  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The rural-urban categorization is one of the most well-known classifications of 
households in developing countries. Even though some livelihood differences exist 
within each of rural and urban sectors, it is widely acknowledged that urban welfare 
levels generally exceed those of rural areas. Moreover, rural-urban differences 
characterise households’ asset portfolios and livelihood activities. These differences 
often generate linkages between the two sectors. The linkages include migration, 
remittance flows, trade, and the utilisation of resources across the two sectors. As 
expected, the disparities in rural-urban welfare and livelihoods – and the associated 
linkages between the two sectors – have spawned various discussions in the 
development literature. Whilst some have explored factors underlying the rural-urban 
welfare gap (see Lipton, 1977 and 1982; and Corbridge, 1982), others have engaged 
with issues relating to the interactions between the two sectors (see Lipton, 1980; 
Tacoli, 1998; and Dercon and Hoddinott, 2005). 
 
In spite of the prevalence of rural-urban interactions in developing countries, much 
remains to be learnt about their welfare impacts. This thesis extends the discussion on 
rural-urban linkages by examining – for Ghana – two of the main forms of such 
interactions: migration and remittance flows. In addition to exploring the determinants 
of these specific linkages, we examine their impacts on poverty and welfare, using data 
from the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS). The academic and public 
interest in issues relating to poverty reduction further makes the study’s focus 
particularly pertinent. 
 
It is worth mentioning from the outset that the classification of localities into rural and 
urban is not a settled issue. As noted by Hugo, Champion, and Lattes (2001), urban 
settlements are often identified on the basis of specific criteria and rules, whilst the 
residual (non-urban) areas are classified as rural. These criteria and rules – one or more 
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of which may be adopted – include population size threshold
1
, population density, the 
availability of specific municipal amenities, and political or legal status. Thus, there is a 
tendency for differences to exist in the definitions used by countries, or even in the 
definitions employed by the same country at different times. In the 2001 Rural Poverty 
Report, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) observes: 
“The most common definition of the [population size borderline] is 5,000 
persons, as in India; often it is 2,500 persons or fewer, as in Mexico, or 10,000 
or more, as in Nigeria. Other countries, including Brazil and China, do not 
specify a population size but use various characteristics, from typical 
metropolitan facilities to legal or political status” (IFAD, 2001; p. 17). 
Irrespective of the particular set of criteria a country uses to demarcate settlements into 
rural and urban, it is clear that the rural-urban distinction can be blurred in practice. 
 
In Ghana, a population threshold of 5,000 is commonly used to classify settlements as 
urban, and all other localities – those with a population size less than 5,000 – are 
designated rural (see Huq, 1989; and GSS, 2000b). Since the available data for the 
present study are based on this classification scheme, this is our adopted definition. 
Even though the delineation of localities into rural and urban can often be 
controversial, this classification is still relevant for highlighting disparities and linkages 
within a country, so long as it is done with the recognition that for some localities, this 
characterisation may be debatable. 
 
1.2 Background 
 
1.2.1 Ghana’s rural and urban sectors 
 
Although the majority of Ghana’s population reside in rural localities, urbanisation has 
been rising over the years (see Figure 1). Between 1960 and 2000, the urban share of the 
population increased by more than 12 percentage points, reaching a level of 36.1 
percent in 2000. According to Ghana’s 2000 population and housing census, the three 
most urbanised Regions are Greater Accra, Ashanti, and Central, with urban population 
shares of 87.7 percent, 51.3 percent, and 37.5 percent, respectively. Significantly, the 
                                                 
1
 Even with respect to this threshold, differences exist amongst countries. 
 14 
three Regions in the northern part of the country have the three lowest urbanisation 
levels; the urban population shares for the Upper East, Upper West, and Northern 
Regions are 15.7 percent, 17.5 percent, and 26.6 percent, respectively. It has been 
suggested that Ghana’s rising urbanisation is due to increased rural-to-urban migration 
and the reclassification of some settlements from rural to urban status on the attainment 
of the 5,000 population threshold (see Huq, 1989). 
 
Ghana’s rural localities are characterised by a predominantly agricultural and informal 
economy, and account for the bulk of the nation’s agricultural output. A key 
characteristic of rural settlements is the lack of reasonably adequate infrastructure and 
basic amenities. The urban sector, on the other hand, is home to the country’s industries 
and businesses. Although Ghana’s unemployment data may not be very reliable, it has 
been noted that the urban settlements are associated with significant unemployment, 
compared to the rural areas (Sackey and Osei, 2006). Additionally, economic activity in 
the urban sector is characterised by non-agricultural self-employment, formal sector 
employment, and informal activities. It is worth noting also that the provision of basic 
amenities and infrastructure is skewed toward the urban sector, making rural-to-urban 
migration an expected objective of many rural residents. 
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Figure 1: Urbanisation in Ghana 
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Source: Based on data from the 2003 World Development Indicators 
 
1.2.2 Ghana’s rural-urban livelihood differences 
 
The differences in livelihoods between Ghana’s rural and urban sectors can be grouped 
into three categories: differences in asset portfolio, differences in activities and options, 
and disparities in welfare context. Since households’ livelihood activities and options 
are highly linked to their asset portfolios, it goes without saying that rural-urban 
differences in assets largely account for the disparities in livelihood activities (and 
options). Similarly, differences in the kind of livelihood activities available to residents 
of rural and urban areas contribute to the disparities in welfare contexts between the two 
sectors. 
 
a) Differences in asset portfolio 
 
A useful way of discussing assets is to classify them into five forms of capital: physical, 
natural, financial, human, and social capital (Ellis, 1999). Physical capital refers to 
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manufactured items, such as household durables and farm equipment. Natural capital, 
on the other hand, describes any natural resource, whereas financial capital describes 
financial assets. Human capital is the accumulation of knowledge, skill, or health, whilst 
social capital is the access to social support usually acquired through a network of kin, 
friends, and/or acquaintances (Ellis, 1999). In both rural and urban sectors, the range of 
asset ownership (or access) spans all five forms mentioned. Differences exist, however, 
in the composition of assets between the two sectors. 
 
On the whole, Ghana’s rural and urban households exhibit similarities and differences 
in asset holdings. Apart from owning a greater variety of physical assets than their rural 
counterparts, the physical assets owned by urban households are usually more 
expensive. Moreover, an urban household may additionally own a physical asset (for 
example, a house or a corn mill) in a rural locality. Even though households in Ghana 
usually do not own (but rather have access to) natural capital, rural households tend to 
have greater access to this asset. Access to financial capital is generally difficult for 
many households, irrespective of location, whereas urban households generally have 
better access to educational and health facilities (and personnel). Besides having 
appreciable access to social capital, rural households’ access to social support tends to 
be more uniformly distributed, relative to what pertains in urban areas. In urban centres, 
all else being equal, a household’s level of social capital is very much influenced by the 
extent to which members are active in a church or a social organisation. 
 
b) Differences in means of livelihood 
 
In the rural areas, the main means of livelihood is agriculture, with households 
predominantly engaged in farming, fishing or livestock rearing. Urban residents, on the 
other hand, tend to engage mainly in non-agricultural activities, including both white-
collar and blue-collar jobs. A large number of urban residents work in Government 
Ministries and Departments, the educational sector, the health sector, and formal 
financial institutions. Many others, however, are self-employed, petty traders, artisans, 
commercial drivers or street food vendors. 
 
It should be emphasised, that in both rural and urban sectors, households are adept at 
exploring ways of making ends meet. As a result, it is very common for households – 
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and even individuals – to engage in multiple economic activities, some of which may 
not fit the stereotype for the sector in question. In the rural sector, for instance, a typical 
household may diversify its livelihood by engaging in a non-agricultural activity. Such 
activities include petty trading, the sale of palm wine, and the operation of a corn mill. 
Naturally, where one of the members of a rural household is an artisan, the household 
benefits from a greater leverage in diversifying its income source. The following 
narrative illustrates the scope for livelihood diversification in Ghana’s rural localities: 
“Ameena from Adaboya, Ghana is married with three children, ages 7, 10, and 
16. Her village sits 8 kilometres from the nearest road, an hour from the nearest 
telephone. With Ameena’s concentrated effort, her household has managed to 
join the ranks of those few families in Adaboya that are better off. Ameena 
makes and sells malt and rice; she gathers sheanuts to store and sell, and she 
has her own farm and assists her husband on his farm. She also mentions 
repaying a loan to purchase peanut seeds and having money left over to reinvest 
in the businesses. Her entrepreneurship and diverse portfolio of activities and 
assets is typical of the others in the study who have escaped poverty. During the 
interview, she proudly told the researchers that all her children are educated” 
(Narayan, Chambers, Shah, and Petesch, 2000, p. 64). 
 
Another important rural livelihood strategy is the offering of support to a household 
member to migrate to another locality, with the hope that the migrant would 
subsequently send remittances to the household regularly. Closely linked to this strategy 
is the practice of kin-fostering – that is, the practice of children living under the care of 
relatives (other than their parents) for a prolonged period of time. Rural households and 
“sent-out” migrants may arrange for one party to foster a relative. Indeed, kin-fostering 
is a common means by which Ghana’s rural dwellers migrate to the urban areas. 
Additionally, there is the potential for the kin-fostered individual to subsequently serve 
as a link facilitating the migration of other relatives or friends to his/her locality of 
residence. 
 
In the urban centres, some households engage in petty trading and/or back-yard 
gardening to supplement their budget. Similarly, some urban white-collar employees 
take up a second job, such as commercial driving (for example, driving of a taxi) in the 
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evenings and during weekends. Urban households’ livelihood diversification strategies 
also include links with the rural sector. Examples of these links are: 
• An urban household might occasionally receive food items from a rural 
household; 
• An urban female resident can arrange for a rural dweller (often her mother) to 
provide care for her (urban dweller’s) baby; 
• An urban household might keep a farm or a cottage industry in a nearby village. 
 
 
c) Rural-urban differences in welfare context 
 
Although welfare levels in Ghana’s urban sector are reckoned to be higher than the 
levels in the rural sector, many urban households face difficult living conditions. Rural-
urban differences in asset composition and livelihood options generate welfare contexts 
that reflect severe constraints for both rural and urban households; differences, 
nevertheless, can be identified in the nature of the constraints. Regardless of the 
difficulties facing these households, opportunities exist for some to make significant 
welfare gains. 
 
A major difficulty facing Ghana’s rural households is the low productivity 
characterising their agricultural activities. Apart from the rudimentary nature of rural 
agricultural technology, many rural households find agricultural inputs prohibitively 
expensive. Furthermore, since rural households are much more dependent on natural 
capital, especially land, they are very vulnerable to uncertainties associated with the 
weather. In many farming communities, for instance, the lack of access to irrigation 
implies farm outputs are highly dependent on adequate rainfall. Moreover, agricultural 
price fluctuations constitute the bane of many rural households. 
 
The lack of basic infrastructure and amenities is one of the key features of rural life, 
contributing to the low living standards. The absence of good roads, decent toilet 
facilities, adequate educational and health services, and potable water affects just about 
every aspect of a rural household’s livelihood, as illustrated by the following: 
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“Bad or nonexistent roads emerge as problems for six of the seven rural 
communities visited. Men in Twabidi point out that their road becomes 
impassable during the rainy season. Also, truck drivers charge very high fees to 
transport farmers' crops because of the rough road. As a result, the men say, a 
large share of their harvest remains on the farms, creating post-harvest losses 
and deterring farmers from improving yields” (Narayan and Petesch 2002, p. 
24). 
Notwithstanding the fact that in comparison with the urban sector, the nominal cost of 
living is low in rural areas, the incomes of many rural households are too low to keep 
them out of poverty. 
 
The welfare context of rural households is not entirely dismal though; with the 
appropriate intervention, some households are able to escape poverty. A key route for 
rural households to escape poverty is education. The education of a member to a 
reasonably high level can often help enhance the household’s welfare significantly. This 
explains why many rural households attempt to help members with academic promise 
acquire higher education; the resources required for this investment are, however, often 
beyond the capacity of these households. 
 
Notably, education is not the only means by which rural dwellers are able to secure 
significant welfare improvements. Other channels for welfare enhancements include 
interventions from Governmental initiatives, Non-Governmental Organisations, or 
individuals, as illustrated by the following account of a rural dweller: 
 “Even though life was tough for me, I never gave up hope. I started helping 
people on their farms in exchange for food. This enabled me to feed my family 
and even sell some at times. Soon, somebody gave me his [cocoa] farm to look 
after, and I decided to intercrop the [cocoa] with oil palm trees. This went very 
well, and when I harvested, I had enough money to start my own farm. With 
hard work and determination, we have about four different oil palm plantations 
now. I have been able to put up a house here in Twabidi and another at Asotwe, 
in the Ashanti region where I migrated from” (Narayan et al. 2000, p. 65) 
The above narrative further reflects the significant level of social capital that can be 
available to rural households. 
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The infrastructure and social amenities available in the urban sector definitely exceed 
what is available in rural areas. For example, the average urban household does not 
reside very far from the nearest school, hospital or clinic. Furthermore, in addition to the 
typical urban household enjoying relatively good roads, many of these households have 
access to electricity and potable water. Although a large number of urban households 
often are unable to afford the use of some of these services, these households generally 
enjoy greater access to these facilities than their rural counterparts. 
 
It is worth stressing though, that owing to the high costs of living in urban centres, poor 
urban households are often compelled to live in slums, and eke out a living under 
deplorable circumstances. Pollution, congestion, and sanitation-related problems also 
face many of Ghana’s urban residents, and not just those living in slums; the associated 
health hazards render children especially vulnerable. Regarding child care, many 
mothers – in both urban and rural areas – combine full-time child care duties with full-
time economic activities. It is thus common to find mothers providing care for their 
babies whilst street vending or selling their wares at the market place. 
 
1.3 Motivation and main research questions 
 
Given the livelihood differences between Ghana’s rural and urban households, it is not 
surprising that various linkages exist between the two sectors. In view of the desire to 
increase wellbeing, households and individuals are constantly exploring ways of 
enhancing their welfare. Thus, for instance, if a rural resident perceives that urban living 
standards are higher than that of rural areas, it is logical for him/her to attempt to 
establish an appropriate link for tapping into the welfare advantages enjoyed in the 
urban sector. Similarly, an urban household would want to link up with the rural sector 
if there is an aspect of rural livelihood that can be exploited to enhance their welfare. In 
essence, households and individuals try to establish livelihood trajectories that span 
rural and urban sectors, and possibly beyond. 
 
In Ghana, migration and remittance flows constitute two of the main forms of linkages 
between rural and urban sectors. Whilst the prevalence of these specific linkages is 
generally acknowledged, the associated welfare impacts have not received adequate 
attention in empirical research. There are definitely at least a few empirical studies that 
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examine welfare impacts of Ghana’s migration and/or remittances (see, for example, 
Litchfield and Waddington, 2003; Adams, 2006). These studies, however, generally do 
not focus on the rural-urban dimension.  To date, there has been no empirical analysis – 
as far as can be ascertained – of the welfare impact of migration (or remittance flows) 
between Ghana’s rural and urban sectors. Indeed, with regards to migration, discussions 
of the rural-urban dimension often focus on rural-to-urban migration, even though 
available data suggest that the incidence of urban-to-rural migration is significant. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to fill the highlighted gaps in the literature. The principal issues 
of interest are the extent to which migration and remittances affect poverty and welfare. 
In the context of rural-urban interactions, the following main research questions will be 
addressed: 
i) What factors influence migration? 
ii) What is the impact of migration on the welfare of in-migrants? 
iii) What factors influence remittance flows? 
iv) What is the impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare? 
v) What are the poverty impacts of migration and remittances? 
The first two questions will be tackled in chapter six, whilst answers to the third and 
fourth will be the focus of the seventh chapter, with the fifth question addressed in 
chapter eight. 
 
The relevance of this study stems from: 
i) The importance of rural-urban linkages in Ghana; 
ii) The policy relevance of knowing the poverty and welfare impacts of 
migration and remittances. 
The prevalence of rural-urban linkages – especially migration and remittance flows – 
underscores their importance to Ghana’s households. Since migration and remittances 
are integral components of livelihoods in Ghana, knowledge of their welfare (especially 
poverty) implications will be useful in formulating policies for rural and urban 
development. For instance, if these activities are found to have significant positive 
welfare impacts, planners and policy makers might want to put in place structures to 
enhance them. 
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1.4 Organisation 
 
In the next chapter, we review the Ghana poverty and welfare literature, focusing on the 
more basic themes. The third chapter revisits the issue of Ghana’s rural-urban welfare 
disparities by providing a more comprehensive discussion. Chapter four discusses the 
literature on migration, as well as that of remittances. In view of the importance of data 
and methodology to empirical research, chapter five discusses these and provides a 
justification for the study’s choice of methodological approach. Chapter six is devoted 
to an empirical analysis of migration, focusing on factors that influence these 
movements as well as migration’s impact on migrants’ welfare. Similarly, chapter seven 
analyses remittance flows between rural and urban sectors, highlighting their impacts on 
recipients’ welfare. The poverty implications of migration and remittances form the 
thrust of the eighth chapter. The ninth chapter concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter Two:  
A Review of the Ghana Poverty and Welfare Literature 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Academic interest in Ghana’s living standards is by no means a recent phenomenon. 
Prior to 1988, however, data constraints played a big role in limiting the number and 
coverage of such studies. In general, topics covered by the Ghana welfare literature may 
be categorised into two: poverty and welfare distribution. Whilst it is not always easy to 
make a clear distinction, some studies concentrate on poverty (for example, Boateng, 
Ewusi, Kanbur, and McKay, 1992; and GSS, 2000c), and others focus on welfare 
distribution (for example, Canagarajah, Mazumdar, and Ye, 1998). 
 
This chapter provides a survey of some of the issues that have emerged in studies on 
living standards in Ghana, with a view to shedding light not only on what has been 
done, but also on the gaps in the literature. Even though broader issues relating to 
welfare distribution will be captured, the bulk of this review focuses on the poverty 
literature, owing to its domination of the Ghana welfare studies. It is worth noting that 
this review will be mainly confined to an examination of the literature’s coverage of the 
basic issues about poverty and welfare. In particular, aspects of the literature that 
explore links between welfare and migration (or remittances) are covered in a different 
chapter. 
 
The next section begins with a brief review of some poverty conceptual issues, and is 
followed by a discussion of how poverty has been conceptualised and measured in 
studies on Ghana. The third section discusses the literature’s evidence on Ghana’s 
poverty profile. In the fourth section, we present key findings from studies that 
emphasise welfare distribution in Ghana. Given the increasing importance of qualitative 
welfare studies, section five is devoted to a discussion of issues emerging from such 
studies on Ghana. A summary and thoughts for further research conclude the chapter. 
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2.2 Meaning and measurement of poverty 
 
2.2.1 Some conceptual issues 
 
Poverty lends itself to various definitions. It has been defined as “the state of one who 
lacks a usual or socially acceptable amount of money or material possessions”
2
. An 
alternative description of poverty has been given as “the state of not having enough 
money to take care of basic needs such as food, clothing, and housing”.
3
 In the words of 
Ravallion (1994, p.3), “‘Poverty’ can be said to exist in a given society when one or 
more persons do not attain a level of economic well-being deemed to constitute a 
reasonable minimum by the standards of that society.” These definitions give a flavour 
of the diversity of perceptions about poverty, two major ones being the absolute and 
relative concepts. 
 
Absolute poverty has been described as “subsistence below minimum, socially 
acceptable living conditions, usually established based on nutritional requirements and 
other essential goods” (Lok-Dessallien, n.d; p.2). The concept of relative poverty, on the 
other hand, is based on the argument that a person’s welfare relative to that of the rest of 
society is what matters for determining whether he/she is poor. This view of poverty 
captures the idea that poverty is highly related to the time and social milieu in question. 
Whilst absolute poverty can be eradicated, relative poverty implicitly captures the 
notion that poverty can never be completely eradicated. It is also worth noting that 
owing to the important role of non-monetary factors in the construction of wellbeing, 
many economists currently place a high premium on the notion that poverty is multi-
dimensional (see, for example, Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2002; Hulme and 
McKay, 2005; and Duclos, Sahn, and Younger, 2006). As a result, even where data 
constraints preclude the incorporation of non-monetary elements into poverty analysis, 
it is crucial to be aware of poverty’s multi-dimensional aspects. 
 
Although differences in poverty perceptions have informed the formulation of different 
poverty measures, central to poverty measurement is the notion of a poverty line. A 
                                                 
2
 According to the Merriam-Webster English Dictionary. 
3
 According to the Encarta World English Dictionary. 
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poverty line is a welfare threshold that delineates the poor from the non-poor. In 
practice, however, the use of poverty lines is not without problems. Firstly, since 
poverty lines can be absolute or relative, they are subject to criticisms relating to the 
absolute versus relative notions of poverty. In this respect, the main criticism of 
absolute poverty lines is that the identification of the poor without consideration of the 
broad societal welfare context is unrealistic; on the other hand, the use of relative 
poverty lines can result in a reduced emphasis on the elimination of abject poverty. 
Apart from the above limitations, a major drawback of the poverty line is the 
arbitrariness inherent in its determination; irrespective of the specific value of the line, it 
can be argued that, all else being equal, individuals whose estimated welfare levels are 
marginally higher than this threshold might be indistinguishable (from a well-being 
perspective) from those whose estimated welfare levels are marginally below the line. 
This tendency for poverty lines to retain some element of arbitrariness has contributed 
to the increase in studies that employ poverty dominance analyses
4
 (see, for example, 
Justino and Litchfield, 2003; and Madden and Smith, 2000). 
 
To a large extent, the various measures of poverty are functions of the poverty line. a 
key poverty index is the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of measures. The FGT 
generic index yields indicators of poverty incidence, depth, or severity, depending on 
whether a non-negative parameter takes the value 0, 1, or 2, respectively (see Foster, 
Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984). Chapter eight of the present study makes use of this index 
to analyse the impact of migration and remittances on aggregate poverty. 
 
2.2.2 Insights from the Ghana poverty studies 
 
In conformity with the general poverty literature, studies on Ghana’s poverty generally 
agree that poverty is a lack of the basic standard of living deemed to be a reasonable 
minimum by society. Additionally, the Ghana literature highlights the multi-
dimensional concept of poverty. Thus, these studies also address issues such as access 
to health care and education, powerlessness, and social exclusion (see GSS, 1995; 
                                                 
4
 Poverty dominance analysis refers to the application of stochastic dominance techniques to the analysis 
of poverty. This facilitates the possibility of making generalisations about changes in aggregate poverty 
measures that are robust to the choice of the poverty line. 
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Norton, Aryeetey, Korboe, and Dogbe, 1995; and Narayan, Patel, Schafft, Rademacher, 
and Koch-Schulte, 1999). Even though there is a general endorsement of the multi-
dimensional notion of poverty, the use of a money-metric welfare measure is very 
common in the quantitative literature. Studies on Ghana have typically used 
consumption expenditure as the money-metric welfare measure (for example, Glewwe 
and Twum-Baah, 1991; Coulombe and McKay, 1995; and GSS, 1995). On the whole, in 
measuring poverty in Ghana, the studies have adopted the conventional approach; a 
poverty line is first defined on the basis of the preferred money-metric welfare measure, 
after which an aggregate measure
5
 of poverty is computed. We now turn attention to a 
brief discussion of how poverty lines have been defined in the Ghana poverty literature. 
 
Initial studies employing data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) often 
used a relative or semi-relative
6
 poverty line. In their analysis of welfare in Ghana, 
Glewwe and Twum-Baah (1991) defined two relative poverty lines – the upper one was 
the third decile of real consumption expenditure, and the lower line was the first decile 
of real consumption expenditure. Boateng et al. (1992) also employed relative poverty 
lines, with the upper and lower lines being defined as two-thirds and one-third of the 
mean real per capita household expenditure respectively. The use of semi-relative 
poverty lines is common in studies employing data from the first two or three waves of 
the GLSS. An often-used semi-relative poverty line is a fraction of mean per capita 
household consumption expenditure for 1987/88 (see GSS, 1995; and Coulombe and 
McKay, 1995). Using this approach, GSS (1995) obtained an upper poverty line (in 
constant May 1992 Accra prices) of 132,230 cedis per person per year; the lower 
poverty line was 99,173 cedis. The use of some fraction of the national minimum wage 
has also been used in the literature. For example, in their study of Ghana’s income and 
expenditure profiles, Seini, Nyanteng, and van den Boom (1997) defined two poverty 
lines; the minimum wage defined the upper line, whilst the lower poverty line was set at 
one-half of the minimum wage. This yielded – in cedis per capita per year – upper and 
lower poverty lines of 43,800 and 21,900, respectively. Clearly, a drawback of the 
                                                 
5
 The aggregated measure of poverty has usually been the FGT class of poverty indices. 
6
 This has typically been a fraction of a particular year’s mean household consumption expenditure per 
adult equivalent. Defined this way, the poverty line retains some relativity, since it is linked to the 
distribution of a welfare measure. It however, also reflects some semblance of absoluteness by being held 
fixed when measuring and analysing poverty in different years. 
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above studies is the element of arbitrariness characterising the choice of the poverty 
line(s). 
 
In a more recent study, GSS (2000c) uses an absolute poverty line, thus making a 
significant departure from the practice of employing relative lines in Ghana poverty 
studies. Using calorie requirements as a guide, two poverty lines are set. The lower (or 
food) poverty line (700,000 cedis per equivalent adult per year) is based on the average 
expenditure required to obtain the minimum nutrition requirements, assuming 
household members consume the average consumption basket. Thus, the lower poverty 
line represents an extreme poverty threshold; it is a level of expenditure at which calorie 
requirement can be met only by devoting the whole budget to food or by consuming an 
inferior food basket. The upper poverty line (900,000 cedis per equivalent adult per 
year) for 1998/99 was obtained by augmenting the food poverty line with the non-food 
expenditure of individuals whose total consumption spending is equivalent to the food 
poverty line. Even though there is no official poverty line for Ghana, the Ghana 
Statistical Service (2000c) upper poverty line has gained wide acceptance. 
 
As hinted earlier, not all the Ghana poverty studies employ a money-metric welfare 
measure. In an inter-temporal cross-country analysis of forty-seven countries (including 
Ghana), Sahn and Stifel (2002) adopt a “nutrition poverty line” by using anthropometric 
measures of nutrition as indicators of welfare. Given that past chronic nutritional and 
health deprivation tend to leave children ‘stunted’ – i.e., shorter than expected for their 
age and gender, relative to a reference population – the specific well-being indicator 
employed by Sahn and Stifel is the standardized height-for-age of children between the 
ages of three and thirty-five months. The standardized height-for-age of children – also 
known as the height-for-age z-score (HAZ) – is thus used as a proxy for the 
accumulation of nourishment and health over the entire life of a child. Following 
standard practice, the nutritional poverty line chosen was a z-score of –2; incidentally, 
this poverty line is also arbitrary. Apart from offering the advantage of similar 
measurement techniques across surveys
7
, the approach of Sahn and Stifel renders the 
use of exchange rates and deflators unnecessary owing to the non-monetary nature of 
the welfare measure. 
                                                 
7
 The study used Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data. 
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2.3 Poverty profile 
 
A common feature of many of the studies on poverty in Ghana is a description of the 
pattern of poverty across various subgroups. These subgroups could be ecological, 
demographic, or simply, based on type of employment or economic activity (see Boateng 
et al., 1992; Glewwe and Twum-Baah, 1991; and GSS, 1995). Some of the studies (usually 
those that employ regression analysis) also attempt to identify poverty correlates (see 
Asenso-Okyere, Nsowah-Nuamah, and Alberson, 1997), i.e., the main characteristics 
associated with poor households. We now turn attention to the literature’s evidence on 
poverty patterns and correlates in Ghana. 
 
2.3.1 Poverty patterns 
 
The analysis of Ghana’s poverty patterns has often been carried out in terms of rural-urban 
comparisons, and there is a general consensus that rural poverty incidence is higher than 
that of the urban sector. It appears though, that Ghana’s rural-urban welfare gap has 
widened over the past four decades. This is because older studies on Ghana’s economy 
suggest that the gap was not large in the 1960s and early 1970s (see, for example, 
Knight, 1972; and Omaboe, 1966). In highlighting the literature’s evidence on Ghana’s 
poverty patterns, the discussion will rely heavily on data provided by GSS (2000c). 
 
Using the upper poverty line (900,000), the proportion of Ghanaians that were poor in 
1991/92 was 51.7 percent. An analysis of the geographical pattern of poverty shows that in 
each of the ecological zones (i.e., Coastal, Forest, and Savannah), more than half of the 
rural population were poor, with poverty incidence being highest (73 percent) in Rural 
Savannah (see Table 1). On the contrary, each of Accra and the other urban localities 
(Coastal, Forest, and Savannah) recorded a poverty incidence of less than 40 percent. The 
lowest poverty incidence (23.1 percent) was registered in Accra. In discussing poverty 
patterns, however, the contribution of an area to poverty is probably more important than 
the area’s poverty incidence. Regarding the contribution of the various geographical 
localities to the overall incidence of poverty, patterns similar to that of the incidence of 
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poverty are observed. The highest contribution of an urban locality (Forest) to poverty was 
5.5 percent, whilst the lowest contribution of a rural locality (Coastal) was 14.4 percent. 
Rural Forest contributed the most (35.3 percent) to national poverty incidence, and the 
lowest contribution of 3.7 percent was by Accra. In 1991/92, not only did rural residents 
account for the bulk of poverty incidence in Ghana, but the majority of Ghana’s severely 
poor were located in rural areas. 
 
The geographical pattern of poverty in 1998/99 is quite similar to what is observed in 
1991/92. The overall proportion of the population with a welfare measure below the 
poverty line was 39.5 percent. Again, more than 80 percent of these poor individuals were 
located in rural areas. The lowest incidence of poverty (3.8 percent) was recorded in Accra, 
and the highest (70 percent) was found in the Rural Savannah (see Table 2). A comparison 
of each ecological zone’s population share with its contribution to national poverty reflects 
a general pattern of urban localities dominating rural areas. It must be noted however, that 
even though this pattern was consistent in 1991/92, the pattern in 1998/99 did not reflect a 
complete domination of the rural sector by the urban. This is because whilst poverty 
incidence in the Urban Savannah was 43 percent, that of the Rural Forest was 38 percent. 
More importantly, although the Urban Savannah accounted for 4.8 percent of Ghana’s 
population, the proportion of the country’s poor living in this ecological zone was 5.2 
percent. The Rural Forest, on the other hand, had a share of 31.6 percent in the national 
population, but had a smaller share (30.4 percent) of Ghana’s poor residing in the 
ecological zone. This specific result notwithstanding, on the whole, rural communities 
accounted for a greater part of poverty in 1998/99, irrespective of whether the poverty 
index in question was the incidence (P0), depth (P1), or severity (P2). More generally, the 
poverty patterns relating to the depth and severity of poverty – and the respective 
contributions to the national figures – are similar to those observed for the head count ratio. 
 
It is worth mentioning that a notable finding of the Ghana poverty literature is the high 
incidence of poverty amongst farmers, especially those in the food crop sub-sector. In both 
1991/92 and 1998/99, poverty incidence was highest amongst food crop farmers, with the 
second highest incidence being registered by export farmers (see GSS, 2000c). 
Furthermore, in 1991/92 and 1998/99, farmers accounted for at least 65 percent of Ghana’s 
poverty incidence, with the contribution of food crop farmers being close to 60 percent. 
Thus, the 1990s witnessed a pattern of overrepresentation of farmers (especially food crop 
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farmers) among the poor. Although the pattern of poverty across different segments of 
Ghana’s labour force was, on the whole, not markedly different between 1991/92 and 
1998/99 (see GSS, 2000c), it should be noted that in 1991/92, there was very little 
difference in poverty incidence between Food crop farmers and Export farmers (68.1 
percent and 64 percent, respectively). In 1998/99 however, a noticeable disparity was 
observed; 59.4 percent for Food crop farmers and 38.7 percent for Export farmers. On the 
whole, since most of Ghana’s farmers are in the rural sector, it is not surprising that – in 
terms of the labour force – farmers account for the bulk of poverty incidence.  
 
The discussion in this subsection makes a strong case for the view that rural poverty is 
considerably higher than urban poverty. Moreover, the pattern observed using the upper 
poverty line accords with the pattern depicted by the lower poverty line, with the latter 
even accentuating the rural-urban differences for both 1991/92 and 1998/99. We therefore 
do not discuss in detail the rural-urban poverty patterns that are based on the lower poverty 
line, except to note the following: 
i) In 1998/99, the rate of extreme poverty in Accra was less than two percent, 
whilst the corresponding rate for Rural Savannah was almost sixty percent (see 
GSS, 2000c). 
ii)  In each of GLSS3 and GLSS4, more than eighty-five percent of all extremely 
poor individuals lived in rural areas (see GSS, 2000c). In this connection, we 
note that Seini et al. (1997) – using GLSS1 and GLSS2 data and poverty lines 
based on the minimum wage – found that roughly 85 percent of all extremely 
poor individuals lived in rural areas. 
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Table 1: Indices of poverty by location, 1991/1992; Poverty line = 900,000 cedis        
Poverty indices Contribution to 
national poverty 
 Population 
share (%) 
Average 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
P0 P1 P2 C0 C1 C2 
Accra 8.2 1,844.8 0.231 0.051 0.017 3.7 2.2 1.6 
Urban 
Coastal 
8.7 1,433.6 0.283 0.070 0.024 4.7 3.3 2.3 
Urban 
Forest 
11.0 1,618.9 0.258 0.064 0.022 5.5 3.8 2.8 
Urban 
Savannah 
5.3 1,321.2 0.378 0.136 0.069 3.9 3.9 4.2 
Rural 
Coastal 
14.2 1,085.5 0.525 0.161 0.067 14.4 12.3 10.8 
Rural 
Forest 
29.6 938.0 0.616 0.227 0.106 35.3 36.4 35.8 
Rural 
Savannah 
23.1 762.9 0.730 0.305 0.161 32.6 38.1 42.5 
All 100.0 1,130.8 0.517 0.185 0.088 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2000c). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Indices of poverty by location, 1998/1999; Poverty line = 900,000 cedis 
Poverty indices Contribution to 
national poverty 
 Population 
share (%) 
Average 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
P0 P1 P2 C0 C1 C2 
Accra 8.8 2,468.5 0.038 0.008 0.002 0.8 0.5 0.3 
Urban 
Coastal 
7.8 1,769.9 0.242 0.070 0.028 4.8 3.9 3.4 
Urban 
Forest 
11.8 2,005.0 0.182 0.051 0.020 5.4 4.3 3.6 
Urban 
Savannah 
4.8 1,191.6 0.430 0.114 0.042 5.2 4.0 3.1 
Rural 
Coastal 
14.6 1,248.3 0.452 0.141 0.061 16.7 14.8 13.3 
Rural 
Forest 
31.6 1,297.9 0.380 0.107 0.044 30.4 24.4 20.8 
Rural 
Savannah 
20.6 826.8 0.700 0.323 0.178 36.6 48.0 55.5 
All 100.0 1,412.1 0.395 0.139 0.066 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2000c). 
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2.3.2 Poverty correlates 
 
Obtaining information about the characteristics of the poor is, obviously, very important. 
Apart from helping to determine causes and consequences of poverty, it has relevance for 
the formulation of effective poverty-reducing policies. Despite the fact that determining 
the direction of causality is often difficult, it is reasonable to presume that there is usually a 
two-way causality. Due mainly to the availability of data from the various GLSS waves, 
several studies on Ghana’s poverty have highlighted the main poverty characteristics or 
correlates. These correlates relate to the following, amongst others: 
i) Access to (and utilisation of) basic needs such as health care, education, 
potable water, and toilet facilities 
ii) Health status 
iii) Educational status 
iv) Access to electricity 
v) Household asset ownership 
vi) Household size and economic dependency 
 
This section reviews knowledge available in the literature on the characteristics of the poor 
in Ghana. Some of these studies are based mainly on cross tabulations computed from 
GLSS data (see Boateng et al., 1992; GSS, 1995; and Appiah, Demery, and Laryea-Adjei, 
2000). Other studies, however, employ regression analyses to help determine the relative 
importance of these correlates (see Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997; and Coulombe and 
McKay, 2003). Useful insights have also been offered on poverty correlates by qualitative 
studies (see Norton et al., 1995; and Narayan et al., 1999). While this sub-section does not 
provide definite answers regarding the causes and consequences of poverty in Ghana, it 
does present useful findings from the literature that shed light on factors associated with 
poverty. 
 
According to GLSS4, in the urban areas of Ghana, 57.8 percent of the very poor
8
 did not 
make any health-related consultation when ill or injured, whilst the corresponding 
proportions amongst the poor and the non-poor were 59 percent and 44.1 percent, 
respectively (see Table 3). A similar result was found for the rural areas; amongst the very 
                                                 
8
 The “very poor” refers to persons lying below the lower poverty line, whilst the “poor” refers to those 
below the upper poverty line. 
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poor, only 35 percent made some form of consultation when ill or injured, with the 
respective proportions for the poor and non-poor being 38 percent and 42.9 percent (see 
Table 4). These results suggests that, compared to the non-poor, individuals who are poor 
(including the very poor) are less likely to consult a doctor, nurse, pharmacist, or some 
other health care provider when ill or injured. 
 
 
  
Table 3: Type of health personnel consulted by ill or injured individuals in urban 
areas, 1998/1999 
 Poverty status 
 Very poor Poor Non-poor All 
Doctor 21.1 15.8 37.2 33.9 
Nurse/midwife 7.7 10.5 4.8 5.5 
Medical 
Assistant 
4.1 6.4 3.1 3.4 
Pharmacist 3.0 0.9 6.9 6.0 
Other 6.2 7.5 4.0 4.5 
Did not 
consult 
57.8 59.0 44.1 46.6 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: “Very poor” correspond to those lying below the extreme poverty line, “poor” to those below the 
poverty line but above the extreme poverty line, and “non-poor” to those above the poverty line 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2000c). 
 
 
 
Table 4: Type of health personnel consulted by ill or injured individuals in rural 
areas, 1998/1999 
 Poverty status 
 Very poor Poor Non-poor All 
Doctor 7.4 12.6 17.8 14.0 
Nurse/midwife 7.6 12.2 8.9 9.0 
Medical 
Assistant 
12.3 8.5 7.9 9.3 
Pharmacist 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.1 
Other 6.8 4.0 6.9 6.5 
Did not 
consult 
65.0 62.0 57.1 60.2 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: “Very poor” correspond to those lying below the extreme poverty line, “poor” to those below the 
poverty line but above the extreme poverty line, and “non-poor” to those above the poverty line 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2000c). 
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A survey
9
 conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service in 1997 throws further light on 
health status patterns in Ghana. Some selected results from the survey are shown in Table 
5 and Table 6. Of those surveyed, 1.0 percent suffered from some form of physical or 
mental handicap. For rural Ghana, the percentage of the surveyed population that were 
physically or mentally handicapped was 1.1 percent; the corresponding proportion for the 
urban sector was 0.9 percent. Within the lowest quintile of the rural sector, 1.5 percent of 
the population were physically or mentally handicapped, whilst the richest quintile of the 
rural sector had 1.0 percent of the population suffering from physical or mental handicap. 
The distributional pattern of physical or mental disability in urban areas lend further 
support to the view that the health status of the poor, on the whole, tend to be lower than 
that of the non-poor. Amongst the urban lowest quintile, 1.6 percent of the population are 
physically or mentally challenged, but within the fourth and fifth quintiles, the 
corresponding proportions are 0.4 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively. Although these 
statistics do not provide unambiguous conclusions about causality, they suggest, that 
compared to the non-poor, the poor are more likely to suffer physical and/or mental 
disability; this might result from their inability to access appropriate nutrition and health 
care. The statistics additionally suggest that the physically or mentally disabled are more 
prone to being poor, ceteris paribus. 
 
The time taken to reach the nearest health facility is an important health-related index. 
Clearly, in many critical illnesses or injuries, the time taken to reach a health facility can 
be crucial in determining the survival or otherwise of the patient. Even for less serious 
illnesses or injuries, the time taken to reach the nearest health facility can discourage the 
ill/injured from seeking appropriate medical care, and this can have long-term negative 
consequences. According to GSS (1998), for 47.1 percent of all persons surveyed, the 
nearest health facility is more than thirty minutes away; within the rural and urban 
sectors, the proportions of persons who lived more than thirty minutes from the closest 
health facility were 61.4 percent and 19.6 percent, respectively. These statistics reflect 
the disadvantaged position of rural – relative to the urban – dwellers in terms of access 
to health care. An examination of similar statistics for poverty quintile groups within 
rural and urban sectors is insightful. Amongst the urban population surveyed, the 
proportions of the poorest and next poorest quintiles that live within thirty minutes of 
                                                 
9
 The Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) Survey. 
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the nearest health facility are, respectively, 70.6 percent and 73.5 percent. The 
equivalent proportions for the fourth and fifth quintiles are 87.5 percent and 90.3 
percent, respectively. For the rural surveyed population, however, 48.7 percent of 
persons within the richest quintile are located within thirty minutes of the closest health 
facility, with the corresponding proportion for the lowest quintile being as low as 30 
percent. An important message emerges from these figures; relative to the non-poor, 
poor individuals tend to face higher prices for health care when time cost is taken into 
account. 
 
 
Table 5: Selected health-related indicators (%) for rural Ghana, 1997 
Poverty quintile Indicator National Rural 
All 1 2 3 4 5 
Physically 
or mentally 
handicapped 
1.0 1.1 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.0 
Nearest 
heath 
facility 
more than 
30 minutes 
away 
47.1 61.4 70.0 66.9 62.7 56.2 51.3 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (1998) 
 
 
 
Table 6: Selected health-related indicators (%) for urban Ghana, 1997 
Poverty quintile Indicator National Urban 
All 1 2 3 4 5 
Physically 
or mentally 
handicapped 
1.0 0.9 1.6 1.4 0.7 0.4 0.2 
Nearest 
heath 
facility 
more than 
30 minutes 
away 
47.1 19.6 29.4 26.5 20.2 12.5 9.7 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (1998) 
 
 
 36 
We now take a look at the pattern of child
10
 nutritional status. According to the 1998 
and 2003 Ghana Demographic and Health Surveys (GDHS), the nutritional status of 
rural children – as measured by the incidence of stunting
11
, wasting
12
, and 
underweight
13
 children – lags behind that of the urban sector. With each of the three 
measures of child malnourishment, and in both 1998 and 2003, the urban sector fared 
better than the rural (see Table 7). In 1998, for example, the urban incidence of stunting 
was 14.3 percent, whilst the rural rate was 29.7 percent. On the whole, the rural-urban 
disparities in child nutritional status are somewhat most pronounced in respect of 
stunting. 
 
Table 7: Child nutritional status; 1998 and 2003 
 
 
1998 
 
Incidence (%) of 
stunting 
 
Incidence (%) of 
wasting 
Incidence (%) of 
underweight 
children 
National 25.9 9.5 24.9 
Urban 14.3 6.5 15.6 
Rural 29.7 10.5 27.9 
2003    
National 29.9 7.1 22.1 
Urban 20.5 6.6 15.4 
Rural 34.5 7.4 25.4 
Source: The 1998 and 2003 Ghana Demographic and Health Surveys (GDHS) 
 
Between 1998 and 2003, stunting incidence worsened at all levels (that is, national, 
urban, and rural), whereas the incidence of wasting registered improvements at the 
national and rural levels, but remained virtually unchanged at the urban level (see Table 
7). With respect to the proportion of children who were underweight, there were modest 
gains – between 1998 and 2003 – at the national, urban, and rural levels. It is significant 
to note also, that on the whole, the 2003 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey shows 
a general trend of worsening incidence of child malnourishment as one moves from the 
richest wealth quintile to the poorest. For example, the 2003 national stunting incidence 
                                                 
10
 This refers to those less than five years old. 
11
 A stunted child is one whose height-for-age index is more than two standard deviations below the 
median of an international reference population. 
12
 A wasted child is one with a weight-for-height score in excess of two standard deviations below the 
median for the reference population. 
13
 A child is described as underweight if his/her weight-for-age index is less than the median of the 
reference population by more than two standard deviations. 
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for the richest to the lowest wealth quintiles are 13.2 percent, 24.2 percent, 30.2 percent, 
31.5 percent, and 41.8 percent, respectively (GSS, NMIMR, and ORC Macro 2004). 
 
Sahn and Stifel (2002) have noted that of the three indicators of child nutritional status, 
stunting proxies best the standard of living. They argue, that unlike the other indicators 
of child nutritional status, the incidence of stunting is a long-term indicator of child 
nutritional well-being or health, and is unaffected by acute short-term bouts of 
illness/stress occurring close to the time of measurement. In the light of this 
observation, Ghana’s rural-urban disparities in stunting incidence and the worsening of 
stunting incidence at all levels (between 1997 and 2003) assume greater importance. 
 
The poor in Ghana are also often characterised by relatively low levels of education. As 
noted by Glewwe and Twum-Baah (1991), poor households tend to be headed by 
people with no (or very little) formal education. Boateng et al. (1992) also found very 
low literacy rates among the poor and in the rural sector. Even though the study did not 
identify a clear direction of causality between educational level and poverty, it notes 
that, “… a vicious circle may be in operation. Individuals without education are only 
able to obtain low wages and are thus more likely to be poor; such households may then 
be less likely to send their children to school, or will send them for shorter periods, 
compared with the average household because of the high monetary and opportunity 
costs involved" (Boateng et al. 1992, p.55). 
 
The link between education and poverty is further supported by data from the 1997 
survey by GSS (1998). Within the rural communities surveyed, the literacy rate
14
 
amongst the fourth and topmost quintile were 47.5 percent and 62.1 percent, 
respectively, whereas the rate amongst the poorest quintile was less than 24 percent (see 
Table 8Table 8: Selected education-related indicators (%) for rural Ghana, 1997Figure 
8). In the urban sector, although higher literacy rates are observed, the pattern of 
disparity amongst quintiles is similar; 85 percent of persons within the richest quintile 
were literate, but the literacy rate amongst the lowest quintile was 40.3 percent (see 
                                                 
14
 This was the rate for persons more than fifteen years old. 
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Table 9). Other education-related statistics are also illuminating. In both rural and urban 
sectors, there is an inverse association between education-related remoteness and 
welfare; the proportion of persons who live more than 30 minutes from the nearest 
primary or secondary school increases as the welfare level – as proxied by the poverty 
quintile – falls. The strong correlation of poverty in Ghana with low levels of education 
has also been given credence by multivariate studies. For example, in employing 
regression analyses to establish the relative importance of poverty correlates in Ghana, 
Coulombe and McKay (2003) found education to be one of the most significant 
correlates. Furthermore, in a logit model analysis of poverty in Ghana, Asenso-Okyere 
et al. (1997) found the educational level of the household head to be inversely related to 
the odds of being poor. 
 
 
Table 8: Selected education-related indicators (%) for rural Ghana, 1997 
Poverty quintile Indicator National  Rural 
All 1 2 3 4 5 
Literacy 
rate (>15 
years) 
47.9 39.9 23.7 29.5 37.5 47.5 62.1 
Nearest 
primary 
school 
more than 
30 
minutes 
away 
7.9 10.4 14.3 12.6 10.3 8.8 5.9 
Nearest 
secondary 
school 
more than 
30 
minutes 
away 
65.2 77.4 85.5 81.1 77.5 74.2 68.8 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (1998) 
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Table 9: Selected education-related indicators (%) for urban Ghana, 1997 
Poverty quintile Indicator National  Urban 
All 1 2 3 4 5 
Literacy 
rate (>15 
years) 
47.9 63.0 40.3 51.4 63.3 73.5 85.0 
Nearest 
primary 
school 
more than 
30 
minutes 
away 
7.9 3.0 6.0 4.2 2.8 1.1 0.9 
Nearest 
secondary 
school 
more than 
30 
minutes 
away 
65.2 41.5 56.9 49.8 40.3 33.5 27.3 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (1998) 
 
 
Another major characteristic of the poor in Ghana is low access to assets and amenities. 
This is also evident from both quantitative and qualitative studies. According to survey 
data collected in 1997 (GSS, 1998), the proportion of persons in urban communities who 
use electricity for lighting is 78.4 percent, whereas in the rural sector, the proportion is 
only 15.5 percent. Within both rural and urban sectors, richer welfare quintiles tend to have 
higher proportions of persons who use electricity for lighting. For example, in the rural 
sector, the incidence of usage of electricity for lighting amongst the richest quintile is 28.6 
percent, but for the lowest quintile, the proportion is 6.2 percent. In the urban sector, 58.2 
percent of the lowest quintile use electricity for lighting, whilst the corresponding 
proportion for the topmost quintile is 95.4 percent. 
 
On the basis of GLSS4, 37.8 percent of urban households have pipe-borne water in their 
houses, but the corresponding proportions for the poor and the very poor are roughly 15 
percent and 8 percent respectively (GSS, 2000c). Also, amongst the fourth and fifth 
quintiles in the urban sector, the proportions of households having pipe-borne water in 
their houses are roughly 29 percent and 47 percent respectively. For households within 
the lowest quintile, however, less than 10 percent live in houses with pipe-borne water 
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(see Table 10). In the rural sector, wells and natural sources constitute the main source 
of drinking water for most (about 78 percent of) households (GSS, 2000c). For the 
richest quintile in the rural sector, about 62 percent of households use wells or natural 
sources as the main source for drinking water. For the poorest and second quintiles in 
the rural sector however, the corresponding proportions are roughly 92 percent and 83 
percent, respectively. From Table 10 and Table 11, it is evident that rural-urban 
disparities in main sources of drinking water are wide. 
 
 
Table 10: Main source of drinking water of households by standard of living 
quintile – urban areas, 1998/99 
 Quintile Poverty status 
 1 2 3 4 5 Very 
poor 
Poor Non-
poor 
All 
Inside pipe 8.3 12.3 23.1 29.2 46.5 8.0 15.1 37.8 34.1 
Water vendor 0.8 1.7 2.7 7.5 8.5 1.0 1.7 7.3 6.4 
Neighbour/private 28.3 30.7 28.1 33.2 27.0 31.4 28.6 28.9 29.1 
Public standpipe 16.3 22.2 21.0 13.9 11.2 17.2 24.9 13.5 14.4 
Well 24.1 15.6 14.1 10.7 4.4 20.2 15.2 7.8 9.2 
Natural source 22.4 17.5 11.0 5.6 2.5 22.2 14.4 4.8 6.8 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2000c). 
 
Table 11: Main source of drinking water of households by standard of living 
quintile – rural areas, 1998/99 
 Quintile Poverty status 
 1 2 3 4 5 Very 
poor 
Poor Non-
poor 
All 
Inside pipe 0.6 0.8 3.1 4.0 8.6 0.7 0.7 5.2 3.4 
Water vendor 0.1 0.7 2.3 2.3 4.2 0.3 0.7 2.9 1.9 
Neighbour/private 1.7 2.5 3.7 6.8 12.5 1.7 3.0 7.6 5.4 
Public standpipe 5.8 12.9 9.1 15.3 13.0 7.1 13.7 12.4 11.1 
Well 59.2 44.2 41.9 37.0 30.8 55.7 44.1 36.6 42.7 
Natural source 32.5 38.9 39.9 34.6 30.9 34.6 37.8 35.3 35.4 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2000c). 
 
 
Other poverty correlates identified in the literature include low access to land and other 
assets, large household size, low educational attainment of household head, and – as 
reflected in the discussion of poverty patterns – residing in the rural and/or Savannah areas 
and being employed in the agriculture sector (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997; Seini et al., 
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1997; and GSS, 1995). It is important to note that the general picture painted by statistics 
on human development indicators, as well as other measures of welfare – such as assets 
ownership and access to key amenities – is supported by qualitative studies. For example, 
these studies strongly suggest that the poor often suffer complications in illnesses or even 
death
15
 mainly due to the distance from the nearest health facility or as a result of their 
inability to pay for the cost of health care (see, for example, Narayan et al., 2000). In 
general, by providing anecdotal accounts of the poor, qualitative Ghana welfare studies 
often highlight important aspects of welfare deprivation that are often difficult to capture in 
quantitative studies. It is evident from the qualitative studies that in many cases, the 
deprivation of the poor is acute and pervasive, making them vulnerable to being trapped in 
a cycle of chronic deprivation. 
 
2.3.3 Inter-temporal poverty comparisons 
 
Most (if not all) of the quantitative studies of poverty in Ghana carry out some form of 
poverty comparison. The comparisons are varied. These include inter-sectoral (already 
discussed), inter-temporal, and cross-country comparisons. On the whole, inter-
temporal comparisons outnumber the cross-country type. This is apparently due to the 
difficulty in obtaining suitable data for carrying out a cross-country welfare study. Most 
of the inter-temporal comparisons of poverty in Ghana cover the post-1986 era. This is 
partly because comprehensive data for this kind of national level analysis became 
available through the Ghana Living Standards Surveys. Additionally, earlier surveys 
were not comparable. 
 
Quantitative studies on poverty in Ghana unanimously report an increase in poverty 
incidence between 1987/88 and 1988/89, and a more-than-offsetting decline between 
1988/89 and 1991/92. For example, GSS (1995) found that, even though Ghana’s 
incidence of consumption poverty increased from 36.9 percent to 41.8 percent between 
1987/88 and 1988/89, the rate declined from 41.8 percent to 31.4
16
 percent between 
                                                 
15
 Kanbur and Mukherjee (2006) have pointed out that conventional aggregate measures of poverty fail to 
capture poverty-causing deaths, and that these deaths – all else being equal – even lead to a reduction in 
the index of poverty. This, obviously, is a limitation that needs to be addressed. 
16
 GSS (2000c) revised this rate of poverty incidence after improving the measurement of both the 
standard of living index and the poverty line.  
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1988/89 and 1991/92. GSS (1995) further reports that all the specified geographical zones 
– that is, Accra, Other Urban, Rural Coastal, Rural Forest, and Rural Savannah – 
experienced a worsening in the incidence of consumption poverty between 1987/88 and 
1988/89. Furthermore, there were increases in the depth and severity of poverty – 
nationally and across almost all localities – between 1987/88 and 1988/89. With the 
exception of Accra, all localities experienced a decline in the incidence of consumption 
poverty between 1988/89 and 1991/92 (Coulombe and McKay, 1995; and GSS, 1995). 
Furthermore, the depth and severity of poverty at the national level – and in all localities – 
declined between GLSS2 and GLSS3. 
 
According to GSS (2000c) and Aryeetey and McKay (2004), between 1991/92 and 
1998/99, the incidence of poverty dropped from 51.7 percent to 39.5 percent (see Table 
1 and Table 2). Aryeetey and McKay (2004) further note that this reduction in poverty 
incidence is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. An examination of 
disaggregated rates of poverty incidence between the two periods reveals non-uniform 
changes in consumption poverty. While some localities experienced small or moderate 
reductions in poverty incidence, poverty incidence worsened (by about 5 percentage 
points) in the Urban Savannah (see Table 1 and Table 2), despite this change lacking 
statistical significance (Aryeetey and McKay 2004). Localities that experienced the 
largest declines in poverty incidence are the Rural Forest (23.6 percentage points) and 
Accra (19.3 percentage points). With regard to changes in poverty incidence between 
1991/92 and 1998/99, Aryeetey and McKay (2004) have noted, that in addition to the 
statistically significant change at the national level, localities that registered statistically 
significant changes were Accra and the Rural Forest
17
. In view of the sizable sample 
share – on average, more than 30 percent – of the Rural Forest, the overall reduction in 
poverty incidence between 1991/92 and 1998/99 was considerably influenced by this 
locality’s improvement in consumption level. In terms of the depth of poverty, there 
was a reduction at the national level, and most localities registered an improvement. 
Similarly, there was an overall decline in the severity of poverty, even though the Rural 
Savannah and Urban Coastal zones experienced an increase – although not statistically 
significant (Aryeetey and McKay 2004) – in this index. 
 
                                                 
17
 In all three cases, the changes in poverty incidence were statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 43 
2.4 Welfare distribution 
 
Although findings from the Ghana poverty literature do provide some insight into the 
distribution of welfare between various population groups, these studies typically focus 
on identifying the poor and measuring the extent of poverty. As a result, little emphasis 
(if any) is placed on the overall distribution of welfare. Whilst relatively few Ghana-
specific studies explore the distribution of welfare, some significant attempts have been 
made in this direction (see, for example, Canagarajah et al., 1998; and Coulombe and 
McKay, 2003). 
 
An important element of some of the Ghana welfare studies is the attempt to explore 
linkages between inequality and poverty. Changes in welfare distribution have been 
analysed in the context of changes in poverty incidence across various population 
categories. Such attempts have employed aggregate indices of welfare distribution, such 
as the Gini coefficient and the generalised entropy class of inequality indices. These 
indices have been employed to investigate changes in overall welfare inequality, as well 
as within-group and between-group inequality changes. 
 
Using the entropy class of inequality measures and stochastic dominance, Canagaragah 
et al. (1998) found evidence for an overall improvement in inequality between 
1987/1988 and 1991/92. They note that poverty reduction over the period is attributable 
principally to improvements in average levels and the distribution of incomes in the 
informal and non-farm sectors in areas outside Accra. In an analysis of survey data for 
1991/92 and 1998/99, Coulombe and McKay (2003) suggest an increase in inequality at 
the lower end of the welfare distribution, and a possible reduction at the upper end. 
They also observe considerable variations in inequality changes across different 
ecological zones. Coulombe and McKay (2003) further note that in those areas (Accra 
and the Rural Forest) where poverty reduction was very apparent, inequality declined. 
For the rest of the country, however, no major changes in poverty were found, and 
inequality tended to rise. 
 
One other important finding of Canagaragah et al. (1998) relates to the influence of 
education on inequality. They argue that majority of the poor in Ghana are unable to 
attain educational levels beyond primary schooling. This, coupled with the very low 
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income return to primary education, results in the poor deriving fewer benefits (relative 
to the non-poor) from education. As a consequence, Canagaragah et al. (1998) note, that 
rather than reducing inequality, education increases it. On the whole, the findings of 
Canagaragah et al. (1998) and Coulombe and McKay (2003) suggest – at least, with 
reference to Ghana’s experience in the 1980s and 1990s – that major changes in the 
degree of welfare inequality do often occur at the lower end of the distribution. Given 
the potential link between education and rural-to-urban migration, it is very probable 
that rural-urban linkages have significant implications for the poverty-education-
inequality relationships. 
 
Even though an examination of within-group versus between-group inequality is 
dependent on the groupings employed, there are suggestions that Ghana’s welfare 
inequality is mainly driven by within-group variations (see, for example, Vanderpuye-
Orgle, 2002; and Sahn and Stifel, 2002). The importance of within-group inequality 
does not imply that between-group inequality is irrelevant, since small changes in 
between-group inequality can have a considerable impact on overall inequality. In the 
case of Ghana, Vanderpuye-Orgle (2002) has stressed the importance of between-group 
inequality by observing that variations in inequality levels – over the period 1987-1999 
– were mainly driven by changes in between-group (that is, the spatial component of) 
inequality. Vanderpuye-Orgle further finds evidence for an increase in 
polarization
18
over the period. 
 
2.5 Issues emerging from the qualitative studies 
 
Even though the quantitative studies’ depiction of Ghana’s poverty profile is largely 
mirrored by the qualitative ones, the two sets of studies are not always in agreement. A 
key area of disagreement is the direction of change in poverty over time, especially over 
the 1990s. Whilst the quantitative studies generally indicate a reduction in poverty 
incidence during the 1990s, the qualitative studies strongly suggest otherwise. What 
exactly accounts for this discrepancy is not easy to pinpoint. It does appear however, 
that the different methodologies of the two traditions – quantitative studies often 
employing objective welfare measures, whilst qualitative studies usually adopt 
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 Polarisation refers to the clustering of the welfare distribution, such that welfare levels are very similar 
within each cluster, but very different between any pair of clusters (see Zhang and Kanbur, 2001). 
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subjective measures of well-being – have a bearing on the conflicting results that 
sometimes emerge. Given that qualitative well-being studies are often carried out by 
non-economists, these studies offer insights that should complement knowledge gained 
from the quantitative studies (see Appleton and Booth, 2005). In what follows, we 
highlight some of the insights into Ghana’s living standards provided by qualitative 
poverty/welfare studies. 
 
Compared to the Ghana Living Standards Surveys, the surveys upon which qualitative 
welfare studies are based are usually less comprehensive in coverage. This 
notwithstanding, these studies provide rich insights into perspectives – of poor 
individuals, households, and communities – about poverty and their livelihoods, and 
invariably complement the information provided by the quantitative approaches. These 
participatory Ghana poverty studies emphasise the point that poverty is multi-faceted 
and defies easy conceptualisation. They further show that although Ghana’s poverty is 
widespread, it is more concentrated in the northern part of the country. For instance, in 
her study of local poverty and wealth inequality of the Upper East Region of northern 
Ghana, Whitehead (2006, p.296) notes: 
“In Ghana’s Upper East, where levels of well-being are shockingly low and 
levels of poverty exceedingly high, poverty was persistent for a large proportion 
of households, with only a small minority having enough resources ‘to solve 
their problems’ and to invest.” 
 
A key message from the qualitative studies is that poverty reflects food and material 
deprivation, vulnerability to ill health and death, insecurity, lack of assets, humiliation, 
social marginalisation, and powerlessness (Kunfaa, Lambongang, Dogbe, and Mackay, 
1999; Narayan et al., 1999; and Norton et al., 1995). In their three-phase study of fifteen 
Ghanaian communities, Norton et al. (1995) used qualitative and participatory research 
methods to explore perceptions of poverty and vulnerability, as well as factors that 
underpin poverty in Ghana. The study links the poorest members of communities to 
factors such as disability, age coupled with the lack of adult children, widowhood and 
childlessness. The sentiment expressed below by a group of men at Beo Tankou (as 
reported by Norton et al. 1995, pp. 27-28) illustrates the multidimensional nature of 
poverty in Ghana: 
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“Most of us have no money or food and nothing to sell for money. That is why 
death is so rampant in this village. Take the death of this small boy this morning 
for example, the boy died of measles. We all know he could have been cured at 
the hospital. But the parents had no money and so the boy died a slow and 
painful death not out of measles but out of poverty”. 
 
Locality and gender influences have also been identified in the perceptions of poverty, 
as well as in the priority needs of the poor. Narayan et al. (1999) observe a tendency for 
women to define poverty in terms of food insecurity, whereas for men, poverty is linked 
to material asset deprivation. According to Norton et al. (1995), rural communities 
attach more importance to community level assets than urban communities. They 
identify the priority needs of rural communities – as perceived by the communities 
themselves – as including food security, access to health care and education, supply of 
water (for both consumption and production), access to credit, and improvements in 
transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the concerns of urban communities 
include lack of adequate employment opportunities, availability of small enterprise 
credit, poor water supply and inadequate infrastructure. Rural communities, according 
to Kunfaa et al. (1999), are more concerned about food security, ownership of assets 
(including wives and children), and disability, whilst urban dwellers focus on issues 
such as lack of employment opportunities, housing, social service provision, access to 
capital, and skills acquisition. 
 
The relatively more intense poverty in the Rural North is a theme that emerges strongly 
in Kunfaa et al. (1999) and Norton et al. (1995). Kunfaa et al. found more severe 
poverty in their three Northern Savannah study sites than in the others. Norton et al. also 
identified the incidence and depth of poverty to be highest in the rural north, where 
seasonal chronic food deprivation – especially in the Upper West and Upper East 
Regions and often affecting entire communities – was also observed. Kunfaa et al. 
(1999) suggest that the geographical pattern of Ghana’s poverty could be traced to 
ecological and political factors. On the whole, contrary to the message from the 
quantitative studies, the qualitative literature suggests poverty has probably not 
decreased in recent years. It should be noted though that direct comparisons of the 
quantitative literature with the qualitative studies should be done with care. This is 
mainly because the qualitative studies were relatively limited in coverage. Furthermore, 
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with respect to the qualitative literature, it is often difficult to identify the specific time 
horizon over which any comparisons of well-being are being made. 
 
On the subject of the survival and coping strategies employed by the poor, the 
qualitative welfare literature offers extensive insight – such as an enhanced highlighting 
of welfare dynamics – often lacking in quantitative studies. According to Norton et al. 
(1995) and Kunfaa, Dogbe, MacKay, and Marshall (2002), survival and coping strategies 
employed by Ghana’s poor include the following: 
(i) Selling off assets, such as livestock 
(ii) Gathering and selling firewood 
(iii) Burning and selling charcoal 
(iv) Withdrawal of children from school 
(v) Depending on social networks, such as collecting loans/remittances from friends and 
relatives who have migrated 
(vi) Migrating in search of employment 
(vii) Offering labour to other farmers 
(viii) Deceit, fraud, begging, or some other socially demeaning activity. 
Whilst there are some commonalities in strategies between rural and urban dwellers, 
some differences are evident. As observed by Norton et al. (1995), not all coping 
strategies are available to both rural and urban dwellers. For example, whilst rural 
residents are often able to fall on the environment (such as chopping and selling 
firewood) –with its attendant consequences for future livelihoods – in times of need, 
urban dwellers typically do not have access to such resources. Furthermore, whilst these 
coping strategies vary in their sustainability, on the whole, their long-run sustainability 
is doubtful. It is worth noting also that other poverty-related issues have emerged in the 
qualitative studies. These include the incidence of street children (Anarfi, 1998), rural-
to-urban migration of children (Beauchemin, Baffoe, and Avevor, 1999), and food 
insecurity and malnutrition (International Food Policy Research Institute, 2002), issues 
that will not be given further discussion at this point. 
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2.6 Summary 
 
The literature on Ghana’s poverty and welfare is dominated by poverty studies, with the 
quantitative studies often measuring aggregate poverty in terms of consumption 
expenditure. Other aspects of well-being, such as insecurity of livelihoods, and the 
diversity of coping strategies are given prominence in the qualitative literature. 
Notwithstanding the focus on consumption poverty in the computation of aggregate 
welfare indices, the multidimensional nature of welfare is recognised in both 
quantitative and qualitative studies.  
 
Despite the widespread nature of Ghana’s poverty, the literature makes a strong case for 
the view that rural poverty is considerably higher than urban poverty. It has also been 
observed that poverty is more intense in Northern Ghana than in other parts of the country. 
This is supported by both quantitative and qualitative studies. A pattern of a 
disproportionate overrepresentation of farmers (especially food crop farmers) among the 
poor has also been noted. Other poverty correlates identified in the literature include 
inadequate access to health care and education, lack of assets and amenities, large 
household size, and low educational attainment of household head. Even though the 
quantitative studies indicate an overall decline in poverty incidence in the 1990s, this 
does not emerge clearly from the qualitative literature. The questionable long-run 
sustainability of the identified poverty coping strategies has been noted. 
 
The literature on welfare distribution provides evidence to suggest the existence of 
considerable diversity in inequality changes across different segments of the population. 
Support has also been found for a link between poverty reduction and improvements in 
welfare distribution. Besides highlighting the importance of both within-group and 
between-group inequality in Ghana, the literature finds evidence for a possible major 
role for inequality changes at the lower end of the welfare distribution. 
 
Although the Ghana poverty-welfare literature has covered considerable grounds, there 
are still a number of issues that have not yet been thoroughly addressed. One of these 
relates to an explanation of the rural-urban welfare disparities. Are these differences 
likely to narrow over time? Are there factors that tend to entrench these disparities? 
What are the prospects for bridging the gap? What are the relative impacts of the 
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various forms of rural-urban linkages on welfare? To what extent can migration and 
remittance flows between rural and urban areas alleviate poverty in the two sectors? 
Even though the welfare literature on Ghana is not completely silent on these issues
19
, 
many of the questions raised have received very little attention so far. Some of these 
questions will be addressed in the present study. 
                                                 
19
 As noted earlier, the literature review in this chapter was intentionally confined to the more basic issues 
about poverty and welfare. 
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Chapter Three:  
Ghana’s Rural-Urban Welfare Disparities
20
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter takes a look at the evolution of welfare in Ghana, focusing on the nature of 
rural-urban welfare disparities, and the factors that underpin these. The motivation for 
such an exercise is informed by the strong connection between these welfare disparities 
and the various linkages between rural and urban sectors. Focusing mainly on the 
period, 1991-1999, the chapter specifically aims to: 
i. Highlight some aspects of Ghana’s welfare distribution in the 1990s; 
ii. Present a picture of patterns, differences, and changes in welfare between 
Ghana’s rural and urban areas; 
iii. Identify the major influences on the evolution of Ghana’s rural-urban 
welfare; and 
iv. Explore the prospects for improving the rural-urban welfare patterns. 
 
The next section presents a compilation of information about rural-urban welfare 
patterns, whilst the third section discusses plausible explanations for – and prospects for 
improving – the observed rural-urban welfare patterns. The fourth section concludes the 
chapter. 
 
3.2 Rural-urban welfare patterns 
 
This section presents information on welfare patterns in rural and urban areas, focusing 
on the period, 1990 - 2004. The section discusses welfare patterns on the basis of both 
consumption welfare and other welfare indicators. All references to poverty incidence 
are based on a poverty line of 900,000 cedis per adult equivalent per annum, measured 
in Accra January 1999 prices. 
 
                                                 
20
 This chapter is based on Boakye-Yiadom (2004), a paper presented at the International Conference on 
Ghana’s Economy at the Half Century. Comments by the Conference participants are highly appreciated. 
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3.2.1 Consumption welfare 
 
A useful starting point is a look at changes in consumption welfare levels between 
1991/92 and 1998/99. Table 12 shows the increase in mean consumption welfare 
between the two survey periods on the basis of rural-urban ecological zones. With the 
exception of the Urban Savannah zone, all rural-urban ecological zones registered 
increases in mean consumption welfare, with the largest percentage increase (38.4) 
occurring in the Rural Forest zone. As suggested by Coulombe and McKay (2003), the 
Rural Forest’s remarkable increase in average consumption welfare is attributable to a 
favourable cocoa sector performance. The lowest percentage change in mean welfare 
was –9.8, and it was registered by the Urban Savannah. 
 
 
Table 12: Changes in mean consumption welfare between 1991/92 and 1998/99, by 
rural-urban ecological zone 
 Urban; 
absolute 
change (in 
cedis) 
Urban; 
percentage 
change 
Rural; absolute 
change (in 
cedis) 
Rural; 
percentage 
change 
Coastal 506,770.7 31.03 162,882.1 15.01 
Forest 386,095.1 23.85 359,909 38.37 
Savannah -129,576 -9.81 63,906.15  8.38 
Source: computed using data from GLSS3 and GLSS4. 
 
 
With regard to average consumption welfare, the Coastal zone had the highest in both 
rural and urban areas in 1991/92, with the Forest and Savannah zones following in that 
order (see Figure 7 in the Appendix to this chapter). In 1998/99 the Coastal zone again 
registered the highest average consumption welfare in the urban sector, whilst the Forest 
zone achieved the highest in the rural sector and the Savannah zone recorded the lowest 
in both urban and rural sectors (see Figure 8 in the Appendix). In 1991/92, the highest 
urban-rural welfare gap (measured as urban average welfare less rural average welfare) 
was found in the Forest zone, with the Coastal zone registering the lowest (see Figure 9 
in the Appendix). In 1998/99, however, the lowest urban-rural welfare gap was in the 
Savannah zone, and the highest was found in the Coastal zone. Between 1991/92 and 
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1998/99, the urban-rural welfare gap increased in both the Coastal and Forest zones, but 
fell in the Savannah zone. These statistics show that even though there is no consistent 
pattern in the relative magnitudes of consumption welfare across ecological zones, the 
rural-urban differences in these measures are important. 
 
Expressing rural welfare as a percentage of urban welfare, the biggest rural-urban 
welfare gap (42.3 percentage points)
21
 in 1991/92 was registered in the Savannah zone, 
and the lowest (33.5 percentage points) was recorded in the Coastal zone (see Figure 2). 
In 1998/99, the order was reversed; the Coastal zone had the largest gap (41.7 
percentage points), whereas the smallest gap (30.6 percentage points) was found in the 
Savannah zone. Thus, in terms of percentage point gaps, the rural-urban welfare gap 
reduced – between 1991/92 and 1998/99 – in both the Forest and Savannah zones, but 
increased in the Coastal zone. 
 
                                                 
21
 That is, rural welfare was 57.7 percent of urban welfare. 
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Figure 2: Rural welfare as a percentage of urban welfare 
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The rural-urban disparity in consumption welfare is further evidenced by the proportion 
of rural versus urban residents represented in the national consumption welfare 
quintiles. Included in the poorest 20 percent of the population in 1991/92, were 27 
percent of the rural population, and only 12 percent of the latter were amongst the 
richest 20 percent of the national population (see Figure 3). On the other hand, only 5 
percent of the urban population were amongst the poorest 20 percent of the national 
population. Amongst the richest 20 percent of the national population were 37 percent 
of the urban population. This pattern was repeated in 1998/99. In fact, as shown in 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3, higher national quintiles were associated with declining proportions 
of the rural population, and with increasing proportions of the urban population. 
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Figure 3: Rural-urban representation in national welfare quintiles; 1991/92 
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Figure 4: Rural-urban representation in national welfare quintiles; 1998/99 
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In the context of Ghana’s consumption welfare, is relative welfare more important than 
absolute welfare? This is not an easy question to answer, since a case can be made for 
either. A focus on absolute welfare is likely to result in increased efforts at reducing 
absolute poverty, whereas a focus on relative welfare might lead to a greater emphasis 
on inequality reduction.  Given the level of poverty in Ghana, however, it is arguably 
better for policy makers to place more emphasis on increasing the absolute welfare of 
the poor, while not neglecting any concerns for inequality reduction. In any case, 
increasing the absolute welfare of the poor can often result in a decline in inequality. 
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3.2.2 Poverty incidence 
 
For any given ecological zone (i.e., Coastal, Forest, or Savannah), and in both 1991/92 
and 1998/99, rural consumption poverty incidence was higher than the urban incidence. 
In both 1991/92 and 1998/99, the Savannah zone had the highest consumption poverty 
incidence in each of rural and urban sectors. In 1991/92, the urban sector’s highest 
poverty incidence was 38 percent (registered in the Savannah zone), but the rural 
sector’s lowest poverty incidence was 53 percent (recorded in the Coastal zone). 
 
In terms of contributions to national poverty, the rural sector contributed more than the 
urban, irrespective of ecological zone or year. In 1991/92, even though the rural sector’s 
share of the population was 66.9 percent, its aggregate contribution to national poverty 
was 82.3 percent. Similarly, in spite of its 66.8 percent share of the national population 
in 1998/99, the rural sector’s contribution to national poverty was 77.7 percent. In each 
of 1991/92 and 1998/99, rural-urban disparities in contributions to national poverty 
were particularly severe in the Forest and Savannah zones; the rural sector’s 
contributions in each of these zones were consistently more than five times that of the 
urban sector. 
 
In 1991/92 the lowest rural-urban gap in poverty incidence was 27 percentage points, 
and it was registered in the Coastal zone, whereas the biggest gap (36 percentage points) 
was recorded in the Forest zone. In 1998/99, however, the pattern was reversed; the 
Forest zone registered the lowest rural-urban gap in poverty incidence (20 percentage 
points), and the highest gap (32 percentage points) was in the Coastal zone (see Figure 
5). These statistics partly reflect the remarkable fall in rural poverty incidence – from 
61.6 percent to 38.0 percent – that occurred over the period for the Forest ecological 
zone. Figure 5 further shows that between 1991/92 and 1998/99, the Forest and 
Savannah zones experienced a decline in the rural-urban poverty incidence gap, but the 
gap in the Coastal zone increased from 27 percentage points to 32 percentage points. 
The main message here is that, poverty incidence in the rural sector has consistently 
been markedly higher than the incidence in urban areas, regardless of ecological zone or 
survey period. The extent to which the gap in rural-urban poverty incidence has been 
bridged has, however, varied considerably across ecological zones. The favourable 
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cocoa sector performance in the latter period is one plausible reason for the observed 
pattern. 
 
 
Figure 5: Rural-urban gaps in poverty incidence in the 1990s (gap: percentage 
point difference between rural poverty incidence and urban poverty incidence) 
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3.2.3 Health and nutrition 
 
Infant and under-five mortality rates are useful indicators of access to healthcare. Using 
data collected over the period November 1998 – February 1999, Ghana Statistical 
Service (GSS) and Macro International Inc. (1999) found a clear disparity in these rates 
between rural and urban areas. In urban localities, the infant mortality rate was 43 
deaths per 1,000 live births, whilst the corresponding rural rate was 68 deaths per 1,000 
live births. With regard to under-five mortality, urban areas registered a rate of 77 
deaths per 1,000 births, and rural localities had a rate of 122 deaths per 1,000 live births. 
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Regarding the seeking of medical assistance when ill, most Ghanaians – whether 
residing in rural or urban areas – do not consult health personnel when ill or injured. As 
shown in the previous chapter, the consultation of doctors by the urban ill or injured is – 
in proportionate terms – higher than that of other health personnel. In rural localities, a 
sizable proportion (though not the majority) of those who consult health personnel do 
consult doctors. Relative to the urban areas, a smaller proportion of ill/injured 
individuals in rural areas consult doctors and pharmacists, whereas a higher proportion 
consult nurses, midwives, and medical assistants. 
 
Children’s nutritional status offers valuable insights into a society’s well being, and a 
standard method for capturing this is the use of anthropometric indicators. Table 13  
shows – for rural and urban localities – the proportions of children under-five who were 
malnourished during the 1998 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). The 
table shows the proportions of children who are stunted
22
, wasted
23
, or are 
underweight
24
. From the table, rates of malnourishment (and that of severe 
malnourishment) are consistently higher in rural localities than in urban areas. These 
strongly suggest that rural welfare lags behind that of urban residents. 
 
 
Table 13: Rates (%) of malnourishment
25
 and of severe malnourishment amongst 
children under five; 1998 (note: rates of severe malnourishment are in 
parentheses) 
 Height-for-age 
(Stunting) 
Weight-for-height 
(Wasting) 
Weight-for-age 
(Underweight) 
Urban 14.3 (4.8) 6.5 (0.7) 15.6 (2.6) 
Rural 29.7 (10.8) 10.5 (1.6) 27.9 (6.1) 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and Macro International Inc. (MI) (1999). 
                                                 
22
 A stunted child is one whose height-for-age index is more than two standard deviations below the 
median of an international reference population. 
23
 A wasted child is one with a weight-for-height score in excess of two standard deviations below the 
median for the reference population. 
24
 A child is described as underweight if his/her weight-for-age index is less than the median of the 
reference population by more than two standard deviations. 
25
 These include those who are severely malnourished. 
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3.2.4 Access to drinking water and toilet facilities 
 
According to the Ghana Statistical Service (2000c), potable water (that is, water from 
non-natural sources) was the main source of drinking water for just a little over half of 
rural residents in 1991/92, with more than half of those in the two lowest welfare 
quintiles using natural water sources (e.g. water from lakes, rivers, and rain water). In 
urban localities, a sizeable majority of residents (with the proportion rising with welfare 
quintile) had access to potable water. 
 
In 1998/99, there was a remarkable improvement in access to potable water in rural 
areas; about 65 percent of rural households had access to potable water, and at least 60 
percent of households in each quintile used potable water. Urban households also 
registered an improvement in access to potable water, but the change was less 
pronounced, ostensibly due to the relatively high level of access in 1991/92. 
 
Data from the third and fourth waves of the GLSS indicate that pit latrine was the main 
type of toilet facility used by rural households (GSS 2000c); the proportions of rural 
households using pit latrines as their main toilet facility were 61.2 percent and 45.3 
percent in 1991/92 and 1998/99, respectively. In urban localities, pit latrines were the 
main type of toilet facility for 29.6 percent of households in 1991/92, but by 1998/99, 
KVIPs
26
 had become the major type, with a 45.2 percentage usage. The proportion of 
urban households using KVIPs in 1991/92 was 12.6 percent. Between 1991/92 and 
1998/99, rural household usage of KVIPs also increased from 3.7 percent to 19.9 
percent. 
 
Both GLSS3 and GLSS4 report a wide rural-urban disparity in the usage of flush toilets. 
The proportions of rural and urban households using flush toilets in 1991/92 were 1.4 
percent and 17.6 percent, respectively. The corresponding proportions for 1998/99 were 
1.6 percent and 15.2 percent. 
 
                                                 
26
 KVIP is the abbreviation for Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pit latrine. 
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3.2.5 Education 
 
Data from the 2003 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (GDHS) consistently 
indicate higher school attendance ratios in urban areas, relative to those of rural 
localities (GSS, NMIMR, and ORC Macro, 2004). At the primary level, the urban net 
attendance ratio (NAR)
27
 was 68.3 percent, and the corresponding rural ratio was 55.8 
percent. The urban and rural gross attendance ratios (GAR)
28
 for primary schooling 
were 105.2 percent and 89.6 percent, respectively. The urban NAR and GAR at the 
secondary level were 45.1 percent and 52.6 percent respectively, whereas the 
corresponding rural ratios were 26.4 percent and 30.8 percent. 
 
In the light of the above, educational attainment in urban localities is expected to be 
higher than that of rural areas. According to the 2003 GDHS, 15.2 percent of urban 
males – aged six years and above – have no formal education, whilst the corresponding 
figure for the rural sector is 33.3 percent (see Table 14). A similar pattern is found 
amongst females; in urban areas, 25.9 percent of females had never had formal 
education, whereas rural females without formal education accounted for 46.8 percent 
of the female sample. Plausible reasons for the lack of formal education for some people 
include the inability to pay school-related fees, family pressures – such as parents 
engaging children with family farm or business activities, and truancy. These statistics 
provide further evidence in support of the prevalence of rural-urban welfare disparities 
in Ghana. It can also be seen from Table 14 that there is some gender gap in education. 
Factors accounting for this gap are largely cultural. In Ghana, partly because households 
are normally headed by males, the education of males traditionally takes precedence 
over that of females amongst many ethnic groups. Furthermore, the education of 
females – especially in rural areas – is often disrupted by pregnancy and/or early 
marriage. 
 
 
                                                 
27
 The NAR for primary schooling is the percentage of the primary school age (6-11 years) population 
that is attending primary school. An analogous definition applies to the NAR for secondary schooling, 
with the relevant age group being 12-18 years. 
28
 The GAR for primary schooling is the total population of students attending primary school – 
irrespective of age – expressed as a percentage of the official primary school-age population. Thus, the 
GAR can be greater than 100 percent. The GAR for secondary schooling has an analogous definition. 
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Table 14: Educational attainment (%) by rural-urban residence and gender 
 Urban males Rural males Urban 
females 
Rural 
females 
No education 15.2 33.3 25.9 46.8 
Some primary 25.5 31.4 22.5 27.8 
Completed 
primary
29
 
4.4 4.0 4.6 4.0 
Some secondary 38.1 26.9 38.1 19.5 
Completed 
secondary
30
 
9.7 2.5 5.8 0.9 
More than 
secondary 
6.6 1.5 2.8 0.6 
Don’t 
know/missing 
0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: GSS, NMIMR, and ORC Macro (2004). 
 
 
In an apparent contradiction of the above information, the 1997 Core Welfare Indicators 
Questionnaire (CWIQ) Survey data suggest there was little difference in net primary 
enrolment rates between rural (87.3 percent) and urban (89.6 percent) localities
31
. A 
plausible reason for this apparent contradiction is the possibility that many rural 
children do actually enrol in primary schooling, but drop out after a very short time, 
such as a few weeks. At the lower secondary level, a sizable rural-urban gap was 
registered in the net enrolment rate; the urban rate was 49.6 percent and the rural rate 
was 39 percent (see Figure 6). Rural-urban disparities are also evident in proximity to 
schools. Whereas three percent of urban primary school pupils require more than thirty 
minutes to reach the nearest school, the corresponding percentage for the rural sector is 
10.4. For 41.5 percent of urban secondary school students, the nearest school is more 
than thirty minutes away, whilst the corresponding rural proportion is 77.4 percent. 
                                                 
29
 Completed grade 6 at the primary level. 
30
 Completed grade 12 at the secondary level. 
31
 Whilst significant differences exist in the estimated enrolment rates available from the 1997 CWIQ 
survey, GLSS4, and the 2000 population and housing census (Coulombe and McKay, 2003), the rates 
provided here are plausible. 
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Figure 6: Selected education statistics; 1997 
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This section has provided an overview of Ghana’s rural-urban welfare patterns in the 
1990s and early 2000s, with a view to emphasise the welfare disparities between rural 
and urban residents. Whilst Ghana’s rural-urban welfare differences are not surprising – 
and are possibly lower than those in some African countries (Sahn and Stifel, 2003) – it 
is important to explore the forces underpinning these disparities, and to discuss the 
prospects for ameliorating them; the purpose of the next section. 
 
3.3 Factors underpinning (and prospects for improving) Ghana’s rural-urban 
welfare differences 
 
Any attempt at determining the key factors underlying Ghana’s rural-urban welfare 
differences must acknowledge the complexity of the potential factors, some of which 
are non-economic. In the discussion that follows, an attempt is made to garner insights 
into factors underlying the evolution of Ghana’s rural-urban welfare disparities. Whilst 
the focus is on establishing plausible factors underlying the welfare gap, prospects for 
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improving rural-urban welfare patterns are also examined. To facilitate the discussion, 
the following propositions are proffered: 
i) Ghana’s rural-urban welfare gap is caused (at least partly) by the 
concentration – in urban areas – of business and industrial activities, and is 
sustained by the resultant inequalities in education, access to healthcare, and 
basic amenities; 
ii) In the absence of a major policy shift to address this imbalance, there will be 
little change in the welfare gap. 
 
3.3.1 Concentration of business and industrial activities in urban areas 
 
One of the glaring features of economic life in Ghana is the concentration of business 
and industrial activities in urban centres, with this concentration being pronounced in 
cities like Accra, Kumasi, Tema, and Sekondi-Takoradi. Although economic factors 
underlie this concentration of business and industrial activities, other (such as 
geographic and political) factors are very important. 
 
Accra’s attraction as a commercial and industrial centre is linked to its being the 
country’s capital. As the fulcrum of national political power, Accra is the ultimate 
preference with regard to the location of the headquarters of major business or industrial 
establishments. As a result, government ministries, major financial institutions, 
parastatals, and multinational corporations have their main offices in Accra (Republic of 
Ghana, 1999). Owing to the generation of agglomeration economies, this concentration 
of corporate and business activity tends to be reinforcing. Tema, on the other hand, is 
the location of Ghana’s largest harbour; a factor that has played no mean a role in the 
setting up (in this city) of Ghana’s oil refinery, the Volta Aluminium Company 
(VALCO), and other major industrial establishments. Also worth emphasising is the 
fact that the coastal location of Tema, coupled with its proximity to the capital, must 
have influenced its selection as the site for the harbour in the first place. Accra’s capital 
status and Tema’s industrial character have generated – in these two cities – a relatively 
well-developed infrastructure, with its attendant positive externalities. Accra-Tema has 
consequently become the industrial and commercial hub of Ghana. It is not surprising 
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therefore, that despite being the smallest Region (in terms of land area), Greater Accra 
is Ghana’s second most populous Region. 
  
Being the capital of Ghana’s most populous Region (Ashanti), Kumasi’s importance as 
a major trading centre is understandable. Other factors have enhanced Kumasi’s appeal 
as a major commercial and industrial centre, notably its vast natural resources, its status 
as the seat of the prominent Asante kingdom and its central location that further makes 
it an essential economic link between northern Ghana and southern Ghana (especially 
Accra and Tema). Given the economic and political importance of Accra, Kumasi’s role 
as a link between northern Ghana and Accra assumes increased significance. It is worth 
mentioning also that commercial activities in Kumasi have further been boosted by the 
city’s tourist appeal. 
 
Sekondi-Takoradi has also been one of Ghana’s major cities for many years. It is the 
country’s third largest city and the capital of the Western Region. Apart from being 
home to Ghana’s oldest artificial harbour, this twin city lies on a railway network that 
links it to Accra and Kumasi. These features have enhanced the city’s attraction as a 
major industrial and trading centre. With the construction of a bigger harbour in Tema 
in 1962, Sekondi-Takoradi seems to have gradually lost some of its glamour as an 
industrial hub. The city nevertheless continues to play a crucial role in Ghana’s 
economy, since the Takoradi harbour is the main port for the country’s exports (Huq 
1989). The industrial and commercial appeal of Sekondi-Takoradi thus thrives on the 
cities’ links to Ghana’s export activities, which are quite significant. 
 
It should be stressed that the factors underlying the relative concentration of business 
activities in other urban centres largely mirror – albeit to a much lesser extent – the 
account given about Accra-Tema, Kumasi, and Sekondi-Takoradi. In a nutshell, 
economic, geographical, and socio-political factors have combined to concentrate 
industrial, commercial, and governmental activities in urban centres, with this 
concentration more pronounced in cities. As a result, there has been a tendency over the 
years for urban centres in general, and cities in particular, to attract many residents, 
especially persons with relatively high levels of educational attainments and/or wealth. 
As discussed shortly, urban centres’ monopoly over industrial and business activities 
has further contributed to the emergence of other rural-urban welfare inequalities. 
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3.3.2 Education-related inequalities 
 
In Ghana, there is a tendency for urban residents to have higher levels of education than 
rural residents. This is partly due to the fact that relative to jobs located in rural areas, 
urban jobs typically require higher educational attainments. As a result, there is the 
tendency for rural school leavers and educated members of the rural labour force to 
migrate to urban centres. Writing in the 1960s, Omaboe (1966) drew attention to this 
phenomenon. He noted: 
 “In Ghana ... there is a growing drift of labour from the rural areas to the urban 
centres. Unfortunately, the drift has been largely of the educated sections of the rural 
population. These have not found agricultural employment attractive either 
economically or socially and they have swarmed to the few urban centres to seek 
employment in white-collar jobs” (Omaboe 1966, p.26). 
 
It must be emphasised that the concentration in the urban centres of better-educated 
workers tends to result in other education-related inequalities between rural and urban 
localities. This is linked to the fact that better educated workers generally wield 
considerable economic, social, and political clout, compared to the less educated. As a 
result, urban residents tend to have an advantage in terms of the number, quality, and 
affordability of schools available. Moreover, the relative greater ability of urban 
residents to pay for better educational facilities contributes to the existence of these 
education-related disparities between rural and urban sectors. 
 
In his “model” of educational inequality, Farrell (1999) identified four categories of 
educational equality; equality of access, equality of survival, equality of output, and 
equality of outcome. This classification scheme is adopted in the discussion of Ghana’s 
rural-urban educational inequalities. The meanings of these concepts of equality (or 
inequality) – as used in the present study – are given below. 
 
Inequality of access refers to rural-urban disparities in the likelihood of an individual 
entering (a given level of) the school system. Inequality of survival relates to rural-
urban differences in the probability of staying in the school system to some specified 
 66 
level, such as to the end of a complete cycle (e.g. primary or secondary). Output 
inequality refers to rural-urban differences in knowledge gained by the end of a given 
stage of the school system. Inequality of outcome has to do with rural-urban disparities 
in living standards, subsequent to the completion of the same level of schooling. 
 
Ghana’s educational system has five levels, namely, Pre-school, Primary school, Junior 
Secondary School (JSS), Senior Secondary School (SSS), and the Tertiary level. The 
Primary and JSS levels are jointly classified as Basic Education. Pre-school education is 
available mainly in urban localities, and as a result, rural children are typically excluded 
from it. At the primary level, data from the 1997 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 
(CWIQ) Survey – shown earlier in Figure 6 – suggests there is very little inequality of 
access between rural and urban areas. However, as already noted, primary enrolment 
figures can be misleading owing to the possibility of many enrolled children dropping 
out after a few weeks, a possibility consistent with Table 14. 
 
Inequality of access at the JSS level is however pronounced, with the rural enrolment 
rate lagging behind that of the urban by more than 10 percentage points (see Figure 6).  
Indeed, it is expected that rural-urban access inequality will widen for higher levels of 
the schooling cycle. It has also been observed that many children in Ghana do not 
acquire education beyond the basic level (Penrose, 1998). Given the disadvantages 
faced by rural school children (in relation to their urban counterparts) such as, the time 
taken to reach nearest schools, it is very probable that survival inequalities at the 
primary, JSS, and SSS levels are high. 
 
Although accurate data on educational output inequalities are difficult to obtain, rural-
urban literacy rates can provide a rough indication of the extent of these inequalities. 
Data provided by the 2003 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey suggest that rural 
educational output is markedly lower than that of the urban; this should, however, be 
treated with caution owing to the fact that rural-to-urban migration is likely to 
exaggerate this type of inequality. It is common knowledge though that the quality of 
education in rural localities is significantly below that of urban areas. Urban schools 
tend to have better qualified teachers, owing – at least in part – to the unwillingness or 
reluctance of qualified teachers to accept postings to rural localities, an assertion 
supported by anecdotal evidence. The reluctance to accept postings to rural localities is 
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due mainly to many (or all) of the rural-urban disparities highlighted in this chapter, 
such as inequalities relating to basic amenities, healthcare, and education. Other areas of 
rural-urban disparities in schooling quality include availability of relevant textbooks, 
adequate furniture and other logistics. At this point, it is fairly obvious that a vicious 
cycle is at work. 
 
With regard to inequality in educational outcome, statistics are unavailable as far as can 
be ascertained. This is partly because numerous factors influence a person’s living 
standard and information which link income or expenditure to the locality of a person’s 
past education are difficult to obtain. Any assessment of this type of inequality will, at 
best, be speculative. 
 
It is important to mention that demand-side factors also play a role in the above 
education-related inequalities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the apparent low 
returns to primary schooling, coupled with the low incomes of many rural households, 
results in a situation where some rural household heads find the opportunity cost of 
formal education too high. 
 
3.3.3 Disparities in access to healthcare and basic amenities 
 
A key aspect of Ghana’s rural-urban disparities lies in the area of access to healthcare 
and basic amenities. The information already provided (in section 3.3) about 
malnourishment, infant and under-five mortality, accessibility to potable water, and the 
usage of toilet facilities attest to the extent of rural-urban inequalities in access to 
healthcare and basic amenities. It must be noted that there are “quantity” and “quality” 
dimensions to these inequalities. 
 
Many rural areas in Ghana lack adequate health personnel, such as doctors, nurses, and 
pharmacists. This is a perennial problem akin to the shortage of qualified teachers in 
rural localities. The irony of the problem is the cyclical nature. Health personnel are 
often unwilling to take up jobs in rural localities, a major reason ostensibly being the 
lack of basic amenities and good-quality schools (for their children). Many qualified 
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teachers are also unwilling to accept jobs in rural areas mainly because of the 
deprivations already highlighted. 
 
There are fairly obvious interrelationships amongst the various aspects of rural-urban 
welfare disparity. For example, GSS and MI (1999) found a strong inverse relationship 
between mothers’ education and infant and under-five mortality rates. They observe, 
“children born to mothers with little or no education suffer the highest mortality” (GSS 
and MI 1999, p.84). Furthermore, inadequate access to basic amenities, such as potable 
water and decent toilet facilities, leads to poor health, decreased productivity, and 
reduced educational outcomes. 
 
3.3.4 Synthesis of factors underlying the rural-urban welfare gap 
 
Living standards in Ghana are characterised by extensive rural-urban inequalities; 
welfare levels in rural localities are considerably lower than those of urban residents. It 
has been held that various self-perpetuating factors are key elements in this perennial 
welfare pattern. These include the concentration of business and industrial activities in 
urban centres and resultant disparities, such as, education-related inequalities, and gaps 
in access to healthcare and basic amenities. 
 
A key element in the evolution of Ghana’s rural-urban welfare gap is the concentration 
in urban centres of the educated and influential members of the population. This, in 
turn, is attributable to the nature of jobs in the urban sector and the urbanisation – at the 
national, regional, and district levels – of political power. Given the widely documented 
positive relationship between educational attainment and earnings or welfare (see, for 
example, Asenso-Okyere et al. 1997, and Coulombe and McKay 2003), the logical 
outcome of such a concentration of economic and political power in urban areas is the 
pervasive rural-urban disparities. Furthermore, inherent in the urban agglomeration of 
business and industrial activity (with its attendant increased population of the relatively 
well educated) are significant economies of scale and positive externalities that benefit 
various segments of the urban population. 
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The above discussion of factors underpinning Ghana’s rural-urban welfare gap is not 
offered as an exhaustive explanation of the complex interplay of forces. Whilst other 
explanations might be relevant, the factors highlighted can hardly be ignored in any 
analysis of Ghana’s rural-urban welfare differences. Indeed, the evolution of welfare in 
Ghana appears to reflect what Lipton (1977 and 1982) described as an urban bias: 
“Small, interlocking urban elites – comprising mainly businessmen, politicians, 
bureaucrats, trade-union leaders and a supporting staff of professionals, 
academics and intellectuals – can in a modern state substantially control the 
distribution of resources” (Lipton 1982, p.66). 
 
3.3.5 Prospects for improving the rural-urban welfare gap 
 
Given the widespread and perennial nature of Ghana’s rural-urban welfare gap, it is 
appropriate to explore prospects for improving it. It should be noted that rural dwellers 
do make various attempts to bridge this gap, especially through migration and its 
associated remittance flows. However, there is scope for supplementing these individual 
efforts through policy formulation and implementation. It is worth emphasising though, 
that any attempt to deal with these rural-urban disparities must be within a broad 
framework of policies to improve welfare (especially poverty reduction) within each of 
rural and urban areas. This is because to a large extent, Ghana’s rural and urban sectors 
are not dichotomous; they are a continuum. Moreover, there are diversities within each 
of these sectors, especially within the cities. For example, the standards of living in 
certain slums of Accra are likely to be considerably lower than welfare levels in certain 
rural localities. Apart from the fact that residents of major cities have been grappling 
with hazards of city life – such as overcrowding, traffic congestion, and crime – 
attention has been drawn to the increasing numbers of street children in Accra and other 
cities (see Beauchemin et al., 1999). It is critical to identify policies that would enhance 
opportunities for increased productivity and income generation in each of the two 
sectors. 
 
One effective means of narrowing the rural-urban gap is by enhancing spatial linkages 
between rural and urban localities. This can be accomplished partly by improving 
transportation networks between rural and urban areas and by providing information 
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relating to job/market prospects in either sector. This would have the effect of reducing 
transportation costs, improving trade links, and promoting technology transfer between 
the sectors. It can also increase the labour pool and the market size for several goods 
and services. The proximity – in time and space – of rural localities to urban centres 
can, thus, be mutually beneficial to both rural and urban economies. 
 
The importance of education and access to healthcare – in narrowing the rural-urban 
gap – can hardly be overemphasised. It is essential to improve upon the current 
provision of infrastructure and basic amenities in the rural areas as an objective in itself, 
and as a means of reducing the unwillingness of health personnel and qualified teachers 
to accept postings in these localities. It should be noted that major improvements in the 
provision of infrastructure and basic amenities have the potential of setting in motion a 
series of disparity-reducing effects. Specific policies to establish special incentives for 
health personnel and teachers who are willing to accept jobs in rural areas will be 
particularly useful. It is also important to acknowledge the role of demand-side issues in 
addressing the highlighted disparities. It will be helpful to inculcate into the general 
populace – especially rural residents – the importance of formal education. This can be 
accomplished through various avenues such as the news media, traditional rulers, 
churches and other religious groups, and market associations. 
 
In a nutshell, even though improving the rural-urban welfare gap is feasible, it requires a 
concerted effort within a general policy framework of addressing welfare deprivations 
in each of rural and urban localities. Specific incentives to attract investment in rural 
areas – or in urban localities that are close to rural settlements – can have a highly 
beneficial impact on the rural-urban welfare gap. It is important to emphasise though 
that given Ghana’s significant budget constraints, these suggestions call for enormous 
political will owing to their political economy implications and challenges. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Welfare patterns in Ghana are characterised by pervasive rural-urban disparities, with 
the welfare of rural residents lagging behind that of their urban counterparts. This rural-
urban welfare gap is caused (at least partly) by the concentration – in urban areas – of 
business and industrial activities, and is sustained by the resultant inequalities in 
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education, access to healthcare, and basic amenities. These inequalities are self-
perpetuating and firmly entrenched. Thus, without a major policy shift to address the 
disparities, there will be little change in the welfare gap. 
 
In addressing the issues raised, some broad generalisations have been made about living 
standards in rural and urban areas. But as noted elsewhere in this study, there is 
considerable heterogeneity within each of Ghana’s rural and urban areas. For example, 
welfare differences exist between Rural Coastal residents and their Rural Savannah 
counterparts. Furthermore, there are significant pockets of slums in major urban centres, 
such as Accra and Kumasi.  
 
It has been observed that rural-urban welfare differences underpin various linkages 
between Ghana’s rural and urban sectors. Two major forms of these linkages are 
migration and remittance flows. One definite route through which these interactions can 
bridge the rural-urban welfare disparities is the extent to which they impact the welfare 
of participants. The welfare impacts of migration and remittance flows between Ghana’s 
rural and urban sectors are therefore worth exploring, and appropriately form the thrust 
of this study. As a prelude to the discussion of the data and methodological issues, a 
review of relevant literature on migration and remittances is carried out in the next 
chapter.
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Appendix to Chapter Three 
 
 
Figure 7: Rural-urban consumption welfare; 1991/92 
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Figure 8: Rural-urban consumption welfare; 1998/99 
1248.3
1297.9
826.8
2140.2
2005.0
1191.6
0.0
500.0
1000.0
1500.0
2000.0
2500.0
Coastal Forest Savannah
Ecological zone
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 w
e
lf
a
r
e
 (
'0
0
0
 c
e
d
is
)
Rural
Urban
 
 74 
Figure 9: Urban-rural welfare gap in the 1990s (gap: urban mean welfare less 
rural mean welfare) 
547.9
680.9
558.3
891.8
707.1
364.8
0.0
100.0
200.0
300.0
400.0
500.0
600.0
700.0
800.0
900.0
1000.0
Coastal Forest Savannah
Wefare gap ('000 cedis)
E
co
lo
g
ic
a
l 
z
o
n
e
1991/1992
1998/1999
 
 75 
Chapter Four:  
Migration and Remittances – A Review of Relevant 
Literature 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Migration and remittance flows are topics that have received considerable attention in 
the development literature for many years. Whilst each of these topics (especially 
migration) is sometimes studied independent of the other, many studies analyse 
remittances in the context of migration, presumably because of the widely-held notion 
that migrants are the main source of remittances. As noted in an earlier chapter, owing 
to the fact that migration and remittance flows are conceptually different phenomena, 
the present study analyses them separately, whilst identifying the strong links between 
the two. 
 
Over the years, the relevance of migration, the rationale for migrating, and the policy 
response to migration patterns and magnitudes have dominated academic and policy 
discussions. Migration-related policies have also been influenced significantly by the 
migration literature. In the 1950s and 1960s, conventional thinking was favourably 
disposed to rural-to-urban migration, since it reflected the economic justification for a 
redistribution of resources, in response to economic incentives. This view was reflected 
by Lewis’ (1954) model of economic development, a model that we revisit shortly. 
 
The 1970s and 1980s, however, witnessed a shift in the theoretical and policy 
perspectives on migration. The escalating problems posed by urbanisation in developing 
countries, coupled with the dominant influence of the Todaro (1969) and Harris-Todaro 
(1970) hypotheses significantly cast serious doubts on the merits of rural-to-urban 
migration. Currently, there seems to be a growing acknowledgement that migration is, 
in many cases, a key escape route out of poverty for many households in developing 
countries (see de Haan 1999). Even though rural-to-urban migration has often 
dominated discussions on migration, there is evidence to suggest that for many 
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developing countries, it is not the most prevalent form of internal migration, and that 
rural-to-rural migration is more common (see de Haan, 1999; and Lucas, 1997). 
 
The importance of remittances in developing countries has also featured prominently in 
academic and policy circles in recent years. Remittances often flow from migrants to 
relatives residing in migrants’ country or place of origin. This is especially 
characteristic of remittances sent by international migrants. Whilst internal migrants 
(especially, rural-to-urban) have been known to send remittances to relatives in areas of 
origin, the flow of remittances from non-migrants to migrants is not uncommon, often 
taking the form of the transfer of goods, such as foodstuffs. In Ghana, for example, 
visits from urban residents to relatives in the rural sector (or visits from rural dwellers to 
urban residents) are usually occasions for remittance flows in both directions; the urban 
residents usually give out money and other items, such as, canned food and clothing, 
whilst the rural residents typically give out foodstuffs. 
 
The sheer scale of remittance flows – in terms of their prevalence and the amounts 
involved – has attracted significant attention in recent times. There have been 
discussions relating to remittances’ capacity for becoming an important source of 
external development finance, as well as their potential role in bridging the investment-
saving gap in developing countries (see Ratha, 2005; and Buch, Kuckulenz, and Le 
Manchec, 2002). There have also been suggestions that remittances play a major role in 
enhancing the living standards of many households in developing countries (Adams and 
Page, 2005; and Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of relevant literature relating to 
these two important topics of migration and remittances. The remainder of the chapter is 
divided into two parts; the first part reviews the migration literature, whist the second 
focuses on the remittances literature. The discussions in each of the two parts are further 
split into two sections, namely a review of the general (that is, non-Ghana) literature and 
a survey of those studies with a Ghana focus. Furthermore, discussions relating to 
theoretical issues are generally separated from those dealing with empirical modelling. 
Nevertheless, where theoretical issues are discussed, a limited discussion of some 
empirical results is carried out in those cases where the extent of linkage between an 
empirical study and the theory justifies their being jointly discussed. Owing to the 
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microeconomic perspective of the present study, coupled with the vastness of the 
literature on migration and remittances, microeconomic studies will dominate the 
literature review. 
 
I. Review of relevant migration literature 
 
4.2 General migration literature 
 
4.2.1 Background 
 
Ever since the seminal work of Ravenstein (1885), numerous studies have been carried 
out into various facets of this pervasive phenomenon. The diversity of disciplinary 
perspectives – e.g., demography, economics, and geography – of the studies attests to 
the intriguing and complex nature of migration. Many of the migration studies attempt 
to address issues relating to migration patterns [for example, Ravenstein (1885); and 
Lee (1966)], the rationale for migration (see, e.g., Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; and 
Lucas and Stark, 1985), and the welfare impacts of these population movements (for 
example, Falaris, 1987; and Litchfield and Waddington, 2003). 
 
The dominant influence of economic factors in migration decisions has been a standard 
theme in the migration literature (see Lucas, 1997; and de Haan, 1999). In discussions 
about the causes of migration, “push”-“pull” factors have been widely acknowledged. 
The “push-pull” concept can be gleaned from the writings of Lee (1966). The basic idea 
of the “push”-“pull” hypothesis is that certain adverse factors (inherent in areas of 
origin) tend to “push” people away, whilst other favourable factors (associated with 
areas of destination) tend to “pull” potential migrants from their areas of origin to the 
destination regions. Within the “push”-“pull” paradigm, the typical areas of origin and 
destination are rural and urban localities, respectively.  
 
It is argued that rural dwellers are saddled with numerous “push” factors, such as 
unfavourable land-tenure arrangements, vagaries of the weather, high costs of 
agricultural inputs, and inadequate access to basic amenities, like potable water, toilet 
facilities, schools, and health centres. In short, widespread deprivation and poverty are 
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some of the major “push” elements. It should be noted that other “push” factors are non-
economic, such as, conflict and war. Clearly, people facing the described adverse 
conditions have a high inclination to migrate. “Pull” factors, on the other hand, include 
higher wages, good drinking water, adequate toilet facilities, other basic amenities, and 
the glamour of urban life. 
 
The issue of which of the two sets of factors – i.e., “push” and “pull” – is more relevant, 
is an empirical question. In practice, both sets of factors are often at play. In typical 
developing countries, such as Ghana, many people look out for opportunities to migrate 
in order to escape the deprivations of both rural and urban life. Whilst many rural 
dwellers explore opportunities to migrate to urban areas, urban residents often are eager 
to migrate to other countries, especially, Europe and North America. It is also not 
uncommon to find potential migrants planning to migrate in stages. For example, a rural 
dweller might initially migrate to a small town, settle there for a few years, and then 
migrate to a city. After living in the city for a few or several years, this individual might 
eventually migrate outside the country. In developing countries, there is usually the 
perception that one will be better off living in the city than in a rural area, and that 
living in Europe or North America is much better than making a living in the 
developing country. This perception is often strengthened through links or contacts with 
migrants; these links include visits, telephone conversations, and remittance flows. 
 
It is quite evident that the “push” – “pull” explanation of migration is quite general. 
Beyond this level of generality, there is no shortage of theories that attempt to explain 
migration. The next sub-section highlights key migration theories, with the expectation 
that they will provide an appropriate backdrop for the discussions in other sections of 
this chapter. 
 
4.2.2 Theories of the migration process and determinants 
 
In the mid-1950s, Arthur Lewis propounded a model that sought to place rural-to-urban 
migration at the very core of the development process. Cast in a classical resource 
allocation framework, Lewis (1954) established arguments that predicted and endorsed 
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the migration of surplus labour
32
 from the subsistence sector to an expanding capitalist 
sector. Whilst Lewis did not aim at propounding an explicit theory of migration, his 
model nevertheless, formed an important element of the paradigm that influenced 
economic and policy discourse on migration – especially, rural-to-urban – in the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
 
In his two-sector model, Lewis (1954) argued that rural-to-urban migration is the logical 
and desirable outcome of a wage-gap between rural and urban sectors, and that there is 
the tendency for the process to continue until the wage-gap is eliminated. The main 
arguments of Lewis may be summarised as follows: 
i) Many developing countries are characterised by a dual economy; a large 
subsistence sector and an expanding capitalist sector; 
ii) Whilst the capitalist sector’s marginal productivity of labour is positive, that 
of the subsistence sector is negligible, zero, or even negative, due to an 
unlimited supply of labour; 
iii) The use of capital in the capitalist sector facilitates higher levels of labour 
productivity and wages than pertains in the subsistence sector; 
iv) The gradual transfer of labour from the subsistence to the capitalist sector is 
a logical and desirable feature of the development process, since it provides 
the required human resource for industrial expansion; and 
v) The process of labour transfer will stop when all surplus labour have been 
used up by the capitalist sector. 
 
In Lewis’ framework, the transfer of surplus labour from the subsistence sector to the 
modern or capitalist sector is a key impetus to capital accumulation and economic 
growth. Lewis argued that the subsistence sector’s wage level served as a benchmark – 
specifically, a price floor – for wage setting in the capitalist sector. It was his view that 
in practice, the mark-up in subsistence wage needed to attract labour to the capitalist 
sector was in many cases, at least, 30 percent. 
 
Even though Lewis’ theory is highly acclaimed, it has come under some criticisms. A 
major critique of the theory relates to the validity of the assumption of surplus labour in 
                                                 
32
 That is, labour whose marginal productivity is non-positive; the employment status of such labour can 
be described as disguised unemployment. 
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the subsistence sector. For many developing countries, this assumption has limited 
validity. For example, with regard to farming, the assumption of surplus labour is likely 
to be untenable during the stages of ploughing, planting and harvesting. Another point 
of criticism has been the theory’s assumption of a continuous demand (by the modern 
sector) for rural labour as long as the capitalist sector is expanding. As noted by Todaro 
and Smith (2003), this assumption is problematic since the modern sector’s expansion 
may be associated with investment in labour-saving technology. 
 
In a major contribution to the migration literature, Sjaastad (1962) explicitly treats 
migration as an activity that requires resources, generates costs, and yields returns. He 
conceptualises migration as an investment that increases labour productivity, and leads 
to an efficient allocation of resources. By treating migration as an investment, Sjaastad 
implies that individuals, after evaluating the present value of net income streams 
(associated with migrating to alternative locations), can make a rational choice based on 
the option with the highest rate of return. In other words, an individual will have an 
incentive to migrate if migration will increase the present value of his/her lifetime net 
income. 
 
Apart from the intuitive appeal of Sjaastad’s framework, the approach persuasively 
addresses the issue of selectivity of migrants. For example, it explains why young 
persons tend to have a higher representation (relative to the aged) amongst migrants; the 
young, on average, would have a longer time horizon (compared to that of older 
persons) over which the returns to migration can be reaped. Lucas (1997) has observed, 
however, that to the extent that young persons have a higher discount rate than that of 
older persons, this often made assertion may not be valid. 
 
Perhaps, the most well-known migration model is the hypothesis formulated by Todaro 
(1969), and subsequently, extended by Harris and Todaro (1970). Key assumptions 
underlying the model include the following: 
i) The highest wage levels in the economy are in the urban formal sector, and 
as a result, the preferred jobs of rural dwellers are urban formal employment; 
ii) Due to the difficulty in obtaining urban formal jobs, the search for such jobs 
is best carried out from a state of urban unemployment or urban informal 
employment; 
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iii) The probability of obtaining an urban formal sector job is inversely related 
to the rate of urban unemployment. 
 
According to Todaro, rural-to-urban migration is determined by rural-urban “expected” 
– rather than actual – real wage differentials. In other words, rural-to-urban migration 
depends on a combination of rural-urban actual real wage differentials and the 
probability of obtaining an urban job. Todaro’s hypothesis essentially underscores the 
view that rational economic considerations are key to migration decisions. The model 
postulates that prospective migrants weigh the costs and benefits (over their entire 
planning horizon) of potential migration decisions, taking into account the risks of 
unemployment in the urban centre. Thus, as rightly pointed out by Lucas (1997), the 
Todaro model represents a reformulation of Sjaastad’s (1962) model. 
 
The Todaro model offers a plausible explanation for the simultaneous existence of 
urban unemployment and rising rural-to-urban migration. As noted by Todaro (1969, 
p.147), 
“… as long as the urban-rural income differential continues to rise sufficiently 
fast to offset any sustained increase in the rate of job creation, then even in spite 
of the long-run stabilizing effect of a lower probability of successfully finding 
modern sector employment, the lure of relatively higher permanent incomes will 
continue to attract a steady stream of rural migrants into the ever more 
congested urban slums”.  
 
In extending the Todaro model, Harris and Todaro (1970) utilised a two-sector internal 
trade model with unemployment, to obtain an equilibrium characterised by urban 
unemployment. In addition to assuming that prospective rural migrants are expected 
utility maximisers, Harris and Todaro assume the existence of a periodic random job 
selection process, whenever the number of job seekers exceeds the number of available 
jobs. The thrust of the Harris-Todaro hypothesis is that the existence of an 
institutionally determined urban minimum wage in many developing countries can – 
and often does – result in an equilibrium with considerable urban unemployment.  
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The basic Todaro (and Harris) model has been the subject of various criticisms and 
extensions
33
. These criticisms and modifications question the assumptions or empirical 
validity of the model and/or introduce more realistic assumptions. For example, in his 
modification of the Harris-Todaro model, Fields (1975) proposes four extensions to the 
model, by incorporating a more general job-search behaviour, an urban traditional 
sector, preferential hiring by level of education, and labour turnover considerations. 
These modifications result in a considerably smaller and more realistic predicted rate of 
unemployment. In spite of the various extensions to, and criticisms of, the basic Todaro 
model, it continues to be a key reference in the theoretical, empirical, and policy 
discourse on migration. 
 
The economics literature has traditionally treated migration as an individual decision 
motivated by mainly economic considerations. This notion is reflected in the literature 
reviewed so far in this section. Over the past two decades, this view – that the migration 
decision is taken by the individual – has been consistently challenged. Indeed, in typical 
developing countries, it is common for the adult members of a household to collectively 
decide that one of its members should migrate. It is thus understandable that there is, 
currently, an emerging paradigm that recognises the dominant role of the family or 
household in migration decisions. Major proponents of this school of thought include 
Oded Stark and Robert Lucas. This modified view treats migration as the outcome of a 
collective (rather than an individual) strategic decision made by the family or 
household. It is argued, that in many cases, migration is employed as a livelihood 
mechanism for diversifying income and to insure the entire household (including the 
migrants) against risks and uncertainty. Since this view of migration often places 
remittance flows within the context of a migration-remittance strategy, we will revisit 
the issue later in this chapter. 
 
Given the widespread risks associated with agricultural activities, the mitigation of 
covariant risks poses a challenge to many rural households. In principle, these risks can 
be reduced through contractual arrangements with households located in different 
communities. In practice however, whilst longer distances between households reduce 
covariant risks, contract compliance costs and the likelihood of a moral hazard tend to 
                                                 
33
 For a discussion of some of these criticisms and extensions, see Todaro (1980) and Lucas (1997). 
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increase with the distance between households. One way by which households can 
mitigate this dilemma is to “send” one of their members to reside in a different 
community, thereby using the bond of kinship to reduce both the compliance cost and 
the moral hazard problem (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). 
 
In an application of a risk-theoretic framework, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) have 
examined households’ use of a combination of marriage and migration to reduce 
consumption fluctuations. Stark and Rosenzweig hypothesised that the spatial 
distribution and features of marital arrangements involving daughters are partly the 
outcome of tacit inter-household contractual arrangements aimed at consumption 
smoothing. Using longitudinal data from villages in South India, Rosenzweig and Stark 
find evidence in support of their hypothesis; the combination of marriage and migration 
contributes to a decrease in consumption variability, and households that are susceptible 
to higher income risks are more likely to engage in longer distance marriage cum 
migration arrangements. 
 
Schrieder and Knerr (2000) have also examined the potential of migration with 
remittance strategies in smoothing the incomes of rural households. In an application of 
probit and Tobit models to 1991/92 survey data from Cameroon, Schrieder and Knerr 
observe the failure of migration with remittance strategies in serving as a social security 
mechanism when the potential remitter does not expect any considerable inheritance. 
They note, however, that migration-cum-remittance strategies seem to help small-scale 
farmers in times of crises. 
 
4.2.3 Empirical modelling of migration determinants and impact 
 
The migration literature abounds with numerous empirical investigations into the 
determinants of migration. The empirical literature also tackles issues relating to the 
impact of migration on aspects of development, such as income levels and income 
distribution. A useful way of classifying empirical migration modelling is in terms of 
the level of aggregation of the data used. Thus, migration equations can be categorised 
broadly into two, depending on whether macro- or micro-level data are employed. In 
what follows, key features of the empirical modelling of migration determinants and 
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impact are surveyed. It is worth noting that owing to the focus of the present study, the 
empirical micro-migration literature dominates the discussion in this sub-section. 
 
4.2.3(a) Empirical modelling of migration determinants 
 
Many early studies of migration determinants employed aggregate or macro-level data. 
As suggested by DaVanzo (1981), these studies typically treated migration as an 
equilibrating mechanism that acted to narrow spatial income differentials. In her 
acclaimed review of (mainly) macro-migration studies, Yap (1977) notes that 
econometric estimates confirm the importance of economic factors in migration 
decisions. Specifically, the studies generally find a positive effect for (destination-
origin) income differential (i.e., when this gap is explicitly included), and a negative 
effect for distance. Where wages or per capita incomes of origin and destination 
localities are included separately, the destination and origin wages usually exert positive 
and negative effects, respectively, on migration. Other economic considerations 
affecting migration decisions include chances of obtaining employment, better 
educational opportunities, and the availability of social amenities (Yap 1977). 
 
Over the past few decades, there has been an increase in the number of migration 
studies that employ micro-level data. This increase may be attributed to two key factors; 
the increase in the number of household surveys, especially, in developing countries, 
and – as noted by Ghatak, Levine, and Price (1996) – McFadden’s (1974) pioneering 
work on the estimation of discrete choice models. An advantage with using micro-level 
migration data is the increased scope for more detailed analyses of the relationships 
between migration decisions and household or individual attributes. Micro migration 
data also typically provide more observations on relevant variables, thus boosting the 
capacity for the generation of more reliable results. 
 
The following is a stylised representation of micro migration equations (see Lucas, 
1997): 
 
),,,( aaaaa ACWM εµ=  
where: 
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aM : a dummy for individual a’s migrant status; 
aW : a vector of discounted wage streams available to a in alternative locations; 
aC : a vector of discounted costs associated with migrating to alternative locations; 
aA : a vector of a’s personal attributes; and 
aε : a stochastic term reflecting a’s idiosyncratic tastes. 
 
A major difficulty with the estimation of such migration models is with the 
measurement of expected earnings at the alternative locations. The data used in these 
studies are often cross-sectional survey data, and as a result, the observed wage or 
income of a person pertains to only one location. Thus, the problem of the 
counterfactual remains an enormous challenge. A number of studies attempt to 
circumvent this problem by estimating an earnings equation for alternative locations, 
and using these equations to predict a person’s unobserved income at that location (see, 
for example, Lucas 1985). Although this represents a significant step in addressing the 
problem of the counterfactual, other potential problems may still remain (Lucas, 1997). 
For example, since the income equation corresponding to an alternative location is 
estimated using a sample of individuals living in that location, a sample selection bias 
may arise. This is because the individuals whose incomes formed the basis of the 
estimated equation may possess some unobservable characteristic(s), and as a result, 
may be inherently different from those whose (expected) incomes are to be predicted. 
 
In response to estimation problems associated with micro migration equations, various 
studies have pursued, with varying levels of sophistication, modelling refinements of 
the stylised micro migration equation. These refinements include the incorporation of an 
employment equation, and a correction for selectivity bias (for examples, see Lucas, 
1985; and Vijverberg, 1993).  The refinements notwithstanding, Lucas (1997) observes, 
that the main messages from the results have not changed our understanding, even in 
comparison with macro estimates. He adds: 
 
“Whether further effort in refining our estimation techniques will pay off in 
terms of removing biases and increasing precision is obviously unknown. A 
systematic comparison of the improvements to date, from any given data set, 
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may be worthwhile. On the other hand, perhaps the balance of effort should shift 
toward formulating and testing newer hypotheses” (Lucas 1997, pp. 741-742). 
 
4.2.3(b) Empirical modelling of the impact of migration on migrants’ incomes 
 
A major challenge in the estimation of migrants’ income gains is the determination of 
what they would have earned if they had not migrated. Even though several methods for 
estimating migrants’ income gains have been identified in the literature (see Lucas 
1997), two approaches seem to dominate. These methods are the application of 
migration dummies in earnings (or income) functions, and the estimation of separate 
income equations for migrants and non-migrants. 
 
The application of migration dummies (in income functions) has been employed by Yap 
(1976) in a study of rural-to-urban migration and urban underemployment in Brazil. 
Using census data, Yap estimated income functions to compare the incomes of migrants 
with those of non-migrants residing in migrants’ areas of origin; this was done for three 
rural areas (origins of migration) corresponding to the three major regions in Brazil. For 
each rural area, the income gain to migrants (from that area) was estimated by pooling 
observations on rural non-migrants, rural-to-rural migrants, and rural-to-urban migrants. 
The regressors for Yap’s income functions included education level, age group, sex, 
race, and migration status, with each regressor represented by a set of dummy variables. 
In particular, there were four dummy variables for migration status, namely, rural non-
migrant (omitted), rural-to-rural migrant, recent rural-to-urban migrant, and less recent 
rural-to-urban migrant. 
 
Yap’s (1976) results suggest that rural-to-urban migrants derived significant income 
benefits from migration, and that no significant income gains accrued to rural-to-rural 
migrants. In spite of the fact that Yap’s approach is insightful, it does not capture 
convincingly the incomes migrants would have earned if they had not migrated. As 
Lucas (1997) points out, there are concerns about Yap’s assumption that the returns to 
education and other estimated coefficients are identical in both origin and destination 
localities. Lucas further observes that Yap’s approach is potentially problematic because 
of the possible correlation of the migration dummies with unobserved attributes 
distinguishing migrants from non-migrants. 
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The issue of the counterfactual – as it relates to migrants’ incomes – has often been 
addressed by estimating separate income equations for migrants and non-migrants (see, 
for example, Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980; Pessino, 1991; and Tunali, 2000). Such 
methods typically incorporate an adjustment for selectivity bias by employing 
techniques such as Lee’s (1978) two-step method, an approach that is commonly known 
as Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure. For the sake of illustration, let “on” and “off” 
describe the different sets of observations corresponding to individuals who take a 
particular decision (such as, the decision to migrate), and those who do not, 
respectively. Then, in brief, the Heckman two-step method entails deriving selectivity 
variables from a probit (decision) regression, and inserting these variables into income 
OLS regressions for the “on” and “off” samples. This approach yields consistent 
estimates for the truncated – that is, the “on” and “off” – income regressions (see Lee, 
1978; and Heckman, 1979). It is worth noting, however, that this popular two-step 
method assumes that the error terms in the probit and OLS regressions are normally 
distributed; a violation of this assumption might result in failure to detect selectivity in 
the OLS regressions (see Lee, 1982). 
 
Using data from Peru, Pessino (1991) applied Heckman’s two-step procedure to 
estimate wage equations for movers and stayers in three regions; Lima, other urban, and 
rural localities. The regressors used in the study captured attributes, such as, work 
experience, education, and marital status. Even though Pessino did not find evidence in 
support of selectivity amongst movers in any of her samples, she found positive 
selectivity amongst stayers in Lima, and negative selectivity amongst stayers in rural 
areas. In other words, Pessino’s evidence suggests that Lima stayers earned more than 
movers would have earned if they had stayed, but – contrary to expectations – rural 
stayers earned less at their location than movers would have earned if they had stayed. 
 
In a more recent study, Agesa (2001) contributes to the discourse on rural-urban 
migration by applying the Heckman two-step technique to Kenyan rural and urban data. 
Agesa’s approach is, essentially, identical to that of Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980); 
after using the two-step method to estimate migrant and non-migrant income equations, 
these equations are then used to generate an urban-rural income gap variable for 
inclusion in a migration structural equation. Regressors for the migration (decision) and 
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income equations include indicators (or proxies) for personal attributes and human 
capital. In addition to obtaining a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the 
urban-rural income gap variable, Agesa’s findings suggest that those rural workers more 
likely to gain from migrating to the urban sector are those who migrate. Other studies 
that have analysed the migration-income link using corrections for selectivity bias 
include Falaris (1987; for Venezuela), Lanzona (1998; for rural Philippines), and Tunali 
(2000; for Turkey). 
 
4.3 The Ghana migration literature 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
Even though migration is very common in Ghana, it has attracted a modest number of 
economic analytical studies. This dearth of economic migration studies is apparently 
due to the fact, that over the years, there has been a general lack of detailed migration 
data. Some notable attempts have, nevertheless, been made to capture the main patterns 
and rationale for migration in Ghana. 
 
Whilst most of these studies are descriptive, they often present cross-tabulated survey 
statistics and other information that offer valuable insights into the reasons, extent and 
patterns of migration (see, for example, Caldwell, 1968 and 1969; Tutu, 1995; and 
Gbortsu, 1995). Thus, for instance, according to the literature, the reasons (given by 
migrants or their representatives) for migrating include job search, schooling, marriage, 
and other family-related considerations (Caldwell, 1969; Tutu, 1995; and GSS, 2000). 
Other studies (such as Beals, Levy, and Moses, 1967; Knight, 1972; and Litchfield and 
Waddington, 2003) have employed multivariate analyses – using census or survey data 
– to investigate issues relating to migration determinants and the welfare impact of 
migratory movements. 
 
This section aims to present a broad overview of studies on Ghana’s migration. The 
review will cover three main areas namely, migration patterns, the determinants of 
migration, and the impact of migration. Apart from highlighting key results of the 
Ghana migration literature, the discussion will bring to the fore some limitations and 
knowledge gaps. 
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4.3.2 Patterns of migration in Ghana 
 
Migration in Ghana in the early twentieth century was mainly in the form of rural-to-
rural movements, as people migrated to work on cocoa farms and gold mines on a 
seasonal or semi-permanent basis (see Brydon, 1992; and Knight, 1972). Whereas 
permanent migration has assumed increased importance over the past four decades, data 
constraints have considerably limited the available information on the magnitudes and 
patterns of temporary and seasonal migration. According to GSS (2000), 52 percent of 
Ghana’s adult population are migrants, with the corresponding percentages for men and 
women being roughly the same (51.4 and 52.2, respectively). In view of the fact that 
these figures do not include temporary and seasonal migration, population mobility in 
Ghana is quite high. 
 
Regarding the occurrence of temporary and seasonal migration in Ghana, these are 
mainly associated with agricultural activity. More than three decades ago, Beals and 
Menezes (1970) observed that temporary migration is the principal form of labour 
mobility in Ghana. Whilst the increase in manufacturing and other non-farm activities 
may have contributed to an increase in permanent migration, there is no reason to doubt 
the importance of temporary migration, even if it is not the most dominant form of 
migration in Ghana presently. A significant component of temporary migration is 
seasonal migration, which often results from the different farming calendars between 
northern and southern Ghana. This is echoed by Elliot Berg in his discussion of West 
African migrant labour: 
“… climatic zones in West Africa are so ordered that the slack season in the 
[savannah] zones is the busy season along the southern coast. Thus there is a 
seasonal dovetailing; the period of inactivity in the [savannah] regions 
corresponds to the time of peak agricultural demands in the cocoa and coffee 
regions of the forest zone. Short-term movement from [savannah] to forest was 
thus a natural adaptation, particularly because the kinds of work required in the 
cocoa and coffee regions, harvest [labour] and the clearing of new plantations, 
lent themselves to seasonal or casual performance” Berg (1965, p. 164). 
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According to Tutu (1995), the major forms of migration (on the basis of the 1991 
Migration Research Study) are rural-rural, rural-urban, and urban-rural, in that order. 
Tutu also identifies the dominant Regions of destination as the Greater Accra, Ashanti, 
and Western Regions; of the ten Regions, the Upper East was the least attractive 
destination. Using data from the fourth wave of the Ghana Living Standards Survey 
(GLSS), however, GSS (2000a) computed the percentage shares of migration flows for 
1998/99 as follows: urban-rural (35%), rural-rural (32%), urban-urban (23%), and rural-
urban (10%). Batse (1995) provides additional insight into the relative importance of 
different migratory forms. On the basis of data from the 1960, 1970, and 1984 
Population Censuses of Ghana, Batse has compiled a table (see Table 15 below) of the 
relative importance of different forms of internal migration. Table 15 and the GSS 
(2000a) figures above suggest that although rural-rural migration is still widespread, its 
importance, relative to that of the other forms of internal migration, has reduced since 
the 1970s. On the contrary, urban-to-rural migration appears to be more prevalent than 
is often assumed. It has been suggested that the shift in migration patterns between 1970 
and 1984 was at least partly due to a fall in rural-rural migration, which resulted from a 
decline in farming and mining activities in the rural areas in the 1970s and early 1980s 
(Batse, 1995). 
 
 
Table 15: Relative importance of different types of migratory movements within 
Ghana; 1960, 1970, and 1984 
Type of Migratory 
Movement 
1960 1970 1984 
Rural-rural 
Rural-urban 
Urban-urban 
Urban-rural 
59.8 
17.6 
11.1 
11.5 
51.7 
16.6 
15.0 
16.7 
24.2 
16.2 
34.2 
25.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Batse (1995) 
 
From the evidence surveyed so far, it appears that rural-to-urban migration is not the 
most prevalent form of migration in Ghana. As noted elsewhere (de Haan, 1999; and 
Lucas, 1997), rural-to-rural migration is the most common type of migration in 
developing countries, and the literature on Ghana supports this assertion, at least, for 
1960 and 1970. 
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4.3.3 Determinants of migration in Ghana 
 
The Ghana migration literature’s evidence on migration determinants may be grouped 
into community/household characteristics and individual attributes. As is common in 
the general migration literature, many of the studies on Ghana’s migration focus on 
rural-to-urban migration
34
. As a result, the migration determinants identified are often 
mainly applicable to migration from rural to urban localities. The major community and 
household characteristics mentioned in the literature include distance from potential 
destination, the economic condition of the destination locality, the welfare status of the 
sending household or community, and the presence of kinship or friends in the 
destination locality. 
 
One of the key results of the study by Beals et al. (1967) is the negative impact of 
distance on migration rates. Using data from the 1960 population census, Beals found 
statistically significant evidence in support of distance as a strong deterrent to 
interregional migration in Ghana. In a study of rural-to-urban migration using survey 
data
35
, Caldwell (1968) also found evidence in support of the negative effect of distance 
on migration. According to Caldwell, for all persons aged more than 20 years, there was 
a clear inverse association between the propensity to migrate to the towns and the 
distance from the nearest large locality. It is worth noting that Caldwell found this result 
to be statistically significant for both men and women. As suggested by Beals et al. 
(1967), the negative effect of distance might be linked to information costs, as well as 
important cultural and social differences between localities. 
 
Empirical analyses of Ghana’s migration experience lend credence to the common view 
that economic considerations are crucial to migration decisions. Beals et al. (1967) 
observed a tendency for migrants to move to regions with high wages, and noted that 
high wage levels in the destination region contributed highly to the propensity to 
migrate. Data from the 1991 Ghana Migration Survey
36
 suggest that job-related reasons 
                                                 
34
 It is not very clear why this is the case. Perhaps migration-induced city congestion and related problems 
tend to make rural-to-urban migration more prominent, thereby attracting public and research focus. 
35
 The survey – conducted between 1962 and1964 – had a sample of 1,782 rural households and 585 
urban households (Caldwell, 1968). 
36
 The Survey was part of a joint Project of the Ghana Statistical Service and the Social Sector Policy Unit 
of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
sponsored the Project. 
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play a major role in migration decisions (see Tutu, 1995). Thus, on the whole, the 
evidence suggests that favourable economic conditions in potential destination localities 
act as a key determinant of the propensity to migrate in Ghana. 
 
The Ghana migration studies suggest that the welfare level in the sending community 
(or household) exerts an effect on migration. Beals et al. (1967) found a negative effect 
(of origin locality’s income) on migration. Notably, when urbanisation was included in 
the migration equation, this effect (of origin locality’s income) was stronger than that of 
the destination locality’s income level. Caldwell (1968), on the other hand, found 
evidence associating better-off rural households with a higher propensity to migrate to 
the towns. Whilst the results of Beals et al. (1967) and Caldwell (1968) appear to 
conflict, it might well be the case, that they are actually capturing different effects on 
migration. The result of Beals et al. is a reflection of the tendency for people to want to 
stay in an area if favourable economic conditions prevail. On the other hand, Caldwell’s 
result shows, that for any community characterised by unfavourable conditions, 
members of richer households are generally better able to embark on migration. It is 
worth noting also, that apart from the fact that the two studies used different datasets, 
Caldwell was only reporting an association, whereas Beals et al. carried out a regression 
analysis. These results nevertheless highlight the complex nature of migration 
determinants and outcomes. 
 
The importance of networks in migration decisions has been generally acknowledged 
(Lucas 1997), and for Ghana, this factor appears to be crucial in most migration 
decisions (Caldwell, 1968; and Tutu, 1995). This is because the establishment of 
networks often results in the reduction of migration costs. On the basis of data from the 
Ghana 1991 Migration Survey, Tutu reports that for persons intending to migrate, 76 
percent had friends or relatives residing in the destination locality. In the context of 
rural-to-urban migration, Caldwell (1968) also found a very strong statistically 
significant association between the presence of rural household members in the 
destination locality and the likelihood of other members visiting
37
 (or migrating to) the 
town. As rightly observed by Tutu (1995), the role (in migration decisions) of access to 
destination-based kinship and other networks is closely linked to the cost-reducing 
                                                 
37
 Caldwell (1968) observed that the act of visiting was increasingly a prelude to migration. 
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effect of such access. A dynamic element has further been associated with the role of 
destination-based networks of relatives and friends. In his study of rural-to-urban 
migration in Ghana, Caldwell (1969) observes that by increasing the population of rural 
residents’ relatives and friends in urban centres, rural-to-urban migration can be self-
reinforcing. 
 
Whilst the propensity for migration is higher amongst males than amongst females, 
especially over longer distances (Caldwell 1968), migrants in Ghana are dominated by 
young persons (see Caldwell, 1968; and Tutu, 1995), as predicted by the human capital 
theory. The Ghana migration studies’ evidence relating to the effects – on the tendency 
to migrate – of marital status and the number of dependents are, however, somewhat 
tentative. Tutu (1995) observes that the unmarried are more likely to migrate, but 
Caldwell’s (1968) evidence for this was not very strong. Again, in respect of the 
number of dependents, Tutu (1995) reports a negative effect on migratory movements, 
whilst Caldwell (1968) was very cautious on this. Caldwell however, found a positive 
relationship between number of siblings and rural-to-urban migration. In the context of 
rural-to-urban migration, Caldwell further suggests there is often strong pressure on 
persons of low birth rank (that is, older siblings) to stay at home, and – in the case of 
persons who have migrated – to return home. According to Caldwell, this tendency is 
due to the fact that the most senior siblings are often required by social norms to 
shoulder certain responsibilities, such as, looking after aged or ailing parents, and 
managing the family farm. 
 
With regard to the impact of education on the propensity to migrate, the Ghana studies 
are not unanimous on the direction of influence. In their econometric investigation of 
interregional migration in Ghana, Beals et al. (1967) found a negative effect of 
education on migration. This result was contrary to what had been hypothesised, and the 
authors acknowledged that they “simply do not know what underlies the observed 
inconsistency” (Beals et al. 1967, p.485). Caldwell (1968) on the other hand, found a 
statistically significant positive association between education and the propensity for 
rural-to-urban migration. According to the 1991 Migration Research Study, however, a 
higher percentage of migrants have no formal education, compared to non-migrants 
(Gbortsu, 1995). Data reported by Gbortsu further suggest, that it is only with respect to 
university education, that the proportion of migrants with education exceeds that of non-
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migrants. Clearly, the education-migration interplay appears to be complex. This 
complexity may be attributed to the potential for considerable correlation between any 
pair of education, incomes, and migration. 
 
The incorporation of a correction for selectivity bias is a key aspect of a recent 
econometric migration study by Tsegai (2005). Using data collected under a Common 
Sampling Frame (CSF) approach, the study examines the determinants of the decision 
to migrate within the Volta Basin of Ghana. In investigating the determinants of the 
migration decision, Tsegai places particular prominence on the role of migration income 
in influencing the decision. In view of the fact that migrants may be non-randomly 
selected from the population, the study employs Heckman’s two-step procedure for 
selectivity correction. A major result of the study is the evidence found for expected 
income gains in influencing migration decisions. Other factors found to influence the 
migration decision include previous migration experience of the household head and/or 
spouse, household size, education, social capital, ethnic networks, having irrigated 
fields and off-farm activities. Since the study’s geographical focus was very localised, 
its findings cannot be generalised for the entire country. Notwithstanding this limitation, 
the study’s results and – more importantly – the methodology constitute a valuable 
addition to the Ghana migration literature. 
 
The literature reviewed in this sub-section suggests that studies on Ghana’s migration 
determinants are dominated by the use of descriptive statistics. Whilst the usefulness of 
such methods can hardly be ignored, it is appropriate to emphasise that an increased use 
of alternative and more rigorous approaches – to the analysis of migration data – can be 
insightful and complementary. 
 
4.3.4 Impact of migration on welfare in Ghana 
 
Even though the subject of migration’s impact has received considerable attention in 
general public discourse, relatively few studies have addressed it in a systematic 
fashion. Whilst this paucity of studies may be attributed partly to the lack of suitable 
data for such an exercise, one can hardly lose sight of the challenge posed by the 
complex interplay of factors characteristic of migratory movements and their effects. 
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The above problems notwithstanding, useful information can be obtained – from survey 
data – on the impact of migration. Some of the information relate to the perception of 
both migrants and non-migrants about the impact of migration. 
 
Tutu’s (1995) examination of the 1991 Migration Survey data provides useful insights 
into the perceptions of family members left behind with regard to the impact of 
migration. According to the study, there was a perception that the migration-induced 
loss of rural labour was compensated for by the extra effort put into productive 
activities by the remaining workforce. It is not surprising therefore that most (52 
percent) households claimed short-run output had been unaffected and they anticipate 
the same situation in the long-run. Furthermore, 66 percent of remaining family 
members did not reckon there had been a disruption of family life as a result of the 
migration of their members. 
 
Tutu (1995) further provides information on the perception of return migrants about the 
impact of their migration on their households. Return migrants generally reckoned that 
migration had enhanced their household welfare. According to the findings, a quarter of 
return migrants indicated that the output of household business would be boosted by 
their return, whilst 22 percent and 18 percent believed that family income would rise, 
and their return would decrease family dependence on hired labour, respectively. 
 
In exploring interrelationships between migration and development, Asante (1995) has 
highlighted the important role played by migrants in the initiation and funding of 
development projects in their (rural) localities of origin. He notes that many of these 
projects are funded jointly by migrants and non-migrants; migrants normally make 
larger financially contributions per head, and non-migrants often provide considerable 
labour input. To quote Asante (1995, p. 219),  
“There is a lot of undocumented evidence in Ghana of second cycle schools, 
health clinics, electricity, pipe-borne water supply, markets and feeder roads 
construction in rural communities which have been provided through such 
combined efforts.” 
Asante (1995) – also using data from the 1991 Migration Survey – highlights the 
important role of migration through urban-to-rural remittance flows. He cites this as one 
of the avenues through which migration enhances the welfare of sending households 
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and communities. Asante also suggests that urban-to-rural remittances sent by rural-to-
urban migrants perform a key welfare redistribution function by narrowing the welfare 
gap between rural and urban sectors. 
 
In discussing migration’s impact on destination communities, Asante (1995) draws 
attention to the lack of clear evidence on the subject. He notes that whilst rural-to-urban 
migration might contribute to urban unemployment, data from the 1970 and 1984 
population census fail to provide clear support for this. Asante further suggests that 
many rural-to-urban migrants are unable to gain employment in the formal sector, and 
consequently, the informal sector becomes a haven for the majority of these migrants. 
 
Very few econometric analyses of the impact of migration are available. The few 
existing studies, nevertheless, lend some support to the view that migration enhances 
migrants’ welfare. Using data from two waves of the Ghana Living Standards Survey 
(GLSS), Litchfield and Waddington (2003) employ multivariate analyses to investigate 
the impact of migration on three welfare indicators, namely, household consumption 
expenditure, poverty status, and primary school attendance. The study used standard 
OLS regressions (of equivalised household consumption expenditure) and migration 
dummies to determine whether migrants are better off than non-migrants. A similar 
approach was used for the evaluation of migration’s impact on primary school 
enrolment. However, regarding the analysis of the impact of migration on the likelihood 
of being poor, poverty probits were utilised. Some of the correlates employed by 
Litchfield and Waddington are human and physical assets, main economic activity, and 
region of residence. 
 
Litchfield and Waddington observe, that even though the OLS regressions suggest 
migrants have a higher standard of living than non-migrants, the migration premium 
seemed to have halved between 1991/92 and 1998/99. The poverty probit for 1991/92 
showed migrants having a lower probability of being poor (that is, relative to non-
migrants), but that for 1998/99 did not indicate any statistically significant difference in 
the probabilities of being poor between migrants and non-migrants. Furthermore, when 
the analysis was extended to the non-monetary welfare indicator, the results showed 
little impact of migration on welfare. It is worth mentioning, however, that the absence 
of a correction for selectivity bias implies the parameter estimates of the study’s linear 
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regressions are likely to be inconsistent, a limitation the authors acknowledge. Given 
the paucity – in the context of the Ghana literature – of rigorous quantitative analyses of 
migration, the study by Litchfield and Waddington is, nevertheless, an important 
contribution. 
 
It is worth mentioning that although Tsegai’s (2005) Volta Basin study focused on 
migration determinants, he found evidence suggesting that incomes of migrant 
households are higher than those of their non-migrant colleagues. Given that the study 
employed a methodology that corrected for selectivity-bias, this conclusion is 
noteworthy. It is also consistent with the results of Litchfield and Waddington (2003) 
regarding migration’s impact on consumption welfare. 
 
From the survey of the literature in this sub-section, the evidence on the impact of 
migration in Ghana is still evolving. In Ghana, even though the expression of concern 
about the negative effects of migration (usually, rural-to-urban) is very common, it does 
seem that the impacts on the migrants and on the sending households and communities 
are generally net-beneficial, whilst the net effect on destination communities is unclear. 
Given the limitations of the studies reviewed, it will be prudent to treat the available 
evidence with caution. 
 
II. Review of relevant literature on remittances 
 
4.4 General remittances literature 
 
4.4.1 Background 
 
Since the early 1980s, there has been a significant increase in the number of studies 
exploring the phenomenon of remittance transfers, that is, the transfer of money (or 
goods) from one household to another. Given that remittances are often sent by 
migrants, it is not surprising that many of the studies on remittances confine the 
analyses to remittances sent by migrants (see Lucas and Stark, 1985; Liu and Reilly, 
2004; and Brown, 1997). It should be noted though, that remittances are not necessarily 
sent by migrants, and that sometimes migrants are rather the recipients of these 
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transfers. Furthermore, remittance transfers can occur outside the context of migration, 
even though such occurrences appear to be much less common. Studies that adopt a less 
restrictive approach – in the sense of not limiting analyses to the migration context – 
include Cox (1987), Ravallion and Dearden (1988), and McKay (2000). It is fair to say, 
however, that remittance transfers typically occur within the context of migration; in 
other words, remittances often take the form of transfers from (or to) migrants. What 
needs to be stressed, though, is that the strong link between remittances and migration 
does not imply that the latter is necessary for the former; in principle, private inter-
household transfers can occur between non-migrant households. 
 
It is expedient to note at this point, that a useful way of thinking about remittance 
studies is to consider them as part of the broader literature on private transfers. This is 
because in discussing remittances, the focus is on that subset of private transfers that 
occur between households; in general, private transfers also include private charitable 
donations to organisations, as well as bequests. Examples of studies covering non-
remittance private transfers are Bernheim and Severinov (2003) and Light and McGarry 
(2004) – both examining bequests – and Schwartz (1970), which focuses on 
philanthropic private transfers. One way of distinguishing remittances from other 
private transfers is to describe them as private inter vivos transfers
38
 (see Cox, 1987; 
and Cox and Rank, 1992). It is not surprising therefore that remittance studies draw on 
the wider literature on private transfers, and this literature review will similarly draw on 
the non-remittance private transfers literature where appropriate. 
 
4.4.2 Some general issues 
 
There are various ways of categorising the economic literature on remittances, one of 
which is in terms of the source of the transfer. Using this criterion, remittance studies 
may be classified into three, namely 
i. Studies that examine remittances originating from within the domestic 
economy (for examples, see Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974; Schrieder and 
Knerr, 2000; and Banerjee, 1984); 
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ii. Those that focus on international remittances (see Adams, 1991; Agarwal 
and Horowitz, 2002; and Funkhouser, 1995); and 
iii. Studies that examine both international and domestic remittances (see 
Gubert, 2002; and Adams, 2004). 
The remittance literature may also be broadly classified on the basis of whether they are 
microeconomic or macroeconomic studies. In this regard, it is worth noting, that whilst 
a large number (if not most) of macroeconomic remittance studies tend to focus on 
international remittances, studies of domestic remittance flows are often analysed within 
a microeconomic framework. 
 
In noting the increasing economic research interest in remittance flows, it is important 
to highlight some of the data challenges associated with these studies. Owing to various 
limitations, many remittance studies employ data that are far from ideal. Although there 
are two main agents in a remittance flow (that is, the donor and the recipient), data 
relating to both agents are often unavailable. Where such data are available, their quality 
may be compromised if the survey depended on one agent for information relating to 
the other. For instance, data on urban-to-rural remittances may have been obtained from 
a survey of rural households (see Hoddinott, 1994 for an example), in which case, 
reliable detailed data on recipients can be obtained, but similar information about 
donors – such as their income levels and sources – may be inaccurate or unavailable. 
These data constraints can influence a study’s balance of emphasis regarding remittance 
expenditures and remittance receipts. 
 
Even though a remittance may be defined as a private inter-household transfer, it is 
often useful – especially, in empirical analysis – to distinguish between gross 
remittances and net remittances. Gross remittances refer to the total amount of 
remittances sent, whilst net remittances are the amount of remittances sent, net of the 
amount received. It has been observed, that the use of net remittances – rather than 
simply gross transfers – ensures that the analyst takes into account the full effects of 
these transfers on household behaviour and welfare (McKay, 2000). The use of gross 
remittances in empirical analyses may, however, be necessitated by a lack of data on (or 
for deriving) net remittances. On the other hand, remittance flows may be largely 
unidirectional, rendering the choice between gross and net remittances irrelevant (see, 
for example, Hoddinott, 1992). In cases where data are available, the use of both gross 
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and net remittances can be informative, since it would highlight the extent to which 
differences in the definition of a remittance affects the results of the analysis (see 
Ravallion and Dearden, 1988). 
 
4.4.3 Motives for remitting 
 
Theoretical analyses of remittances have been dominated by questions relating to the 
motivation for remitting. Why do private inter-household transfers occur? On the whole, 
the remittance literature identifies two main motivations for remitting, namely, altruism 
and self-interest or exchange
39
. Rapoport and Docquier (2005) have observed that until 
recently, altruism was more frequently assumed than tested against competing theories. 
Current thinking on remittance motivations, however, gives considerable importance to 
self-interest-based exchange. It is useful to emphasise that the debate about remittance 
motives is not trivial; it has significant implications for fiscal policy, since remittances’ 
response to public transfers depends on the predominant remittance motive. This is 
because if remitters are motivated by altruism, then an increase in public transfers will 
lead to a reduction in private transfers, and this will result in the impact of the public 
transfers being less than originally planned (see Cox and Jimenez, 1990; and Cox and 
Rank, 1992). Thus, the incidence and effectiveness of public transfers are influenced by 
whether or not remittances are motivated by altruism or by self-centred exchange.  
 
The basic principle underlying altruism is that, inter-household private transfers occur 
because the remitter or donor cares about the well-being of the recipient, and as a result, 
derives satisfaction from improvements in the recipient’s welfare. More formally, 
altruism exists when a donor’s utility function partly depends positively on the utility of 
the recipient. Thus, for instance, an adult might send regular remittances to his elderly 
parents, simply because increases in the parents’ welfare increase his utility. As noted 
by Cox and Jimenez (1990), Garry Becker was one of the first to provide a theoretical 
framework for the altruistic motive. In his seminal contribution, Becker (1974) 
developed an economic model of social interactions, within which the implications of 
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 Elsewhere, self-interest and exchange are treated as separate motives (see, for example Park, 2003b), 
but – as suggested by Cox and Jimenez (1990) – there is a sense in which each of the two labels can 
broadly represent the same motive. 
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altruism – together with those of other socio-economic phenomena – were analysed. 
Other studies that espouse altruism include Ishikawa (1975) and Adams (1980). A key 
prediction of the altruistic model is that, ceteris paribus, there will be a negative relation 
between a recipient’s pre-transfer income and the amount of remittance received (Cox 
and Jimenez, 1990). Even though the altruistic motive is plausible in many cases, there 
are various scenarios in which its validity is doubtful. 
 
According to the exchange or self-interest model, reciprocity underlies remittance 
flows. In other words, remittance transfers are acts of repayment, or are sent with the 
explicit (or tacit) understanding that they will be paid back (not necessarily in the same 
form). A migrant, for instance, might send remittances to relations residing at the 
migrant’s place of origin as a way of repaying the extended family’s expenses on his/her 
education or migration (see Bates, 2000). Similarly, parents may sponsor a child’s 
education in anticipation of receiving remittances when he/she enters the labour market 
after schooling. Remittances may also be motivated by the remitter’s aspirations to 
inherit family property or by his/her vested interest in the proper maintenance of an 
investment at place of origin. 
 
Various models of the exchange hypothesis are found in the literature. For example, 
Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) developed a model of bequests, in which the 
testator intentionally influences the behaviour of beneficiaries via his choice of a 
bequest-sharing rule. Even though this particular model deals with bequests, it provides 
support for the notion that remittance behaviour is often motivated by self-serving 
exchange considerations. From his model of the exchange motive for sending 
remittances, Cox (1987) concluded, that contrary to what pertains under altruism, 
remittances do not necessarily decrease with increases in the recipient’s income if 
remittances are motivated by exchange. One way of rationalising this result is to reckon, 
that by enhancing the recipient’s bargaining power, the increased income can result in a 
higher amount of remittance receipt. 
 
Whilst the pure altruistic and exchange models of remittance motivations have 
relevance in many scenarios, it is only fair to reckon that a more realistic explanation of 
remittance behaviour should incorporate elements of the two models. In a pair of 
influential papers, Robert Lucas and Oded Stark have formulated a model that exhibits 
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elements of altruism and self-interest in explaining the motivation for remittance flows 
(see Lucas and Stark, 1985; and Stark and Lucas, 1988). Cast in the context of the 
interactions between migrants and relatives back home (that is, at place of origin), 
Lucas and Stark (1985) and Stark and Lucas (1988) employ a game theoretic framework 
to advance a model of tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest. In this model, 
remittances are seen as one element in a self-enforcing arrangement between migrant 
and home. The model, thus, treats remittances as part of a co-insurance arrangement 
between the donor and the recipient, insuring both parties against shocks, such as, 
liquidity constraints, unemployment, and poor harvest. Even though the model 
emphasises the crucial role of self-interest as a motivation for remitting, it highlights the 
importance of altruism in reducing any inclination – on the part of the contractual 
parties – to renege on their obligations. The views of Lucas and Stark are further echoed 
by Bates (2000), who notes that the pleasure gained by parents from the success of their 
children helps to sustain the informal contractual arrangements. Additionally, the threat 
of social sanctions is usually enough to deter the migrant from breaking his (or her) 
promise (Bates, 2000). 
 
Are the above theories (or models) of the remittance motive testable? If so, what is the 
extent of empirical evidence for them? Even though the theoretical explanations for 
remittance flows are testable, data constraints often render such an exercise far from 
ideal. Apart from the fact that reliable information about both donors and recipients may 
be unavailable, detailed information about remittance amounts (and not just remittance 
decisions) might be necessary for making inferences about transfer motives (see Cox, 
1987). The following observation captures the data-related difficulties associated with 
the empirical testing of remittance motives: 
“…it is extremely difficult to empirically discriminate between these different 
motives: most empirical studies regress remittances on a set of variables (which 
typically includes pre-transfer incomes of both senders and recipients), but any 
sign for these relations may be interpreted in a number of ways, and the 
additional information needed to implement more discriminative tests (e.g., 
longitudinal data on the timing of remittances, information on the migrant’s 
education, the recipient household’s assets and number of heirs, etc.) is rarely 
available in a sufficiently detailed manner” (Rapoport and Docquier 2005, 
p.10). 
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In spite of the above constraints, various notable attempts have been made at 
ascertaining the extent of empirical support for the competing hypotheses about 
remittance motivations. On the whole, the evidence is mixed. 
 
In the study by Lucas and Stark (1985), the proposed model of tempered altruism (or 
enlightened self-interest) was explored empirically using data from Botswana; findings 
from the analysis provided some support for the model. An implication of this model is 
that remittances often represents the outcome of a household strategy – via the 
migration of one or more its members – to diversify income and to spread risks across 
space and time. This is illustrated by the following evidence from Botswana: 
… having been educated by the family, the migrant gains from higher wages but 
is then expected to repay them; the family gains assurance in undertaking riskier 
agricultural activities, knowing the migrant will support them during drought; 
sons remit in the hope of maintaining favour in ultimate inheritance” (Stark and 
Lucas 1988, p.478). 
 
It is worth noting also, that Cox (1987) – in applying his theoretical framework to 
United States data – found, that conditional on a remittance being sent, there is a 
positive relation between recipient income and the amount of remittances received. This 
finding contradicts the altruistic motive and provides support for the exchange model. 
Using another – but apparently richer – U.S. dataset, Cox and Rank (1992) concluded 
that empirical patterns for inter vivos transfers were more consistent with the exchange 
motive than with altruism. On the basis of survey data on Tongan and Western Samoan 
migrants in Sydney, Brown (1997) also found evidence to the effect that migrants’ 
remittance transfers (to their countries of origin) are motivated by non-altruistic factors 
such as asset accumulation and investment back home. In their study of China, Liu and 
Reilly (2004) find mixed evidence for exchange and coinsurance, and none for altruism. 
Some empirical evidence consistent with the exchange motive can also be found in 
studies that utilise data on typical developing countries [see, for example, Hoddinott, 
1992 (for Kenya), Cox and Jimenez, 1998 (for Colombia), and Gubert, 2002 (for Mali)]. 
 
In a study of international remittances using a Guyana dataset, Agarwal and Horowitz 
(2002) tested the validity of altruism and insurance – as remittance motivations – by 
employing a model that links the remittance behaviour of sole versus multiple-migrants 
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to the remittance incentive. They note that if remittances are underpinned by altruistic 
considerations, the presence of multiple remitting migrants will affect the average 
remittance amount, since migrants are simply concerned with the welfare of the non-
migrating household. If, on the other hand, risk sharing
40
 is the main motivation for 
remitting, the average amount remitted is expected to be unaffected by the presence of 
multiple remitting migrants. Agarwal and Horowitz found significant differences in 
remittance behaviour between single and multiple migrants in a manner consistent with 
the altruistic motive. 
 
Following their modelling of the distribution of remittance receipts in Java (an 
Indonesian island), Ravallion and Dearden (1988) found evidence suggesting 
remittances in rural Java are motivated by altruistic considerations. They report that – in 
rural Java – reductions in recipient’s income are accompanied by a more-than-
proportional increase in remittance receipts. This result is seen as an indication “that the 
donor’s marginal utility of recipient’s income is not only positive, but also elastic in that 
income” (Ravallion and Dearden, 1988, p.43). Remittances in rural Java were also 
observed to be targeted to disadvantaged households, such as the elderly and the sick. 
Evidence for urban Java was, however, noticeably different; remittances were targeted 
to the unemployed, and the distribution of remittance receipts showed little aversion to 
inequality. Other studies that offer support for the altruistic motive include McGarry 
and Schoeni (1995a and 1995b). 
  
On the whole, a number of studies suggest that motivations to remit tend to exhibit 
elements of both altruism and exchange. In the study by Lucas and Stark (1985), 
remittance patterns among individual migrants in Botswana were found to be consistent 
with the model of tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest. Park (2003a) set out to 
investigate, whether for developing countries, child-to-parent transfers are motivated by 
altruism or are meant to repay implicit loans taken up by children for human capital 
investment. Using a Malaysian dataset of child-parent pairs, Park found evidence 
suggesting, that – for individuals of post-secondary education – monetary transfers to 
parents are a combination of repayments and altruistic remittances. Secondi (1997) also 
suggest, that for rural China, altruism alone is inadequate for explaining monetary 
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transfers between relatives, and that exchange considerations may be important. Other 
studies whose empirical findings are consistent with the tempered altruism hypotheses 
include Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2001). 
 
What is the main message from this survey of the literature on remittance motivation? 
The overriding point is that remittances are rarely motivated exclusively by altruism, 
and that very often the motivation lies somewhere along the altruism-exchange 
continuum. It has been suggested that the issue regarding which motive is more 
dominant depends, at least partly, on the nature of the relationship between the donor 
and the recipient (Park, 2003b); on the basis of an analysis of the First Indonesian 
Family Survey data, Park (2003b) concludes, that amongst three main types of transfers 
(that is, parent-to-child, child-to-parent, and inter-sibling), remittances between siblings 
are most consistent with the altruistic motive. Clearly, there is scope for further research 
into the subject of what influences remittance motives. 
 
4.4.4 The literature on the empirical modelling of remittance flows 
 
Despite the general lack of detailed and reliable data for analysing remittance flows, the 
empirical modelling of remittances has received significant attention, with key areas of 
investigation being the motivation for remitting and the determinants of remittance 
flows. Regarding the impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare, there is an apparent 
paucity of studies. Since in the above review of the literature on motives for remitting, 
the empirical evidence on remittance motivations was discussed, this sub-section will 
only focus on the impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare, and the modelling of 
remittance determinants, with the former being understandably brief. 
 
Even though the welfare impact of remittances – as far as it relates to recipients – is 
very important, this subject has not been addressed by many studies, at least compared 
to the large volume of literature on remittance motives and determinants. Besides data 
constraints, this limited coverage might be explained by, at least, two factors. In the first 
place, the issue of whether households benefit from remittance receipts appears to be 
trivial; it does seem obvious that remittances will enhance the well-being of households. 
It is important to note, however, that the answer to this question is not as obvious as it 
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appears if one takes into account the counterfactual. In other words, it is vital to 
recognise that in the absence of remittances, members of a given household might 
explore some other avenue(s) for improving their welfare, such as, taking on an extra 
job or working extra hours. It is therefore possible, that the receipt of remittances can 
stifle a household’s entrepreneurial drive, rendering members less adventurous in 
exploring viable productive activities. Furthermore, in cases where remittances are 
received from migrants, these transfers could well be substitutes for the migrants’ 
income contribution in the absence of migration (see Adams, 2006). 
 
Of course, remittances can have the effect of raising a household’s productivity, but this 
is not automatic. Thus, the salient question is whether remittance receipts enable 
households to derive higher living standards than they would have had without such 
inflows. It is entirely plausible that the apparent triviality of this question – that is, the 
issue of whether (or not) remittances increase the welfare of households – might have 
contributed to the dearth of studies on the subject. The second possible – and probably, 
more likely – reason for the limited research in this area is the difficulty of modelling 
the counterfactual scenario. 
 
Given the paucity of studies that analyse the impact of remittances on recipients’ 
welfare, only two studies are reviewed here. In his study of Guatemala, Adams (2004) 
utilises data from a large and nationally representative household survey to examine the 
impact of domestic remittances and of international remittances (from the United States) 
on the welfare of recipients, and subsequently, analyses remittances’ impact on poverty. 
Using multivariate regression analyses, Adams predicted household expenditures 
corresponding to two scenarios – “excluding remittances” and “including remittances” – 
for different groups of households. The “excluding remittances” expenditures were 
predicted for households that did not receive remittances, those that received internal 
remittances, and households that received international remittances, using parameters 
estimated from the sample of households that did not receive remittances. The 
“including remittances” expenditures, on the other hand, were estimated for only 
households that received remittances, that is, domestic remittance recipients and 
recipients of international remittances. In estimating the “including remittances” 
expenditures, Adams added the actual amounts of remittances received to the 
expenditures for the “excluding remittances” scenario. It is worth adding that the level 
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of household expenditures (per capita) was specified as a function of household 
characteristics and locational variables, with the household attributes including size, 
education, gender, and ethnicity. 
 
Having established the counterfactual scenarios, Adams proceeded to examine the 
impact of domestic and international remittances on poverty by analysing their 
respective effects on household expenditures
41
. With only one exception, the study 
found that both domestic and international remittances have positive welfare effects; 
they both decrease the incidence, the depth, and the severity of poverty. The study finds, 
however, that remittances exert a bigger impact on poverty severity than on poverty 
incidence, a result Adams attributes to the very large share of remittances in the 
expenditures (incomes) of the lowest decile group. 
 
The methodology employed by Adams is illuminating, as it gives considerable insight 
into the issue of the counterfactual. Nevertheless, a few brief comments about the study 
are appropriate. Firstly, the analysis would have been strengthened if an adjustment for 
selectivity bias had been made instead of the assumption that such a bias did not exist. It 
is worth noting also, that the methodology employed appear to rule out the possibility of 
a negative impact of remittances on welfare. This is because the “including remittances” 
expenditures were estimated by adding the actual amounts of remittances received to the 
“excluding remittances” expenditures. Thus, by default, the mean household per capita 
expenditure for the “excluding remittances” scenario will be less than that of the 
“including remittances” situation. Finally, by employing mean measures of the 
household per capita expenditure, the impact of remittances on the welfare of individual 
households was not captured. In spite of these concerns, Adams’ analysis is an 
important contribution to the literature on remittances’ welfare impact. More recently, 
Adams (2006) has employed data on Ghana to carry out a similar investigation; this 
study is discussed in the (next) section on Ghana remittance studies.  
 
The results of Adams (2004) are generally consistent with those of Adams and Page 
(2005). Using cross-country observations on 74 countries, Adams and Page explore the 
impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in the developing world. 
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In doing this, the study employed the basic growth-poverty model proposed by 
Ravallion (1997) and Ravallion and Chen (1997). Two equations were estimated – one 
specifying poverty as a function of mean per capita income, income distribution, and 
migration, whilst the other equation replaced the migration variable (in the first 
equation) with an index of international remittances. Some key findings of the study are 
worth noting. International remittances are found to exert a dampening effect on all 
three poverty indices used. For example, the study estimates that on average, a 10 
percent rise in the share of remittances in a country’s GDP will result in a 1.6 percent 
decline in poverty incidence. Adams and Page further observe that the poverty impact of 
international migration and remittances appears to vary across different regions of the 
developing world. 
 
The subject of remittance determinants is one of the most empirically analysed 
remittance-related themes. Numerous studies of remittance determinants focus on the 
identification of the particular characteristics of individuals and households that 
influence remittance flows. One of the major issues in this regard is a distinction 
between two remittance decisions, namely, the decision regarding whether or not to 
remit, and the decision concerning the amount of remittance to send, given that a 
decision has been made to remit (see Oberai and Singh, 1980; Knowles and Anker, 
1981; and Banerjee, 1981). In this regard, Banerjee (1981) has observed that although 
some studies – for example, Johnson and Whitelaw (1974) and Rempel and Lobdell 
(1978) – estimate remittance functions with observations on donors only, this approach 
ignores the remittance decision issue, and focuses only on the determinants of 
remittance amounts. In other words, a procedure that uses observations on remitters 
only, simply tackles the issue of how much to remit given that a decision has been made 
to remit. A more appropriate approach requires observations on both remitters and non-
remitters. 
 
A number of analytic and econometric issues arise from the above remittance decisions. 
Of analytic interest is the question of the sequencing of the remittance decisions; are the 
two decisions taken sequentially, or they occur simultaneously? The econometric 
problem relates to the nature of the dependent variable in typical remittance regressions. 
Liu and Reilly (2004) refer to the censored nature of the dependent variable, given that 
not all individuals/households remit positive amounts per period, posing problems for 
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the use of the OLS technique. Banerjee (1981) has observed that if the above decisions 
are taken sequentially, then the appropriate procedure for analysing the determinants of 
remittance expenditure is an estimation of two separate equations. He notes, however, 
that if the two decisions are made simultaneously, a single equation can be estimated by 
employing a Tobit regression. 
 
Regarding the econometric implementation of the sequential treatment of the two 
remittance decisions, the application of Heckman’s two-step technique has become 
standard practice (see, for example, Banerjee, 1984; Hoddinott, 1992; and Funkhouser, 
1995). In this context, Heckman’s two-step technique entails the estimation of two 
equations – a probit equation for the decision on whether or not to remit, followed by an 
OLS equation for the remittance level (given a decision to remit) – with an adjustment 
for selectivity bias made in the second equation. Besides yielding consistent parameter 
estimates, the application of Heckman’s two-step method to remittance analyses permits 
a regressor’s effect on the two remittance decisions to be different. The approach’s 
drawback, however, is that estimates can be sensitive to the particular identification 
restrictions imposed (Hoddinott, 1992; and Liu and Reilly, 2004). 
 
In treating the two remittance decisions as being made simultaneously, the commonly 
used econometric method is Tobit estimation. The Tobit estimation technique – unlike 
Heckman’s two-step method – is a single equation model. The model – attributed to 
Tobin (1958) – employs the maximum likelihood procedure to estimate regression 
functions for censored samples (Gujarati, 2003). In the context of a remittance function, 
the Tobit estimation method estimates the relation between remittance amounts and 
suitable regressors, such as, socio-economic characteristics of the remitting household, 
using observations on both remitters and non-remitters. Although Tobit parameter 
estimates are consistent, the technique’s application to remittance analysis has been 
criticised for constraining the effects of regressors on the two remittance decisions to be 
the same (Liu and Reilly, 2004). According to Brown (1997), however, the application 
of the Tobit technique to remittance analysis is convenient, since it allows the analyst to 
identify a single set of variables most significant in influencing “remittance behaviour”. 
Examples of studies that have applied Tobit estimation to the analysis of remittances 
include Banerjee (1981), Brown (1997), and Liu and Reilly (2004). 
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At this point, it will be appropriate to highlight some of the literature’s evidence on 
remittance determinants. Investigations into remittance determinants have often 
hypothesised that remittance flows are influenced by various factors, some of the major 
ones being donor’s income, donor’s educational attainment, and recipient’s income net 
of remittance receipts (see, for example, Banerjee, 1981; Gubert, 2002; and Lucas and 
Stark, 1985). Other factors that are reckoned to affect remittance behaviour are the 
migration status of the potential donor, the duration of donor’s migrant status (that is, if 
a migrant), and the dependency burden of the recipient household, amongst others 
(Knowles and Anker, 1981; Banerjee, 1984; Stark and Lucas, 1988; and Brown, 1997). 
 
Empirical evidence of the importance of remitters’ incomes in influencing remittance 
behaviour has been highlighted by Lucas and Stark (1985). In their analysis of 
remittance patterns amongst individual migrants in Botswana, Lucas and Stark found 
evidence consistent with a positive effect of migrant income on remittance levels. 
Similar evidence is reported in a study on China (Liu and Reilly, 2004). Liu and Reilly 
employed Tobit analysis to examine the determinants of remittances (sent by migrants) 
to rural households, using data on migrant workers drawn from the Jinan Municipality 
in the Shandong province. In addition to estimating the remittance-income (donor’s) 
elasticity to be 0.82, Liu and Reilly found labour earnings to be the most robust 
determinant of remittance levels. In a comparative analysis of remittances by Pacific 
island migrants, Brown’s (1997) use of the Tobit estimation technique established 
evidence suggesting that higher migrant incomes lead to larger amounts of remittances 
transferred. 
 
On the issue of how donors’ incomes affect the decision regarding whether to remit, the 
available evidence typically comes from studies that employ the Heckman two-step 
technique, an exception being Knowles and Anker (1981). Although Knowles and 
Anker estimated separate equations for the two remittance decisions (that is, the 
decision regarding whether to remit, and the one on remittance size, given that a 
decision has been made to remit), each of the two equations was estimated using the 
OLS technique. In a study of the remittances sent to the rural sector (place of origin) by 
migrants in Delhi, India, Banerjee (1984) employed the Heckman two-step method to 
examine the major determinants of the two migration decisions. On the whole, Banerjee 
found mixed evidence on the influence of donors’ incomes on remittance behaviour; 
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migrants’ incomes had no effect on the decision to remit, but were important in 
explaining the size of remittances. 
 
Another factor that is expected to influence remittance behaviour is the recipient’s 
welfare, commonly proxied by recipient’s income net of remittance receipts. As 
mentioned earlier, the relationship between remittance size and recipient’s income is 
crucial for identifying whether remittances are motivated by altruistic or exchange 
considerations (Cox, 1987). Since in our survey of the empirical evidence on remittance 
motivations, the relationship between remittance levels and recipients’ incomes was 
discussed, we only note here that the evidence is mixed (see, for example, Knowles and 
Anker, 1981; Lucas and Stark, 1985; Cox et al., 1998; and Liu and Reilly, 2004). 
 
There are, at least, two ways by which a donor’s educational attainment can influence 
remittance flows. An obvious one is through its effect on the donor’s income. Secondly, 
since a (potential) donor’s level of education often signals the amount of educational 
investment made by his/her parents or family, it is expected to influence remittance 
flows, especially if the (potential) donor is obliged to reciprocate the family’s gesture. 
Empirical evidence on the remittance impact of (potential) remitters’ educational 
attainment is available in various studies. Even though a number of studies suggest 
donors’ educational attainment exert a positive impact on remittances (see Stark and 
Lucas, 1988; and Gubert, 2002), there are others that do not concur (see Brown, 1997; 
and Liu and Reilly, 2004). 
 
In a recent study of western Mali, Gubert (2002) employed Powell’s Censored Least 
Absolute Deviation (CLAD) method, as well as more conventional parametric 
techniques to analyse the determinants of remittances from both internal and 
international migrants. Gubert finds robust evidence supporting the view that migrants 
with higher levels of education are more likely both to remit and to remit higher 
amounts than their colleagues with lower educational attainments. The analysis of 
Kenyan data by Knowles and Anker (1981) also found evidence consistent with a 
positive impact of donors’ educational attainment on both the decision to remit and 
remittance size. Other studies reporting a positive impact of remitters’ incomes on 
remittance size include Stark and Lucas (1988) for Botswana, and Banerjee (1981) for 
Delhi, India. 
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On the basis of his comparative study of remittances sent by Western Samoan and 
Tongan migrants (resident in Sydney), Brown (1997) concludes, that the level of 
educational attainment before migrating is, apparently, not associated with any 
differences in migrants’ remittance behaviour. Similar remarks are made by Liu and 
Reilly (2004) in reference to their investigation of migrants’ remittances using data 
from China. Liu and Reilly observe that a migrant’s educational level exerts little 
influence on either the event of remittance or the size of remittance. Also worth citing is 
Funkhouser’s (1995) comparative analysis of remittances using data from El Salvador 
and Nicaragua. Applying both Heckman’s two-step technique and the Tobit model, 
Funkhouser found – for both El Salvador and Nicaragua – similar impacts of donors’ 
educational attainment on remittances; education is negatively correlated with the 
probability of remitting, but for remitting migrants, education is positively related to 
remittance size. With regards to remittances from migrants in Delhi, Banerjee (1984) 
found no effect of educational attainment on the decision to remit, but observes that 
they are important in explaining remittance levels. It is fairly obvious, that whilst one 
might expect remitters’ educational attainments to influence remittances, the nature of 
the influence, if any, is largely context dependent. 
 
Studies on migrants’ remittances often explore the impact of migrants’ duration of stay 
(at current location) on remittance flows. Evidence found for Kenya suggest, that 
migrants’ duration of stay has a negative effect on the decision to remit, but does not 
affect remittance size (Knowles and Anker, 1981). This result suggests 
“…that the tendency for remittances to decline with the length of time migrants 
have been away from home operates primarily to reduce the tendency to remit at 
all, rather than the amount of income remitted. This is again consistent with the 
view of remittances as a form of insurance which, when deemed to be no longer 
necessary, is dispensed with altogether instead of being scaled down in 
magnitude” (Knowles and Anker, 1981, p. 221). 
Other studies suggest a positive relationship between remittance size and migrants’ 
duration of stay (Banerjee, 1981 and 1984; and Stark and Lucas, 1988), even though an 
inverted U-shape relationship might hold in other cases (see Liu and Reilly, 2004). 
Stark and Lucas (1988) actually reported an inverted U-shape relationship, but note, that 
for all practical purposes, the relationship is positive, since remittances begin to fall 
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around the thirtieth year of the migrant’s stay at the destination. In the case of Liu and 
Reilly (2004), an inverted U-shape relationship between remittance size and migrant’s 
duration of stay was established, with remittances peaking somewhere between the 
second and fourth year of the migrant’s stay. Brown (1997), however, found a positive 
relationship for his Western Samoan sample, and a negative (but statistically 
insignificant) relationship for the Tongan sample. 
 
Evidence abounds in the literature about the influence of other factors on remittances. 
Banerjee (1981 and 1984), for instance, has highlighted the remittance impact of the 
dependency burden of both remitting households and recipient households. On the basis 
of his analysis of Indian data, Banerjee (1981) reports a negative relationship between 
remittance size and the dependency burden of the remitting household, but a positive 
relationship between remittance size and the recipient household’s dependency burden. 
Similarly, the probability that remittances will be sent increases with the rural 
(recipient) sector’s dependency burden, and falls as the dependency burden in the urban 
(remitting) area increases (Banerjee, 1984). Brown (1997), on the other hand, did not 
find any impact of the remitting household’s dependency burden on remittances. With 
reference to the results of their empirical analysis, Ravallion and Dearden (1988) 
observe, that no significant effects of household size on receipts or outlays are revealed 
for their rural sample; evidence from the urban sample, however, suggests that 
remittance receipts decrease with household size. 
 
Before ending this sub-section, it is worth mentioning some empirical evidence on other 
determinants of remittances. According to Banerjee (1984), migrants who have left their 
wives in the rural sector are more likely to remit than unmarried migrants. On the basis 
of evidence from their rural sample, Ravallion and Dearden (1988) also observe an 
apparent lack of influence of household head’s age on remittance receipts, whilst 
remittance outlays reveal a plausible inverted U-shaped relationship, with turning points 
at 61 and 45 years for gross and net outlays, respectively. For their urban sample, 
Ravallion and Dearden observe a strong inverted U-shaped relationship between 
remittance receipts and age, whilst the relationship is U-shaped for remittance outlays. 
Finally, empirical evidence obtained by Knowles and Anker (1981) suggest, that factors 
that tend to positively affect the level of remittances include migrant status, ownership 
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of a house or business in the home area, and the number of wives and children living 
away. 
 
4.5 Ghana remittance studies 
 
Despite the fact that remittance transfers are commonplace in Ghana, very few 
economic studies analyse Ghana’s remittance flows. This dearth of literature may be 
attributed largely to the general lack of relevant household-level data prior to the mid-
1980s. This paucity of data notwithstanding, Caldwell’s (1969) pioneering study of 
Ghana’s rural-urban migration offers significant insights into migrants’ remittance 
transfers. More recently, there has been a burgeoning of Ghana remittance studies, with 
a number of these studies utilising data from one or more waves of the Ghana Living 
Standards Surveys (see, for example, Quartey and Blankson, 2004; Coulombe and 
McKay, 2005; and Adams, 2006). 
 
In his discussion of rural-to-urban migration in Ghana, Caldwell (1969) observes, that 
in economic terms, the most important feature of migration is the associated counter-
flow of remittances. Using data from a survey
42
 organised over the period 1962-64, 
Caldwell observes that migrants’ feelings of obligations to their rural homes are 
widespread. This sense of obligation – which appears to reflect both altruistic and 
exchange considerations – is central to the flow of remittances established in the survey. 
On the basis of his survey data, Caldwell states that probably one-third of rural 
Ghanaian households receive money from urban areas, and one-third of these 
households reckon that without these remittances, they will be ‘very poor’. Caldwell’s 
study further suggests that parents are the most frequent recipients of remittances; of 
those migrants who sent remittances whilst working in the urban sector, 77 percent sent 
money to one or both parents. 
 
Regarding the use to which remittances are put, Caldwell identifies the major one as 
being the maintenance of the rural household. Remittances are, however, sometimes 
used as financial capital, to finance the education of younger relatives, or to assist with 
specific projects, such as the building of a family house or the securing of a farm. These 
                                                 
42
 According to Caldwell (1968), the survey covered 1,782 rural households and 585 urban households. 
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findings on the use of remittances are similar to those of a more recent study by 
Tiemoko (2003). Mazzucato, Kabki, and Smith (2006) have also observed that 
remittances (from Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands) are sent for housing, 
businesses, and funerals. It is important to note that Caldwell (1969), Tiemoko (2003), 
and Mazzucato et al. (2006) place remittances within a social context. In particular, 
Caldwell emphasises the role of remittance transfers as part of a related set of activities 
that link migrants to their rural places of origin. These other activities include visiting 
the village (with varying degrees of regularity), the transmission of skills to the village, 
as well as the building of houses in the village. 
 
The strong link between Ghana’s migration and remittance flows is amply supported by 
anecdotal evidence. At the heart of Ghana’s migration and remittance flows is the 
importance of the extended family system and of intra-household economic decision 
making. The typical Ghanaian rural household is a large one, possibly comprising more 
than one nuclear family. Here, financial limitations would often imply that the 
sponsoring of a child’s education (especially beyond the basic level) would be at the 
expense of the education of some other household member(s). Factors informing the 
selection of the child to sponsor might include gender and academic promise. Given the 
strong link between education and rural-to-urban migration, it is the educated household 
member who is more likely to migrate to an urban centre. This individual might even 
receive financial support (from the household) to migrate. The support provided by the 
household – that is, towards the education and/or migration of a household member – is 
typically carried out with the express or tacit understanding that the sponsored 
household member will reciprocate the gesture. 
 
Under these circumstances, a migrant is obliged to return the favour. Although reneging 
on such informal contracts is a possibility, it is not likely. One main reason for the likely 
compliance is the migrant’s sense of altruism towards the extended family back home; a 
sentiment engendered by family ties. Similarly, the satisfaction gained by parents from 
the success of their children helps to keep the informal contract intact (see Bates, 2000). 
Moreover, any tendency for the migrant to renege is likely to be stifled by the fear of 
social reprobation or by an interest in family inheritance (see Bates, 2000; Lucas and 
Stark, 1985). This is particularly pertinent if the migrant intends to eventually return to 
the rural home. For many of Ghana’s migrants, however, the sending of remittances is 
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done willingly, as reflected in the following comment by a Ghanaian migrant in 
London: 
“The ability to send remittances is a source of great pride” (Cotula et al.  
2004, p. 43). 
The form of “repayment” associated with these informal contractual arrangements 
varies, but remittance transfers constitute a main kind. 
 
One other form of “repayment” is kin-fostering (amongst the Asantes, this typically 
takes the form of a male migrant fostering the child of a sister). Fostering in this context 
entails the child of a migrant’s relative migrating (usually from the rural area) to 
become part of the migrant’s household in the urban locality. Regarding the terms of 
this arrangement, there is a wide spectrum of variation. At one end, the bulk of the 
benefits are reaped by the fostered child (and the parents). This is where the child joins 
the urban household to enjoy a status almost the same as that of the migrant’s own 
children. Here, the migrant provides for the day-to-day upkeep of the child, and also 
sponsors his/her education or apprenticeship, as the case may be. Kin-fostering in this 
circumstance can be viewed as a disguised form of remittance flow.  At the other end of 
the scale of kin-fostering arrangement, the child’s status within the urban household is 
only better than that of a servant. In this scenario, the child will typically not receive (or 
continue) formal education, but may learn a trade eventually. In her study of children’s 
independent migration and education in Ghana, Hashim’s (2005) narration of the 
account of a fostered girl contains elements of the latter fostering arrangement: 
 
“Afifo
43
 is a 12 year-old girl whose father and mother had both told me had 
been moved to her uncle’s in order that she might have a better education, since 
her uncle lived in a large town with better schools and with electricity. On 
tracing Afifo to her uncle’s, however, she informed me that although she was 
attending school, she had in fact moved to cook and clean for her uncle as his 
wife was a full-time student. 
She complained that she was shouted at a lot by her aunt. She also said, ‘When I 
was at home I would eat in the morning and they would give me chop money
44
, 
                                                 
43
 All the respondents’ names have been changed in order to protect their identities. 
44
 This refers to money to purchase food with outside the house. 
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and when I came home they would give me food. Here it is not until I return 
home that I eat.’” (Hashim 2005, p.19). 
 
Throughout Ghana, the exchange of visits and, more recently, of telephone calls help 
cement the link between migrants and those left behind, thereby enhancing remittance 
flows. Even though it is the migrant who bears the onus of visiting, occasional visits 
from rural folks to urban-based migrants are not uncommon. As observed by Caldwell 
(1969), the acceptable minimum frequency of visits (from the urban-based migrant) is 
about once a year. When a rural dweller visits a rural-to-urban migrant, the former is 
almost certain to bring along generous amounts of items, such as, foodstuffs, fish, or 
game. Similarly, the guest is unlikely to return to the village empty-handed; he/she 
would usually return with cash remittance and, possibly, some urban goodies. Visits of 
rural-to-urban migrants to their villages are often routine, mainly to check on how their 
parents and other relatives are faring, many are primarily funeral-related. These visits to 
the rural areas offer additional opportunities for the exchange of remittances (migrants 
often giving out cash, whilst receiving foodstuffs from their relatives). 
 
The role of remittances in poverty alleviation has featured prominently in the more 
recent Ghana remittance literature. Using data from the third and fourth waves of the 
Ghana Living Standards Survey, Coulombe and McKay (2005) estimate the size of total 
remittances in Ghana, and also explore the role of remittances in the selective poverty 
reduction the country expressed in the 1990s. According to Coulombe and McKay, 29 
percent of households received domestic remittances in 1991/92, whilst the 
corresponding figure for international remittances was 6 percent. In 1998/99, however, 
the proportions of households receiving domestic and international remittances 
increased to 34 percent and 8 percent respectively. Furthermore, in both 19991/92 and 
1998/99, domestic remittances accounted for more than half the total remittances 
received by households. 
 
Other findings of Coulombe and McKay are worth highlighting. Between the two 
survey years, domestic remittances received by households increased from 100.2 
million dollars to 202.2 million dollars. With regard to international remittances 
received by households, the overall amount increased from nearly 49 million dollars in 
1991/92 to more than 135 million dollars in 1998/99, with both the amounts and the 
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massive rise largely accounted for by remittances from outside Africa. Although the 
total amount of domestic remittances received by households was higher than the 
corresponding amount of international remittances, the average value of international 
remittances (for recipient households) exceeded that of domestic remittances. Coulombe 
and McKay further draw attention to the general infrequency and irregularity of 
remittances, suggesting they might not be a reliable source of income for the typical 
Ghanaian household. 
 
In a recent study of Ghana’s Volta Basin, Tsegai (2005b) evaluates the impact of 
migration and remittances on farm and non-farm self-employment income. Using 
iterated Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS), Tsegai’s analysis suggests that out-
migration has a negative impact on the direct household farm income in source areas. 
On the other hand, the study finds that remittances sent by the migrants fully 
compensate for the negative effect of lost-labour. Tsegai’s findings are thus consistent 
with the view that the migration-cum-remittance livelihood strategy has an overall 
beneficial impact on migrant-sending households.  
 
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, Adams (2006) has very recently examined 
the impact of remittances on poverty in Ghana. Adams’ methodology is generally 
similar to that of his earlier work on Guatemala (Adams, 2004), the main 
methodological difference being the use (in the Ghana study) of a two-step Heckman-
type technique to test for selectivity bias. The first step of the technique consisted of a 
multinomial logit model, from which a selectivity variable was derived and included as 
a regressor in a household expenditure equation in the second stage. This expenditure 
equation was then estimated by ordinary least squares. Adams’ results did not provide 
evidence for the presence of selectivity bias. As a result, the study proceeded with the 
determination of counterfactual income estimates without making an adjustment for 
sample selection bias. Thus, the actual computation of the counterfactual income 
estimates was identical to the approach adopted in the earlier Guatemala study. Given 
that Adams’ (2004) procedure for obtaining the counterfactual income estimates was 
described in the previous sub-section, it is not repeated here. 
 
Adams (2006) observes that with only one exception, both internal and foreign 
remittances lead to a reduction in the incidence, the depth, and the severity of poverty in 
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Ghana. Furthermore, poverty reduction is larger when foreign, as opposed to internal, 
remittances are included in household income, and when poverty is measured using the 
depth and severity indices. Whilst acknowledging the immense value of Adams’ (2004) 
study to the Ghana remittance literature, it is worth noting that most of the concerns – 
noted in the previous sub-section – about Adams’ Guatemala study are applicable to the 
Ghana study; the only exception is the comment about the absence of a test for 
selectivity bias in the earlier study. 
 
Tiemoko (2003) also provides additional insight into remittances sent to Ghana by 
international migrants. Using results of a survey of over 600 return migrants to Ghana 
and Cote d’Ivoire, as well as qualitative research with migrants remaining in London 
and Paris, Tiemoko explores the influence of family (left behind by the migrants) on 
migrants’ return vis-à-vis the transfer of financial, social, and human capital from the 
migrants. According to the study’s findings, family-influenced Ghanaian migrants sent 
more than twice the average amount of remittances transferred by non-family-
influenced Ghanaian migrants. This result highlights, once again, the dominant 
influence of the family on migration and the associated remittance flows. 
 
On the basis of an analysis of sources of household incomes, Coulombe and McKay 
(2005) observe, that whilst remittances constitute a significant income source for many 
Ghanaian households, they were particularly important in 1998/99 for households in the 
rural forest zone, especially food farming households (the poorest economic activity 
category). Remittances are identified as a possible major factor underlying the large 
poverty decline observed in this rural forest zone, possibly more important than 
increased agricultural productivity. Quartey and Blankson (2004) also find support for 
the view that remittances are crucial for poverty alleviation. Pooling GLSS3 and GLSS4 
datasets into a pseudo panel, Quartey and Blankson observe, that Ghana’s migrant 
remittances are counter-cyclical, with inflows rising in periods of adverse economic 
shock; in addition, remittances are found to have a positive welfare impact on 
households, tending to reduce the effects of adverse economic shocks, especially for 
food crop farming households. Coulombe and McKay (2005), on the other hand, are of 
the view that – relative to international remittances – domestic remittances have been 
more important in Ghana’s poverty reduction, and have exerted a slight moderating 
influence on inequality; additionally, international remittances have a tendency to 
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increase domestic inequality, even if marginally. Quartey (2005) has also drawn 
attention to remittances’ potential for boosting economic growth in Ghana. 
 
Informal remittance channels are reckoned to play a big role in the transfer of 
remittances to Ghanaian households. Remittances sent through these channels include 
those sent through informal money transfer agencies, as well as remittances sent in 
person (for example, through friends and relatives). As a result, estimates based on the 
records of Banks and formal money transfer institutions are likely to vastly 
underestimate the amount of remittances received in Ghana (Addison, 2004; and 
Coulombe and McKay, 2005). As noted by Higazi (2005), money transfer operators in 
industrialised countries (and often working from Ghanaian stores) – together with 
foreign exchange bureaux – represent a crucial component of the informal remittance 
transfer system. Given the large number of Ghanaians domiciled outside the country, 
especially in Europe and North America (COMPAS, 2004; and Higazi, 2005), it is not 
surprising that these informal remittance transfer agencies appear to be thriving. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The importance of migration and remittances to livelihoods in developing countries is 
evident from their prevalence and welfare impacts. Whilst conceptually, migration is 
different from remittance flows, in practice these activities are often pursued as part of a 
family strategy to diversify income across space and time. A review of the literature on 
Ghana’s migration and remittance flows suggests that these observations are similarly 
applicable to Ghana. A key issue identified in both the migration and remittance studies 
is the difficulty associated with the estimation of their welfare impacts. In this context, 
it is pertinent to note that any credible estimation of the welfare impact of these 
phenomena can hardly be carried out without the determination of counterfactual 
scenarios. 
 
The review of the Ghana migration literature suggests that with the exception of a 
couple of old studies (Beals et al., 1967; and Beals and Menezes, 1970), the analysis of 
Ghana’s migration is largely dominated by descriptive studies that place a lot of 
emphasis on rural-to-urban migration. In recent times, however, the use of econometric 
modelling to analyse migration from a microeconomic perspective has been a refreshing 
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development (see Litchfield and Waddington, 2003; and Tsegai, 2005). Whilst social 
and other considerations cannot be discounted, the importance of economic 
considerations in migration decisions has been highlighted in the Ghana literature. 
 
Regarding studies on Ghana’s remittances, these mainly focus on migrant remittances. 
Thus, remittances from non-migrants appear to play a much less important role. Whilst 
this may be true, it will be useful to know the extent of Ghana’s non-migrant 
remittances. Furthermore, even though in comparison with international remittances, 
domestic remittances are received by more households (Coulombe and McKay, 2005), 
the Ghana studies tend to place more prominence on international remittances. An in-
depth analysis of internal remittance flows would therefore be worthwhile. 
 
On the whole, there is ample scope for further research into Ghana’s migration and 
remittance flows. Other specific themes that could benefit from further research include 
the poverty and welfare impacts of migration and of remittances, the roles of different 
types of these phenomena (for example, cash versus in-kind remittances, and internal 
versus international migration), and the various aspects of the migration-remittance 
linkage in Ghana. The present study will address some of these issues. 
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Chapter Five:  
Data and Methodological Approach 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As stated in the introductory chapter, the main aim of the present study is to examine – 
within the context of rural-urban linkages – the welfare impact of Ghana’s migration 
and remittance flows. Given the empirical nature of the research and the critical role of 
data and methodology in such studies, this chapter has a two-fold objective. Firstly, it 
aims at discussing the data used to address the research questions. Secondly, it outlines 
the broad methodological approach adopted, highlighting how this is informed by the 
available data. To this end, the next section examines ways of tackling the main 
research questions and the type of data required for achieving that. The third section 
discusses the available data for the analyses and their implications for the particular type 
of methodology employed. The fourth section concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Ways of addressing the key research questions and their data requirements 
 
In the context of rural-urban linkages, the principal research questions posed in this 
study include the following: 
i) What is the impact of migration on migrants’ welfare? 
ii) What is the impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare? 
iii) What are the poverty impacts of migration and remittances? 
In principle, how could one tackle the above questions, and what kinds of data would be 
required for such an investigation? For the purpose of this discussion, one only needs to 
focus on the first two questions since the third utilises results from the first two. Clearly, 
a common feature of all the questions is impact evaluation. In other words, each of the 
questions generally focuses on the examination of the welfare impact of either migration 
or remittances. 
 
Central to the evaluation of the welfare impact of an activity (or intervention) is the 
determination of the counterfactual, that is, a hypothetical scenario of what the welfare 
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profile would have been in the absence of the activity. The counterfactual is 
hypothetical because it is impossible to know exactly what the welfare levels would 
have been if the intervention (or activity) had not occurred. Notably, all available 
methods for potentially addressing the research questions employ counterfactual 
scenarios, and rightly so, since the construction of the counterfactual is necessary for 
this type of analysis. Thus, a method’s suitability may be judged by its capacity for 
generating a realistic counterfactual. As noted by Duflo and Kremer (2003, p.4), 
“The critical objective of impact evaluation is therefore to establish a credible 
comparison group, a group of individuals who in the absence of the program 
would have had outcomes similar to those who were exposed to the program. 
This group should give us an idea of what would have happened to the members 
of the program group if they had not been exposed, and thus allow us to obtain 
an estimate of the average impact on the group in question.” 
 
Methods for evaluating welfare impacts are of two broad types: experimental (or 
randomized) and non-experimental. Experimental methodologies randomly select a 
control group prior to the application/onset of the activity, and individuals or 
households belonging to this group are then exempted from the intervention/activity 
(see Burtless, 1995; World Bank, 2007; and Galasso, Ravallion, and Salvia, 2001). 
Obviously, this approach is suitable for evaluating interventions for which participation 
can be controlled by the researcher or for which participation is randomly determined 
naturally. Thus, migration and remittance flows are not activities whose welfare impacts 
can be assessed experimentally, since participation is neither random nor subject to a 
researcher’s influence. 
 
Non-experimental approaches, on the other hand, consist of a wide range of techniques 
that construct a control group to facilitate comparisons with a treatment group (see 
World Bank, 2007; and Moffitt, 1991). These techniques include propensity score 
matching, reflexive comparisons, and selectivity-adjusted modelling. Propensity score 
matching attempts to generate a counterfactual by matching each activity (or 
programme) participant with a non-participant deemed very similar. This is done by 
identifying characteristics essential for the decision to participate, and using these to 
predict – for both participants and non-participants – the probability of participating in 
the activity/programme (see Jalan and Ravallion, 1999; Duflo and Kremer, 2003; and 
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World Bank, 2007). The matching of participants with non-participants can be carried 
out prior to the intervention or after it has occurred. The data requirement for pre-
activity matching is more challenging since the data must include characteristics of 
participants and non-participants both before and after the activity, and these data are 
often not observed. Although propensity score matching is appealing, its suitability for 
assessing the welfare impact of migration (or remittance flows) is doubtful. This is 
because whereas migration and remittance flows are activities reckoned to be 
characterised by selection bias, propensity score matching is unlikely to neutralise the 
effects of all such biases. 
 
A reflexive comparison evaluates the welfare impact of an activity (or programme) by 
comparing participants’ welfare levels before and after the activity. Thus, participants 
serve as both treatment and control groups. This method clearly requires panel data, but 
many developing countries lack such datasets on migration and remittances. In this 
regard, it is worth noting that some have attempted to circumvent the lack of panel 
datasets by using repeated cross-sectional data to generate pseudo-panel data (see, for 
example, Bourguignon, Goh, and Kim, 2004). In the case of Ghana, however, there are 
comparability issues with the migration and remittance sections of the few nationally 
representative cross-sectional datasets available. 
 
Apart from the fact that panel datasets on migration and remittances are less common 
than cross-sectional data, the use of reflexive comparisons to evaluate welfare impacts 
is problematic. This is because a simple “before and after” comparison fails to capture 
the appropriate counterfactual; a comparison of an individual (or household) over time 
does not necessarily account for changes in other factors over the time period. For 
example, in the case of migration, an individual’s welfare level prior to migrating is not 
a suitable counterfactual; what is needed is an estimation of what the individual’s 
current welfare level would have been if he/she had not migrated. 
 
5.3 Data and methodological approach 
 
In reviewing the literature on migration and remittance flows, we noted that data 
limitations constitute a major challenge to the analysis of these two phenomena. The 
data constraints take various forms, ranging from a partial lack of data for the relevant 
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period to a complete absence of data. In particular, migration and remittance researchers 
are often confronted with data that are far from ideal, an example being a lack of panel 
data for a study of migration dynamics. With regard to panel data, their importance for 
the analysis of migration dynamics is illustrated by how they have been used to examine 
the interplay amongst marriage, migration, and risks in rural India (see Rosenzweig and 
Stark, 1989). Moreover, as observed by Rapoport and Docquier (2005), the availability 
of longitudinal data can provide valuable information about the timing of remittances; 
such information can be critical to the understanding of the motivation to remit. 
 
Clearly, data-related limitations have implications for the choice of methodology 
employed. Given the particular data constraints, the choice of methodology assumes 
increased importance, since the methodological approach should circumvent the 
limitations, whilst addressing the research questions in a reasonably credible manner. 
For the present study, whilst the availability of panel (or some other enhanced) data 
would not have altered the broad methodological approach of constructing 
counterfactual scenarios, it could have made possible the use of better regressors for the 
econometric analysis. This sub-section discusses the data used in the study and provides 
a broad outline of the methodological approach adopted; details of the methodology are 
provided in chapters six and seven. 
 
5.3.1 Data and methodology – migration 
 
In spite of the huge interest in migration research, these studies are often hampered by a 
lack of suitable data. As noted by Bilsborrow (2005), population censuses are the most 
common source of basic migration data. Economic migration studies, however, usually 
analyse migration in relation to some other issue. For instance, the study may examine 
the impact of migration on poverty (see, for example, Litchfield and Waddington, 
2003), the links between migration and unemployment (see Todaro, 1969), or 
migration-remittance interactions (see Brown, 1997; and Stark and Lucas, 1988). Where 
migration is being analysed in conjunction with some other issue, the usefulness of 
population census data tends to be very limited, and multi-topic household surveys are 
often the preferred data source. This is because in comparison with household surveys, 
population censuses understandably collect less detailed household level data. 
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This study’s migration analysis uses data from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 Ghana Living 
Standards Surveys (GLSS); these surveys are a series of nationally representative 
household surveys, the first of which was carried out in 1987/88. The 1991/92 and 
1998/99 surveys, being the third and fourth in the series, are often referred to as GLSS3 
and GLSS4, respectively. Owing to a difference – between the two surveys – in the 
migration questionnaire design, the 1991/92 data do not permit a precise identification 
of migrants (as defined in this study)
45
. As a result, although we use both datasets for a 
descriptive analysis, an econometric analysis is carried out with the 1998/99 dataset 
only. Also worth mentioning is the fact that the migration data are available at the 
individual level. 
 
The GLSS datasets are immensely useful for analysing various aspects of livelihoods in 
Ghana. Apart from the demographic information collected in the surveys, the data cover 
– in varying degrees of detail – various aspects of living conditions, such as, 
consumption, education, health, housing, employment, migration, and remittance flows. 
Furthermore, the datasets facilitate decompositions of analyses on the basis of several 
categories, such as, administrative regions, ecological zones, rural-urban location, and 
gender of household head. The meticulous statistical methods employed in the surveys 
further make the GLSS data the most widely used survey data on living conditions in 
Ghana. 
 
Despite the fact that household surveys usually provide useful information for 
examining migration and livelihoods, they often lack the complete range of data 
required for exploring all aspects of the subject. In this respect, the GLSS datasets are 
no exception. This lack of comprehensive migration data is apparently due to the 
surveys’ coverage of multiple topics. Indeed, it is probably unrealistic to expect multi-
topic household surveys to cover topics such as migration and remittances in complete 
depth. This is because of the wide range of questions required for such an exercise, 
coupled with the fact that other important topics must be given reasonable coverage in 
the survey. It would seem then, that the data required for studying all aspects of 
migration can only be available from a specialised survey on migration. 
                                                 
45
 On the whole, the migration-related questions asked in the two surveys were very similar, but not 
identical. 
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Apart from providing information about migrants’ age and gender, the GLSS4 dataset 
contains other valuable information. These include migrants’ marital status, highest 
educational qualification, employment category, and main reason for moving from 
previous place of residence. Migration-related data absent, however, include 
information relating to seasonal migration, step migration
46
, and chain migration
47
. It is 
also not possible to analyse the migration history of individuals using the datasets since 
the data are not longitudinal. Data on the financial cost of migration and the sources of 
funding are also unavailable. While probably all the mentioned information can be 
collected only in a specialised survey on migration, it might be possible to obtain some 
of these through the inclusion of an additional question or two. For example, insight 
into migration histories can be gained by including a question similar to the following: 
In how many localities has this person ever resided for a period exceeding three 
months? 
In spite of its lack of data on some important issues relating to migration, the GLSS4 
dataset has enough information to enable this study’s research questions to be addressed 
satisfactorily. 
 
Given the available data, how and to what extent can the research questions be tackled? 
Since we aim to analyse the impact of migration on migrants’ welfare, the use of 
experimental techniques is ruled out. The research questions would be addressed using 
selectivity-adjusted modelling. This stems from its appropriateness for evaluating 
welfare impacts in cases where selectivity bias is likely to be present. 
  
The details of the modelling strategy are provided in the next chapter (on migration), 
but an outline is given here. A major component of the modelling approach consists of 
the estimation of selectivity-adjusted welfare equations for both migrants and non-
migrants. The parameters of these equations are then used to estimate – for cases where 
welfare levels are unobserved – individual migrant and non-migrant welfare levels. For 
scenarios where actual welfare levels are observed, however, we simply estimate 
welfare using the unadjusted welfare equation. In other words: 
                                                 
46
 Step migration refers to a series of small migratory movements as may occur when a person first 
migrates from a village to town, and subsequently migrates to a city. 
47
 Chain migration is the phenomenon whereby a person’s migration is facilitated by the support provided 
by individuals who have already charted that migratory path. 
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i) Each migrant’s current welfare level is estimated using the unadjusted 
migrant welfare equation; 
ii) The selectivity-adjusted non-migrant welfare equation is used to predict 
what each migrant’s current welfare level would have been if they had not 
migrated; 
iii) Each non-migrant’s current welfare level is estimated with the unadjusted 
non-migrant welfare equation; 
iv)  The selectivity-adjusted migrant welfare equation is used to predict what 
each non-migrant’s current welfare level would have been if they had 
migrated. 
The above counterfactual scenarios facilitate the estimation (for any individual in the 
sample) of the proportionate welfare gain from migration. Consequently, the mean 
proportionate welfare gain can be calculated for relevant groups of individuals. It should 
be noted that the described procedure is applied separately to the cases of urban-to-rural 
migration and rural-to-urban migration. 
 
Before discussing the data and methodological issues relating to the remittance analysis, 
it is worth commenting on an implication of the migration data being available at the 
individual level whereas the welfare data are at the household level. Basically, owing to 
the lack of welfare data at the individual level, what this study uses – as a proxy for a 
migrant’s (or a non-migrant’s) welfare level – is the consumption welfare per adult 
equivalent of the household to which this person belongs. Clearly, this is not necessarily 
equivalent to the actual welfare level of the migrant (or non-migrant). 
  
5.3.2 Data and methodology – remittance flows 
 
Unlike data on migration, data on remittances are typically not collected in population 
censuses. Thus, such data are normally obtained from household surveys. For this 
study’s analysis of remittances, only the 1998/99 GLSS dataset is used; the 1991/92 
GLSS data are not included due to the lack of information on multiple remittance 
outflows and receipts. The remittance data were collected at the household level, and to 
a large extent, are comprehensive, with information available on both remittance 
outflows and inflows. Moreover, data exist on multiple outflows and inflows, recipients 
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and remitters, and the relationships between the head of the sending/recipient household 
and each recipient/remitter. 
 
It should be noted though that the GLSS remittance data do not address all issues that a 
specialised remittance survey might cover. This presumably stems from the all-purpose 
nature of the survey. Even though the survey’s coverage of remittances consists of two 
sections (outflows and inflows), these do not pair remitters with recipients; in each 
section, a few questions were asked about the person at the other end of the transfer. 
The remittance outflow section, for instance, has some vital information about the 
recipient(s), namely, their gender, their relationship to the head of the sending 
household, and their place of residence. Nevertheless, a few more questions about the 
recipients would have been valuable. For example, questions about their age and 
employment category (or status) would have enriched the dataset by enabling a more in-
depth analysis of remittance motivations. Furthermore, it would have been useful to 
have a question about the reason for sending the remittance, as well as information 
about contacts (such as visits) between the remitting household and the recipients. 
 
With respect to the questionnaire’s remittance receipt section, suggestions similar to 
those made for the remittance outflow section are applicable. Whereas the remittance 
receipt section asked questions about the remitter’s gender, relationship to the head of 
the recipient household, and the locality of residence, additional questions about the 
remitter’s age and employment category (or status) would have been highly informative. 
Additionally, it would have been illuminating to have a question about what the 
remittances were (or will be) used for. The fact that the dataset’s remittance outflow and 
inflow sections do not pair remitters with recipients places some limitation on the extent 
to which remittances can be analysed. This is because it precludes a direct examination 
of both sides of remittance flows. 
 
In spite of the above limitations, the usefulness of the data (on remittances) can hardly 
be overemphasised. Apart from it being nationally representative, the dataset is 
reasonably comprehensive, given that the survey is of the multi-topic type. Furthermore, 
the availability of information on multiple remitters and recipients is valuable, not to 
mention the availability of data on many other characteristics of sending and receiving 
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households. All in all, the GLSS4 remittance dataset is adequate for providing 
reasonable insight into remittance flows between Ghana’s rural and urban sectors.  
 
To what extent do the strengths and limitations of the remittance data inform the choice 
of methodology? It would be recalled that the relevant principal research question 
relates to the impact of remittances on the welfare of recipients. The implications of the 
data for our methodological approach are similar to the observations made in the case of 
migration. Owing to the likelihood of the presence of self-selection bias, coupled with 
the use of a single dataset, the preferred choice of methodology is selectivity-adjusted 
modelling. Thus, the broad methodological approach is identical to that of the migration 
analysis. As a result, only a brief summary is provided here, especially since details are 
outlined in chapter seven, where the remittance analysis is carried out. 
 
In order to estimate the welfare impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare, we first 
estimate selectivity-adjusted welfare equations for remittance recipients and non-
recipients. These equations then serve as a basis for constructing counterfactual welfare 
levels, from which the average proportionate welfare gains – resulting from remittance 
receipts – are calculated. All these analyses are carried out separately for urban-to-rural 
remittance recipients
48
 and rural-to-urban remittance recipients
49
. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has addressed issues relating to the available data for tackling the study’s 
main research questions, and their implications for the choice of methodology. To this 
end, we have outlined the main methodological options available in principle, and their 
data requirements. The nature of the data available for both the migration and 
remittance analyses has also been mentioned. Notably, because both migration and 
remittance flows are prone to self-selection bias, and consistency considerations rule out 
the use of multiple datasets, selectivity-adjusted modelling is employed in the analyses. 
Even though the GLSS4 dataset – being multi-topic in scope – does not provide all 
desirable information on migration and remittances, it is immensely useful and adequate 
                                                 
48
 That is, rural recipients of urban remittances. 
49
 These are urban recipients of rural remittances. 
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for addressing the research questions. The stage is now set for our empirical analyses, 
starting with that of migration in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six:  
Impact of Inter-Sectoral Migration on Migrants’ Welfare
50
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, it was evident that although migration is prevalent in Ghana, 
very few studies have rigorously examined its welfare impact. Whilst various factors 
might account for this void in the Ghana migration literature, it does appear that data 
limitations and modelling difficulties are some of the main reasons. The present chapter 
is an attempt to fill this research gap. 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to determine the impact of Ghana’s inter-sectoral 
migration (that is, migration between urban and rural areas) on migrants’ welfare. In 
pursuit of this, migration patterns and factors that influence migration decisions are also 
examined. The importance of this exercise stems from the fact that knowledge about the 
welfare impact of migration between rural and urban areas, and about factors 
influencing these population movements are vital for the formulation of appropriate 
rural and urban development policies. In the context of migration between rural and 
urban sectors, the chapter’s main research questions are as follows: 
i) What are the major influences on migration decisions? 
ii) What is the impact of migration on migrants’ welfare? 
The chapter’s analysis consists of the use of both descriptive statistics and econometric 
modelling. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses issues 
relating to definitions. The third section discusses migration patterns and a profile of 
migrants in the periods 1991/92 and 1998/99. The modelling framework for the 
empirical analysis is outlined in the fourth section. In the fifth section, we carry out an 
empirical analysis of migration between Ghana’s rural and urban sectors using data 
from the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey. Section six concludes the chapter. 
                                                 
50
 A paper based on this chapter was presented at the 2006 NEUDC (Northeast Universities Development 
Consortium) Conference at Cornell University. Comments received from participants are very much 
appreciated. 
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6.2 Definitions 
 
At this point it is important to address the issue of the definition of a migrant as used in 
this empirical analysis. Given that this section’s analysis is mainly based on GLSS4 
data, it is instructive to identify some definitions proposed by the GLSS4 Report. The 
definitions – all relating to persons aged 15 years or more – are as follows (GSS 2000a): 
 
In-migrant: a person born outside current place of residence; 
Return migrant: a person born at current place of residence, but who had lived 
elsewhere for at least one year, and returned to place of birth; 
Migrant: an in-migrant or a return migrant; 
Non-migrant: a person born at current place of residence, and who has never lived 
elsewhere for a period lasting, at least, one year. 
 
Whilst the above definitions seem appropriate, it is important to note that they do not 
capture the phenomenon of seasonal or, more generally, temporary migration. 
Consequently, there is a chance of classifying many seasonal and temporary migrants as 
non-migrants. This limitation of the definitions is, however, closely related to the data 
collected in the survey; the survey’s data do not permit an examination of temporary 
migration. As a result, the migration-related definitions proposed in the present study 
similarly do not address this limitation. Future GLSS surveys could, therefore, be 
enhanced with the inclusion of questions that would generate information about 
temporary migration. 
 
A second problem with the above definitions relates to the importance placed on 
birthplace. For example, the definition of an in-migrant can inappropriately classify 
certain persons as in-migrants, as might occur with persons who have always lived in a 
rural locality, but were born in a nearby town (possibly, the district capital). In Ghana 
(and presumably, in many other developing countries), it is not uncommon for 
expectant women to deliver their babies outside their localities of residence. This may 
occur in cases where rural residents deliver in nearby towns owing to inadequate health 
facilities in their own localities. An expectant woman may also deliver outside her 
residential locality simply because of a decision to be with her mother just before 
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delivery, ostensibly to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and skill in the nursing of 
babies. In the cited and similar instances, the nursing mother typically returns (with her 
child) to her usual place of residence, where the child may live permanently or until he 
or she becomes an adult. Furthermore, circumstances unrelated to child delivery may 
result in children moving (along with their parents or guardians) to some other locality 
and residing there permanently. Thus, a desirable feature of migrant-related definitions 
is an adjustment for dealing with problems posed by the strict linkage of migrant status 
to place of birth. 
 
In the light of the preceding discussion, the following definitions are proposed: 
In-migrant: a person born outside current place of residence, and who was at least 15 
years old at the time of moving to current place; 
Return migrant: a person born at current place of residence (or who moved to current 
place of residence before age 15) and who has lived elsewhere for more than one year 
and returned to current place when aged at least 15 years; 
Non-migrant: an “adult” (aged at least 15 years) who is neither an in-migrant nor a 
return migrant.  
 
6.3 Migration patterns and profile of migrants 
 
The available data lend support to the prevalence of migration in Ghana, since a sizable 
proportion of the population are migrants or have migrated at some point in their lives. 
In 1991/92, 46.5 percent of Ghana’s population were migrants (that is, either in-
migrants or return-migrants) whereas the migrant share of the population in 1998/99 
was 39.1 percent (see Table 16). 
 
 
Table 16: Extent of migration in Ghana; 1991/92 and 1998/99 
 
Migrant status 
Share (%) of population   
(1991/92) 
Share (%) of population 
(1998/99) 
In-migrant 24.34 20.13 
Return-migrant 22.15 18.92 
Non-migrant 53.51 60.95 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from GLSS 3 and GLSS4. 
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In terms of origin-destination classification, the data suggest that Ghana’s internal 
migration is dominated by rural-to-rural and urban-to-rural forms of population 
movement. For example, in 1991/92, 14.8 percent of Ghana’s population were rural-to-
rural migrants and 13.5 percent were urban-to-rural migrants, whereas urban-to-urban 
and rural-to-urban migrants constituted 10.5 percent and 3.9 percent, respectively (see 
Table 17).  The pattern of internal migration in 1998/99 was not very different from that 
of 1991/92; urban-to-rural migrants accounted for 13.0 percent of the population, whilst 
rural-to-rural and urban-to-urban migrants represented 12.7 percent and 7.6 percent of 
the population, respectively. As reflected in Table 17, the rural-to-urban migrant share 
(3.1 percent) of the population was the lowest (that is, amongst internal migrants) in 
1998/99. On the whole, and in both survey years, the migrant category with the lowest 
proportion of the population was foreign-to-urban migrants, followed by foreign-to-
rural migrants. It is important to note, however, that in both 1991/92 and 1998/99, 
majority of persons migrating to Ghana from other countries were return migrants (see 
Table 26 and Table 27 in the Appendix to this chapter). 
 
 
Table 17: Distribution of types of migrants in Ghana; 1991/92 and 1998/99 
 
Migrant category 
Proportion (%) of 
population; 1991/92
51
 
Proportion (%) of 
population; 1998/99 
Urban-to-urban          10.46           7.55 
Urban-to-rural          13.49          13.01 
Rural-to-urban            3.93            3.07 
Rural-to-rural          14.75          12.72 
Foreign-to-urban            1.63            0.98 
Foreign-to-rural            1.99            1.72 
Non-migrant          53.74           60.95 
Total        100.00         100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from GLSS 3 and GLSS4. 
 
The characteristics of migrants have been fairly similar between 1991/92 and 1998/99. 
With regard to the gender distribution, females had a higher share than males in each of 
the two survey years. In 1991/92, 53.7 percent of migrants were females, whilst the 
corresponding proportion in 1998/99 was 54.2 percent. It is worth noting that in 
1991/92, even though female migrants outnumbered their male colleagues, the 
migration rate amongst males (46.7 percent) was not very different from the rate (46.4 
                                                 
51
 Information on migrants’ previous place of residence was missing for 0.9% of migrants. 
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percent) amongst females (see Table 28 in the Appendix). The 1998/99 data also 
indicate similar migration rates for males (38.8 percent) and females (39.3 percent). 
 
An examination of Table 18 shows that the majority of Ghana’s migrants are less than 
forty-five years old, and that little change occurred in migrants’ age distribution 
between 1991/92 and 1998/99. In each of the two survey years, migrants who were less 
than forty-five years old accounted for more than 55 percent of the migrant population. 
It must be stressed though, that whilst this age distribution is not surprising, it appears to 
be largely attributable to a generally large share of young people in the population. This 
point is informed by the even more pronounced domination of young people in the non-
migrant population (see Table 18). In fact, amongst persons aged fifteen years or more, 
regardless of migration status, more than 80 percent are less than forty-five years old; 
this holds for both GLSS3 and GLSS4. It is also worth mentioning that the distribution 
of internal migrants is generally similar across the different age groups, except that in 
both survey years, rural-to-rural migration is particularly more prevalent amongst the 
elderly (see Table 34 and Table 35 in the Appendix). 
 
 
Table 18: Age distribution of migrants and non-migrants; 1991/92 and 1998/99 
Age group (in 
years) 
Share (%) 
amongst 
migrants; 
1991/92 
Share (%) 
amongst 
migrants; 
1998/99 
Share (%) 
amongst non-
migrants; 
1991/92 
Share (%) 
amongst non-
migrants; 
1998/99 
15 ≤ age < 25    11.97       9.77   49.59   49.96 
25 ≤ age < 35    25.27     23.04   20.49   18.57 
35 ≤ age < 45    23.69     26.14   11.22   13.99 
45 ≤ age < 55    18.76     20.44     8.19     8.29 
55 ≤ age < 65    11.03     10.42     4.72     4.43 
Age ≥ 65      9.29     10.19     5.78     4.76 
Total  100.00   100.00 100.00  100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from GLSS 3 and GLSS4. 
 
The main reasons for migrating – as indicated by migrants – were generally similar in 
the two surveys. In 1991/92, “other family reasons” was the response category that 
accounted for the largest share (37.9%) of reasons for migrating. This was followed by 
marriage, own employment, spouse’s employment, “other”, schooling, and drought/war 
in that order (see Table 30 in the Appendix to the present chapter). In 1998/99, “other 
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family reasons” was again the response category that accounted for the largest share 
(37.5%) of reasons for migrating. The second most cited reason in 1998/99 was own 
employment, with marriage, spouse’s employment, “other”, schooling, and drought/war 
following in that order (see Table 31 in the Appendix to the chapter). Given the 
importance of “other family reasons” in migration decisions, it would have been useful 
to know exactly what some of these family reasons are. 
 
While broad similarities are evident in the cited reasons for migrating, it is important to 
highlight some gender-related differences. In 1991/92, “other family reasons” was the 
most stated reason for migrating given by men, while own employment was the second 
most dominant reason. Amongst females, however, the most cited reason was marriage, 
followed closely by “other family reasons”. Given that in Ghana, it is women who 
normally migrate to join their husbands, it is not surprising that more than 30 percent of 
females – in each of the survey years – said they migrated mainly because of marriage; 
the corresponding percentage for men was less than 3 in each period. Furthermore, the 
data suggest that migrating as a result of a spouse’s employment is more often 
undertaken by women. In both survey years, spouse’s employment was the third most 
cited reason amongst females, whereas for males, it was the fourth most mentioned 
reason. 
 
In order to obtain a rough measure of living standards across migrant status, we 
examine – for both rural and urban sectors – the mean consumption welfare for in-
migrants, return-migrants, and non-migrants. To this end, we define an individual’s 
consumption welfare as the total consumption expenditure per adult equivalent of that 
individual’s household, measured in real terms. In 1991/92, return migrants had the 
highest mean consumption welfare, followed by in-migrants and non-migrants, in that 
order. In 1998/99, in-migrants had the highest mean consumption welfare, but no clear 
pattern emerged in the ranking between return migrants and non-migrants (see Table 32 
and Table 33 in the Appendix). 
 
A comparison of the mean consumption welfare of internal migrants indicates that 
urban-to-urban migrants had the highest welfare in each of the two survey years, with 
rural-to-urban, urban-to-rural, and rural-to-rural migrants following in that order (see 
Table 19). Furthermore, in both 1991/92 and 1998/99, urban non-migrants had, on 
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average, a higher level of consumption welfare than urban-to-rural in-migrants, whilst 
rural non-migrants had a lower level of consumption welfare than rural-to-urban in-
migrants. These results lend themselves to various reasonable explanations. It is 
plausible, that for urban areas, it is those with lower welfare who often migrate to the 
rural localities, whereas amongst rural dwellers, it is the relatively better-off who 
usually manage to migrate to the urban sector. The results might also be reflecting the 
general welfare disparities between urban and rural sectors. Additionally, these findings 
could be hinting at a tendency for rural-to-urban migration to be more rewarding than 
urban-to-rural migration. The empirical analysis of migration’s impact on migrants’ 
welfare will shed more light on these issues. 
 
 
Table 19: Mean consumption welfare of internal migrants (in ‘000 cedis); 1991/92 
and 1998/99 
Migrant category 1991/92 1998/99 
Urban-to-urban 1,848.1 1,941.2 
Urban-to-rural 1,113.5 1,234.6 
Rural-to-urban 1,616.3 1,636.2 
Rural-to-rural 1,034.3 1,067.8 
Source: Author’s computation using data from GLSS 3 and GLSS4. 
 
 
6.4 Modelling of migration’s impact on migrants’ welfare 
 
The previous section’s discussion provided some insight into the extent and pattern of 
migration, as well as information about consumption welfare across categories of 
migrants. However, as noted in the introduction to the present chapter, it is useful to 
know the welfare impact of migration. In this section, we outline a general model for 
estimating the impact of migration on migrants’ welfare; a general model suffices 
because only a slight modification is required to extend the analysis to the specific cases 
of rural-to-urban migration and urban-to-rural migration. The basic modelling strategy 
follows very closely Lee (1978) and Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980), and is summarised 
as follows: 
1. A simultaneous estimation of the following three equations: 
a) A migration decision equation, defined over both migrants and non-migrants; 
b) A welfare equation for migrants; and 
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c) A welfare equation for non-migrants. 
 
2. The use of the two welfare equations – and data on both migrants and non-migrants – 
to estimate the average impact of migration on migrants’ welfare. 
 
6.4.1 Theoretical framework 
 
Sjaastad’s (1962) human capital framework constitutes the theoretical underpinning for 
the model employed. By viewing migration as an investment in human capital, Sjaastad 
suggests that prospective migrants aim to maximise the present value of the net gains 
resulting from locational change. For any potential migrant, suppose the present value 
of the migration generated net gain is given by: 
 
m
T
ntmtm Cdt
-pt
eWW(t)PV -]-[ 
0 ∫=                                                      (1) 
 
where 
Wmt represents anticipated welfare at the m
th
 prospective destination locality at time t; 
Wnt represents anticipated welfare at origin locality at time t; 
Cm denotes a one-time cost
52
 of migrating to locality m; 
T: duration of migration status; 
p: implicit discount rate. 
 
The individual does not migrate if PVm ≤ 0 for all m; 
The individual migrates, if there exists an m for which PVm > 0, and where this 
condition is satisfied by more than one prospective destination, the individual selects the 
destination yielding the maximum PVm. 
 
In order to adapt the above theoretical framework for empirical analyses, we (following 
Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980) make the following assumption: 
 
                                                 
52
 Even though costs associated with migration are not incurred once, recurring costs of locational change 
are subsumed in the welfare measure. 
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At any given time, individual i will choose to migrate if the anticipated welfare gain 
exceeds the corresponding migration costs. 
 
This implies that at any given time, an individual will migrate if his/her proportionate 
welfare gain exceeds the migration costs, as a proportion of welfare. Thus, denoting the 
individual’s migration costs (as a proportion of welfare) by Qi, individual i will migrate 
if: 
[(Wmi – Wni)/Wni] – Qi > 0,                                                                  (2) 
and will not migrate if: 
[(Wmi – Wni)/Wni] – Qi  ≤ 0,                                                                  (3) 
where 
Wmi denotes individual i’s welfare as a migrant; and 
Wni denotes individual i’s welfare as a non-migrant. 
 
It may be argued that the costs of migration depend on individual attributes (for 
example, age, sex, and marital status) and community-level characteristics, such as the 
cost of living and the unemployment rate. Thus, the decision regarding whether to 
migrate – as indicated in inequalities (2) and (3) – may be expressed as a function of 
(anticipated) welfare gains, individual attributes, and community (origin or destination) 
characteristics. In the tradition of similar methodologies (see, for example, Lee 1978 
and Nakosteen and Zimmer 1980), we adopt a linear functional form for the migration 
decision equation as follows: 
Individual i migrates if: 
I i
∗  = α0 + α1[(Wmi - Wni)/Wni] + α.Gi – εi > 0,                                       (4) 
and does not migrate if 
I i
∗  = α0 + α1[(Wmi - Wni)/Wni] + α.Gi – εi ≤  0,                                      (5) 
where 
α1: Coefficient of the welfare gain variable 
Gi: Vector of variables representing appropriate individual and community 
characteristics 
α: Vector of coefficients of the variables in Gi: 
εi: An error term; and 
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α0: A constant term 
 
It is also reasonable to postulate that an individual’s welfare level depends on personal 
characteristics (such as educational attainment) and community attributes (for example, 
the availability of socio-economic amenities). An individual’s welfare equation can 
consequently be expressed as a function of variables representing individual and 
community characteristics. Invoking the argument of Lee (1978) that (LnWmi - LnWni) 
and (Wmi - Wni)/Wni are approximately equal, the empirical model is specified below, 
with the welfare equations formulated in logarithmic form: 
 
=∗I i α0 + α1(LnWmi - LnWni) + α.Gi - εi  
LnWmi = am + βm.Xi + εmi 
LnWni = an + βn.Xi + εni 
 
where 
I i
∗  is not observed, but we rather observe 
Ii = 1 if I i
∗> 0, and Ii = 0 if I i
∗≤ 0; 
LnWmi: log of migrant welfare 
LnWni: log of non-migrant welfare 
Xi: Vector of variables representing relevant individual and community characteristics 
βm: Migrant vector of coefficients of the variables in Xi 
βn:  Non-migrant vector of coefficients of the variables in Xi 
εi, εmi, and εni are all Normally distributed error terms with zero mean and constant 
variance; 
All other variables retain their definitions. 
 
The observed variables in the model are the limited dependent variables, Wmi and Wni, 
the dichotomous migration decision variable Ii, and the variables contained in vectors 
Gi, and Xi. In general, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique is inappropriate for 
estimating the welfare equations due to its failure to account for selectivity bias (see 
Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980; and Lee, 1978). As a result, we employ Lee’s (1978) 
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proposed solution
53
; the welfare equations are modified by incorporating appropriate 
“selectivity variables”, and adding error terms with zero means. It is worth emphasising 
that even though the variables contained in Gi and Xi represent individual and 
community characteristics, the two vectors need not contain identical variables. 
 
6.4.2 Estimation procedure 
 
In order to estimate all the parameters of the model, the following estimation technique 
is used: 
i. Probit estimation of the reduced-form migration decision equation 
The regressors in this equation consist of the exogenous variables in all the three 
structural equations. Fitted values ( iψˆ ) obtained from this (first) stage are used to 
construct variables u1i and u2i, where: 
u1i = f ( iψˆ ) / F( iψˆ ) is the selectivity variable for the migrant welfare equation; 
u2i = f ( iψˆ ) / [1- F( iψˆ )] is the selectivity variable for the non-migrant welfare equation; 
f: the density function of a standard normal random variable; and 
F: the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. 
 
ii. Insertion of u1i and u2i into the appropriate welfare equations and estimating the 
welfare equations by OLS 
Estimates obtained using the above two-step procedure are known to be consistent (see 
Lee, 1978). 
 
iii. Probit estimation of the structural migration decision equation 
In this step, the consistent parameter estimates of the welfare equations are used to 
obtain fitted values of the logarithm of welfare, which are in turn, used to compute 
estimates of (LnWmi - LnWni). Together with other exogenous variables, the estimates of 
(LnWmi - LnWni) are inserted into the structural decision equation to obtain the probit 
estimates of the structural migration decision equation. 
 
                                                 
53
 As noted earlier, this technique is often referred to as the Heckman two-step method. 
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6.4.3 Determination of migration’s impact on migrants’ welfare 
 
In order to estimate migration’s impact on migrants’ welfare, we employ simulations of 
counterfactual scenarios, coupled with the estimation of an index of welfare gain due to 
migration. This is accomplished by computing an index of the welfare differential 
between migration and non-migration scenarios as follows: 
 
For any sub-group (δ)54 of the entire sample, let N(δ) be the corresponding population 
size; 
Then, for any sub-group (δ), the average proportionate welfare increment attributable to 
migration may be expressed as: 
 
∑
∈
−
=
δi Wni
WniWmi
δN
g
)(
1
 
 
Where, Wmi and Wni – individual i’s welfare levels
55
 as a migrant and as a non-migrant, 
respectively – are proxied by their corresponding fitted values. 
 
 
6.5 Empirical analysis 
 
6.5.1 Introductory note and discussion of variables 
 
In applying the described model to an analysis of migration between Ghana’s rural and 
urban sectors, a number of adjustments are made. These adjustments stem from an 
explicit recognition of two separate migratory movements, namely, urban-to-rural 
migration and rural-to-urban migration. Two separate analyses are consequently carried 
out, one for each migratory movement. It should be noted also, that a migrant – as used 
in the outlined analytical model – is equivalent to an in-migrant as defined earlier; thus, 
                                                 
54
 Examples of a sub-group are (i) migrants and (ii) migrants and non-migrants. 
55
 Although the proportionate change in welfare could have been approximated by the difference in log 
welfare, we follow Lee (1978) in deriving the welfare levels from log welfare via the relation x = e
logx
. 
Thus, for example, Wmi = e
logWmi
.  
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return migrants are excluded
56
. Furthermore, we employ a consumption measure of 
welfare for which an individual’s consumption welfare is defined as the total real 
consumption expenditure per adult equivalent of that individual’s household. It should 
be noted that this welfare measure – contained in the GLSS dataset – was computed on 
the basis of an equivalence scale commonly used in nutritional studies in Ghana (GSS 
2000c). 
 
In addition to the above adjustments, the econometric analysis has been carried out with 
the household head as the unit of observation. This has been done in order to 
circumvent the problem posed by a feature of the dataset; where two or more migrants 
belong to the same household, they will have the same welfare level even though the 
values of their explanatory variables will almost certainly vary. This characteristic of 
the dataset will normally render the estimation of the welfare function inappropriate if 
the estimation is done over the sample of migrants, including those belonging to the 
same household.  
 
For the analysis of urban-to-rural migration, the three structural equations consist of a 
migration decision equation (defined over a pooled sample of urban non-migrants and 
urban-to-rural in-migrants), a welfare equation for urban-to-rural in-migrants, and a 
welfare equation for urban non-migrants. Similarly, in analysing rural-to-urban 
migration, the relevant structural equations comprise a migration decision equation 
(defined over a pooled sample of rural non-migrants and rural-to-urban in-migrants), a 
welfare equation for rural-to-urban in-migrants, and a welfare equation for rural non-
migrants. 
 
The entire data contained 14,196 observations on persons aged 15 years or more. The 
set of regressors for each of the two migration status equations includes variables for 
highest educational attainment, age group, marital status
57
, ethnicity, and (anticipated) 
welfare gain. The choice of these variables is informed by theory, the literature, and a 
preliminary analysis that explored various combinations of regressors. In particular, in 
order to ensure that the parameters of the structural (migration) decision equation are 
                                                 
56
 As an ancillary analysis, the impact of migration on the welfare of return migrants is considered later in 
the chapter. 
57
 Here, what is used is a variable that places emphasis on whether (or not) a person has always been 
single. 
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identified, the welfare equations must contain at least one exogenous variable that is 
excluded from the structural migration equation (Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980). As a 
result, in both the urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban models, household size is included 
as a regressor in the welfare equations, but excluded from the migration decision 
equation. It is worth noting also that the set of regressors for the urban-to-rural and 
rural-to-urban models are not identical. This is because the coefficients of some 
regressors were significant in one model, but insignificant in the other. 
 
On a priori grounds, we expect education to have a positive impact on rural-to-urban 
migration, and to have a negative effect on urban-to-rural migration. With regard to age, 
the literature suggests that young adults tend to have a higher propensity to migrate than 
the elderly. It is therefore expected that the tendency to migrate amongst lower age 
groups will be higher than that of higher age groups. The impact (on migration) of 
anticipated welfare gain is expected to be positive; an expectation rooted in both 
theoretical and intuitive considerations. Finally, apart from serving as control variables, 
the ethnicity variables can provide further insights into population movements between 
Ghana’s rural and urban localities. 
 
Theory and preliminary data examination were again crucial in the selection of 
regressors for the welfare equations. Most of the regressors were common to all four 
welfare equations. These common regressors include highest educational attainment, 
selectivity, and location, as well as variables that capture household characteristics, such 
as size, access to pipe-borne water for drinking, and the use of electricity for lighting. It 
is worth noting that since some regressors in welfare equations can often be 
endogenous, it is important to address this issue satisfactorily. One major approach 
adopted in dealing with this concern is the replacement of variables that are likely to be 
endogenous with respect to migration. Thus, for example, when estimating 
counterfactual non-migrant welfare levels for in-migrants, the Regional, employment, 
and other dummies were replaced with their actual pre-migration values where 
available. For variables for which pre-migration values are unavailable, these were 
predicted using probit regression estimates for the sample of non-migrants
58
. Table 20 
shows a list of variables used in the analysis, together with their mean and standard 
                                                 
58
 These probit regressions – about twenty in all – are available upon request. 
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deviation.
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Table 20: List of variables for the econometric analysis 
Variable Description Number of 
observations 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
lnW Log of welfare      14,196 13.93 0.71 
sex1 Male 14,196 0.46 0.50 
sex2 Female 14,196 0.54 0.50 
Hhsize Household size 14,196 5.53 2.87 
n15 # of children (<15 
yrs) 14,196 2.22 1.82 
n65 # of elderly (>65 
yrs) 14,196 0.22 0.48 
hiedq1 No educational 
qualification 14,196 0.58 0.49 
hiedq2 MSLC/BECE 14,196 0.31 0.46 
hiedq3 Voc., comm.., O/A 
level 14,196 0.07 0.26 
hiedq4 TT/nursing/tech/prof. 14,196 0.03 0.17 
hiedq5 Degree holder 14,196 0.00 0.05 
hiedq6 Unspec. educ 14,196 0.00 0.05 
empcat1 empcat==     1.0000 14,196 0.23 0.42 
empcat2 Empl in agric. 14,196 0.43 0.50 
empcat3 Empl in industry 14,196 0.08 0.27 
empcat4 Empl in services 14,196 0.22 0.42 
empcat5 Empl in other 14,196 0.03 0.17 
farmliv1 HH - farm-related 
activity 14,196 0.71 0.45 
foodpr1 HH - food processing 14,196 0.67 0.47 
othbus1 HH - other business 14,196 0.50 0.50 
pbw1 Pipe-borne water 14,196 0.40 0.49 
eg1 Electricity/generator 14,196 0.39 0.49 
ez2 Forest zone 14,196 0.45 0.50 
ez3 Savannah zone 14,196 0.23 0.42 
agegp1 15≤age<25 14,196 0.30 0.46 
agegp2 25≤age<35 14,196 0.22 0.41 
agegp3 35≤age<45 14,196 0.18 0.38 
agegp4 45≤age<55 14,196 0.13 0.34 
agegp5 55≤age<65 14,196 0.08 0.27 
agegp6 Age ≥ 65 14,196 0.09 0.29 
mar1 Married 14,196 0.44 0.50 
mar2 Informal union 14,196 0.11 0.31 
mar3 Divorced/separated 14,196 0.08 0.27 
mar4 Widowed 14,196 0.07 0.25 
mar5 Never married 14,196 0.31 0.46 
ez1 Coastal zone 14,196 0.32 0.47 
ez2 Forest zone 14,196 0.45 0.50 
ez3 Savannah zone 14,196 0.23 0.42 
reg1 Western 14,196 0.11 0.31 
reg2 Central 14,196 0.10 0.30 
reg3 Greater Accra 14,196 0.13 0.33 
reg4 Eastern 14,196 0.13 0.33 
reg5 Volta 14,196 0.14 0.35 
reg6 Ashanti 14,196 0.18 0.38 
reg7 Brong-Ahafo 14,196 0.08 0.26 
reg8 Northern 14,196 0.07 0.26 
reg9 Upper West 14,196 0.03 0.16 
reg10 Upper East 14,196 0.05 0.21 
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It should be noted also that owing to the fact that the selectivity variable is non-linear, 
the selectivity-adjusted welfare regressions are, in principle, identified even if the set of 
regressors for the first-step probit is identical to that of the welfare regressions (see 
Dolton, 2007; and Puhani, 2000). Dolton has observed, however, that in order to 
facilitate the identification of the outcome (OLS) equation, it is desirable to have at least 
one regressor in the first-step probit excluded from the outcome regression. This 
excluded variable is often referred to as the identifying variable or the exclusion 
restriction. 
 
It is usually difficult to find an appropriate exclusion restriction, since variable(s) that 
may influence participation often also affects outcome. Moreover, tests of the validity of 
exclusion restrictions are uncommon in the literature. In this chapter and the next, we 
provide tests of the validity of the exclusion restrictions employed in the selectivity-
adjusted welfare regressions; those for the migration analysis are in the appendix to the 
present chapter and those for the remittance analysis can be found in the appendix to 
chapter seven. These tests – following Dolton (2007) – are based on the logic that an 
exclusion restriction (or identifying variable) is valid if its coefficient is significant 
when included in the probit, but insignificant when included in the selectivity-adjusted 
OLS regression. 
 
Additionally, since the methodology adopted involves estimating separate equations for 
migrants and non-migrants, Wald-type tests were performed to ascertain whether the 
coefficients of the regressors differ across the migrant and non-migrant samples. 
Clearly, it might be unnecessary to split the sample if there were evidence to suggest 
that the coefficients are the same across the split samples. The results of the test (see  
Table 36 and Table 37) fail to provide evidence that the two sets of coefficients are 
equal, thus strengthening the justification for the methodology employed. It is worth 
mentioning that similar tests are performed for the remittance analysis (see Table 61 and 
Table 62 in the appendix to chapter seven). 
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6.5.2 Factors influencing urban-to-rural migration 
 
In Table 21, results from the following three regressions are displayed
59
, with the 
highlighted variable (the gender dummy) representing the exclusion restriction: 
 
welf1: OLS welfare regression for household heads who are urban-to-rural in-
migrants, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of welfare; 
 
welf0: OLS welfare regression for urban non-migrant household heads, where the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of welfare; and 
 
Probit: Probit estimation of the structural migration decision equation, using the pooled 
sample of urban non-migrant household heads and urban-to-rural in-migrants who are 
household heads, where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 for an 
in-migrant and 0 for a non-migrant. 
 
The results of the analysis generally conform to a priori expectations. The positive and 
significant coefficient of the anticipated welfare gain variable suggests that this factor is 
a major influence on Ghana’s urban-to-rural migration decisions. The results further 
suggest that in comparison with their elderly (at least 65 years old) colleagues, urban 
adults who are less than 35 years old are less likely to migrate to rural areas. Given that 
rural life hardly appeals to Ghana’s urban young adults, this finding is not surprising. 
 
We also find evidence consistent with the view that in comparison with their female 
colleagues, males urban residents are more likely to migrate to rural localities, all else 
being equal. In view of the high statistical significance (p-value is 0.007) of the 
coefficient of the gender dummy, it is reasonable to conclude that gender is a strong 
factor in Ghana’s urban-to-rural migration decisions. 
 
Our findings do not show a strong influence of education in urban-to-rural migration 
decisions. There is, nevertheless, some indication that relative to having no education, 
an educational attainment to the MSLC/BECE level could increase the probability of 
                                                 
59
 The results from the first-step probit regression can be found in the appendix (see Table 38). 
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migrating from an urban area to the rural sector. None of the other educational dummies 
had statistically significant coefficients. 
 
The performance of the ethnicity dummies provides additional insights into Ghana’s 
urban-to-rural migration. The results suggest that ethnicity plays an influential role in 
urban-to-rural migration decisions. For instance, the findings suggest that relative to 
urban residents of Northern extraction, Asantes living in urban areas are more likely to 
migrate to rural areas, all other things being equal. The same holds for Fantis, other 
Akans, and Ga-Adangbes. Given the lack of a clear explanation for this finding, further 
research on this issue will be instructive. 
 
6.5.3 Factors influencing the consumption levels of urban non-migrants and urban-
to-rural in-migrants 
 
As noted earlier, an exclusion restriction was imposed in order to facilitate the 
identification of the welfare equation. Apart from the fact that the selection of the 
gender dummy as the exclusion restriction is supported by the test of its validity (see 
Table 43), such a choice makes practical sense. This is because while the importance of 
gender in migration decisions has been generally acknowledged, it is plausible to expect 
that a migrant’s gender will have little influence on the average household welfare since 
the gender of other household members might be equally important in determining 
household welfare. 
 
With regard to the consumption welfare of urban-to-rural in-migrants, there is strong 
support for a negative effect of household size on welfare. The results show a strong 
negative association between household size and the welfare of urban-to-rural in-
migrants. Additionally, strong support is found – amongst both urban-to-rural in-
migrants and urban non-migrants – for a welfare-enhancing role of education. In both 
welfare equations, virtually all the education dummies have significantly positive 
effects on welfare. 
 
The results further suggest that having electricity (or a generator) for lighting enhances 
the welfare of urban non-migrants. This finding is tenable, given the health hazards 
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associated with some other forms of lighting. Similarly, access to pipe-borne water for 
drinking is strongly associated with improved living standards of urban non-migrants, a 
finding that is expected. It is worth mentioning that virtually none of the locational 
variables had their coefficient being statistically significant. 
 
Another notable finding relates to self-selectivity. For the urban-to-rural welfare 
equation, the coefficient of the selectivity variable is statistically significant and 
positive. This provides support for the positive selectivity of urban-to-rural in-migrants; 
urban-to-rural in-migrants fared better than urban non-migrants would have fared if they 
had migrated. Furthermore, the statistical significance of the coefficient of the 
selectivity variable provides justification for the use of a methodology that corrects for 
selectivity-bias. Other results relating to urban non-migrants are worth noting; ceteris 
paribus, individuals whose households are engaged in an agricultural enterprise are 
likely to have lower levels of welfare relative to those whose households are not 
engaged in these activities. On the other hand, the results suggest that an urban non-
migrant’s welfare tends to be enhanced by the household’s ownership of some other 
business. 
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Table 21: Urban-to-rural migration model 
Dependent variables: 
probit: dummy (1 if urban-to-rural in-migrant, 0 if urban non-migrant) 
welf1 and welf0: Natural logarithm of household consumption expenditure per adult equivalent 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                    welf1                        welf0                       probit                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Household size                      -0.12***       (0.01)        -0.11***       (0.01)                              
Longer-term migrant dummy            0.14          (0.08)                                                           
Log mean age of adults              -0.14          (0.11)         0.04          (0.06)                              
MSLC/BECE                            0.16**        (0.07)         0.07          (0.04)         0.33*         (0.17) 
Voc., comm., O/A level               0.40***       (0.12)         0.30***       (0.05)         0.03          (0.28) 
TT/nursing/tech/prof.                0.52***       (0.12)         0.32***       (0.07)         0.06          (0.24) 
Degree holder                        1.29***       (0.36)         0.34          (0.27)                              
Unspecified education                0.25          (0.47)         0.43          (0.27)                              
No educ qualification (omitted category) 
Farm/livestock                       0.08          (0.10)        -0.10*         (0.05)                              
Food processing                      0.03          (0.08)        -0.02          (0.04)                              
Other business                       0.01          (0.06)         0.14***       (0.03)                              
Pipe-borne water                    -0.09          (0.13)         0.16**        (0.08)                              
Electricity/generator                0.16          (0.11)         0.31***       (0.06)                              
Western                              0.65          (0.50)         0.03          (0.22)                              
Central                              0.57          (0.49)        -0.39*         (0.22)                              
Greater Accra                        0.71          (0.49)         0.09          (0.21)                              
Eastern                              0.22          (0.48)        -0.14          (0.21)                              
Volta                                0.52          (0.49)        -0.15          (0.22)                              
Ashanti                              0.67          (0.49)         0.17          (0.21)                              
Brong-Ahafo                          0.51          (0.48)         0.00          (0.21)                              
Northern                             0.21          (0.52)        -0.12          (0.20)                              
Upper West                          -0.28          (0.61)        -0.17          (0.23)                              
Upper East (omitted category) 
Selectivity                          0.33**        (0.15)        -0.07          (0.12)                              
Male                                                                                           0.44***       (0.16) 
Age:[15, 25)                                                                                  -0.65*         (0.39) 
Age:[25, 35)                                                                                  -0.47*         (0.25) 
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Table 21: Continued … 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                    welf1                        welf0                       probit                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age:[35, 45)                                                                                   0.15          (0.23) 
Age:[45, 55)                                                                                   0.13          (0.23) 
Age:[55, 65)                                                                                   0.14          (0.24) 
Age≥65 (omitted category) 
Asante                                                                                         1.76***       (0.24) 
Fanti                                                                                          0.65**        (0.26) 
Other Akan                                                                                     0.58***       (0.22) 
Ga-Adangbe                                                                                     0.62*         (0.37) 
Ewe                                                                                            0.18          (0.24) 
Other tribe                                                                                    1.41***       (0.29) 
Northern tribes (omitted category) 
Never married                                                                                  0.03          (0.29) 
Anticipated welfare gain                                                                       4.59***       (0.28) 
Constant                            14.01***       (0.67)        14.20***       (0.29)         0.88***       (0.30) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                                  403.00                      1044.00                      1372.00                 
r2                                   0.42                         0.45                                              
r2_a                                 0.39                         0.44                                              
F                                   12.01                        38.59                                              
r2_p                                                                                           0.70                 
chi2                                                                                        1066.46                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
r2_p: Pseudo r2 
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6.5.4 Welfare-gain from urban-to-rural migration 
 
The average proportionate welfare gap between in-migrant and non-migrant scenarios is 
very informative. On the whole, migration had a negative impact on the welfare of 
urban-to-rural in-migrants as they incurred (on average) a 9.3 percentage welfare loss 
(see Table 22). Further examination shows that 32.6 percent of urban-to-rural in-
migrants gained from migrating, their average proportionate gain being 26.5 percent. 
These findings suggest that although urban-to-rural migration is generally not beneficial 
to the migrants, some migrants do gain. 
 
A similar simulation for urban non-migrants shows that if they had migrated to the rural 
sector, they would have incurred a 60.7 percentage welfare loss on average. As shown 
in Table 22, migrating to the rural sector would have left almost all (99.9 percent) of the 
urban non-migrants un-rewarded. Whilst the findings summarised in Table 22 are not a 
direct test for selectivity bias, they lend support to the notion that migrants – and non-
migrants – are often non-randomly selected from the population. Migrants tend to be 
those who have a better chance (compared with non-migrants) of gaining from 
migration. In order to provide an idea of how robust these results might be, the results 
corresponding to an alternative model specification
60
 are shown in Table 41 in the 
Appendix. 
 
 
Table 22: Migration-generated welfare gains; urban-to-rural migration (selectivity 
bias adjusted) 
 Number of 
persons 
Mean 
percentage 
welfare gain 
Percentage 
with welfare 
gain 
Percentage 
without 
welfare gain 
Urban-to-rural 
in-migrants 
337 -9.31 32.64 
(Mean % gain 
= 26.52) 
67.36 
(Mean % loss 
= 26.67) 
Urban non-
migrants 
1,036 -60.70 0.10 
(Mean % gain 
= 2.28) 
99.90 
(Mean % loss 
= 60.76) 
 
 
                                                 
60
 In this alternative specification, the welfare regression includes “# of children” and “# of elderly” as 
regressors.  
 155 
6.5.5 Factors influencing rural-to-urban migration 
 
The findings provide strong support for the importance of anticipated welfare gains in 
migration decisions (see Table 23). The results further point to an absence of a strong 
influence of age in rural-to-urban migration decisions. Nevertheless, the probit estimates 
suggest, that in comparison with the elderly, rural household heads who are aged 
between 35 and 45 years are more likely to be rural-to-urban in-migrants. Given that 
more than 60 percent of rural-to-urban in-migrants have lived at their current location 
for at least ten years, these results are consistent with the view that young adults are 
more likely to engage in rural-to-urban migration, i.e., in comparison with the elderly.   
 
In comparison with rural residents whose educational attainment is either lower than 
MSLC/BECE
61
 or unspecified, rural dwellers with the highest educational attainment 
being vocational, commercial, “O”, or “A” level, are less likely to migrate to the urban 
sector. The underlying reason for this particular finding is, however, unclear. The 
coefficients of the other educational dummies were not statistically significant. 
 
The migration analysis further reflects the view that ethnicity might have some 
influence on migration decisions. The statistically significant and positive coefficient of 
“Asante” suggests that all other things being equal, being an Asante increases the 
probability of rural-to-urban migration. Our results further show that compared to rural 
dwellers whose ethnicity is “Northern”, “Other Akan” rural dwellers are more prone to 
migrating to urban centres. It is worth mentioning that the statistical significance of the 
coefficient of “Other Akan” is particularly high. Since there is no strong reason to 
expect ethnicity to influence welfare, “Other Akan” has been used as the exclusion 
restriction for our selectivity-adjusted welfare regressions, and the test of its validity as 
an exclusion restriction is provided in Table 44 in the Appendix. 
 
It is worth noting that the absence of the gender dummy in the structural probit for 
rural-to-urban migration stems from the fact that the coefficient of the variable was 
insignificant in a preliminary estimation of the model. Considering that the gender 
                                                 
61
 MSLC is the Middle School Leaving Certificate (no longer awarded), and the BECE is the Basic 
Education Certificate Examination. Each of these represents the highest qualification at the basic 
education level. 
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dummy’s coefficient is significant in the urban-to-rural structural probit (see Table 21), 
this finding is interesting. Whereas, all other things being equal, males are more likely 
to migrate from urban to rural areas, rural-to-urban migration appears to be unaffected 
by gender. Although this result looks surprising, it is plausible if more wives tend to 
accompany their rural-to-urban migrating husbands than occurs with urban-to-rural 
migration. 
 
6.5.6 Factors influencing the consumption levels of rural non-migrants and rural-to-
urban in-migrants 
 
One of our robust results is the strong support established for a negative relationship 
between welfare and household size. All other things being equal, rural-to-urban in-
migrants whose households drink pipe-borne water enjoy a higher level of welfare, 
relative to their counterparts lacking this amenity. Furthermore, the living standards of 
rural-to-urban in-migrants are enhanced by the use of electricity (or a generator) for 
lighting. It should be noted, however, that the relationship between welfare and access 
to pipe-borne water or to electricity/generator should be treated as an association, since 
the regressors can hardly be considered strictly exogenous. 
 
The welfare equations for both rural non-migrants and rural-to-urban in-migrants further 
provide some support for the existence of a positive link between education and welfare. 
This positive association conforms to a priori expectations, and highlights the need to 
attach immense importance to education in national development policies. It is worth 
mentioning, though, that improvements in the educational level of all citizens may not 
necessarily enhance the welfare of everyone, owing to the fallacy of composition. 
 
Estimates of the rural-to-urban model are shown in Table 23 as follows: 
 
welf1: OLS welfare regression for household heads who are rural-to-urban in-
migrants, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of welfare; 
 
welf0: OLS welfare regression for household heads who are rural non-migrants, where 
the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of welfare; and 
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probit: Probit estimation of the structural migration decision equation, using the 
combined sample of rural non-migrant household heads and rural-to-urban in-migrants 
who are household heads; the dependent variable is a dummy which assumes the value 
1 for an in-migrant and 0 for a non-migrant. 
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Table 23: Rural-to-urban migration model 
Dependent variables: 
probit: dummy (1 if rural-to-urban in-migrant, 0 if rural non-migrant) 
welf1 and welf0: Natural logarithm of household consumption expenditure per adult equivalent 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                    welf1                        welf0                       probit                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Household size                      -0.11***       (0.01)        -0.12***       (0.01)                              
Longer-term migrant dummy           -0.14          (0.12)                                                           
Log mean age of adults               0.09          (0.15)        -0.06          (0.05)                              
MSLC/BECE                            0.11          (0.09)         0.05          (0.03)        -0.15          (0.14) 
Voc., comm., O/A level               0.36***       (0.13)         0.00          (0.08)        -0.61**        (0.27) 
TT/nursing/tech/prof.                0.45***       (0.13)         0.25**        (0.11)         0.15          (0.27) 
Degree holder                       -0.09          (0.48)         0.82**        (0.39)                              
No educ qualification (omitted category) 
Empl in agric.                      -0.18          (0.16)         0.22***       (0.08)                              
Empl in industry                     0.12          (0.14)         0.17*         (0.09)                              
Empl in services                     0.12          (0.13)         0.25***       (0.08)                              
Empl in other                        0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00)                              
Unemployed (omitted category) 
Other business                       0.05          (0.07)         0.13***       (0.03)                              
Pipe-borne water                     0.43***       (0.14)         0.05          (0.05)                              
Electricity/generator                0.48***       (0.11)         0.07          (0.05)                              
Western                              0.36*         (0.21)         0.90***       (0.07)                              
Central                             -0.54*         (0.29)         0.67***       (0.07)                              
Greater Accra                        0.34*         (0.19)         0.93***       (0.11)                              
Eastern                              0.09          (0.20)         0.65***       (0.07)                              
Volta                               -0.14          (0.19)         0.73***       (0.07)                              
Ashanti                              0.50***       (0.19)         0.89***       (0.07)                              
Brong-Ahafo                          0.32          (0.21)         0.72***       (0.07)                              
Northern                             0.00          (0.00)         0.42***       (0.07)                              
Upper West                           0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00)                              
Upper East (omitted category) 
Selectivity                          0.20*         (0.12)         0.23          (0.14)                              
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Table 23: Continued … 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                    welf1                        welf0                       probit                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age:[15, 25)                                                                                  -0.13          (0.48) 
Age:[25, 35)                                                                                   0.04          (0.21) 
Age:[35, 45)                                                                                   0.44**        (0.20) 
Age:[45, 55)                                                                                   0.29          (0.19) 
Age:[55, 65)                                                                                   0.10          (0.20) 
Age≥65 (omitted category) 
Asante                                                                                         0.40*         (0.23) 
Fanti                                                                                          0.18          (0.22) 
Other Akan                                                                                     0.59***       (0.20) 
Ewe                                                                                            0.29          (0.20) 
Other tribe                                                                                   -0.01          (0.22) 
Northern tribes (omitted category) 
Never married                                                                                 -0.06          (0.30) 
Anticipated welfare gain                                                                       2.83***       (0.18) 
Constant                            13.30***       (0.59)        13.59***       (0.23)        -2.09***       (0.21) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                                  168.00                      1480.00                      1619.00                 
r2                                   0.66                         0.38                                              
r2_a                                 0.62                         0.37                                              
F                                   13.72                        42.74                                              
r2_p                                                                                           0.44                 
chi2                                                                                         452.94                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
r2_p: Pseudo r2  
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Amongst rural-to-urban in-migrants, the specific sector of one’s employment (i.e., after 
migrating) exerts no significant impact on welfare. In the case of rural non-migrants, 
however, our estimates suggest that being employed in any of the agricultural, 
industrial, or services sectors – that is, relative to being jobless – tends to enhance 
welfare, with employment in agriculture or services being particularly influential. 
Additionally, rural non-migrants whose households are engaged in business enterprises 
(other than agricultural or food processing ventures) have higher welfare levels 
compared with those whose households do not engage in such activities. 
 
It can be observed that the coefficient of the selectivity variable is positive and 
significant, lending credence to the view that rural-to-urban in-migrants are positively 
selected. Thus, compared to rural non-migrants, rural-to-urban in-migrants are likely to 
be those who have a better chance of gaining from migrating to urban centres. This 
point is buttressed by the analysis of welfare-gains from rural-to-urban migration, the 
next sub-section’s subject of discussion. 
 
6.5.7 Welfare-gain from rural-to-urban migration 
 
On the basis of our results, rural-to-urban migration is generally very rewarding for the 
in-migrants. By migrating to urban localities, rural-to-urban in-migrants reaped a 
proportionate welfare gain of 97.9 percent on average (see Table 24). In this connection, 
it would be recalled that for the urban-to-rural migration scenario, the in-migrants 
incurred a mean welfare loss (see Table 22). Table 24 further shows that the majority 
(88.4 percent) of rural-to-urban in-migrants gained by migrating, the mean 
proportionate welfare-gain of the gainers being 113.7 percent. For the minority (11.6 
percent) of rural-to-urban in-migrants who did not gain, the mean proportionate welfare-
loss was 22.3 percent. As shown in Table 24, if rural non-migrants were to migrate to 
urban areas, they would incur – on average – a proportionate welfare-loss of 8.2 
percent, and only 34.1 percent of such migrants would gain. The results corresponding 
to an alternative model specification
62
 are shown in Table 42 in the Appendix. 
                                                 
62
 In this alternative specification, the welfare regression includes – as regressors – “# of children” and “# 
of elderly”. 
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Table 24: Migration-generated welfare gains; rural-to-urban migration (selectivity 
bias adjusted) 
 Number of 
persons 
Mean 
percentage 
welfare gain 
Percentage 
with welfare 
gain 
Percentage 
without 
welfare gain 
Rural-to-urban 
in-migrants 
164 97.94 88.41 
(Mean % gain 
= 113.70) 
11.59 
(Mean % loss 
= 22.32) 
Rural non-
migrants 
1,460 -8.15 34.11 
(Mean % gain 
= 23.90) 
65.89 
(Mean % loss 
= 24.74) 
 
 
 
We have observed so far that with each of the two types of migration explored, some 
migrants reaped welfare gains whilst others incurred a loss. A natural question to ask is: 
why do some migrants gain and others do not? In other words, what factors influence 
the welfare outcome of migration? This question is not easy to explore empirically 
owing to the potentially important role of migrants’ unobserved characteristics. An 
attempt was made – using a probit model – to investigate this issue. The results (see 
Table 40 in the Appendix) failed to provide a clear explanation for why some migrants 
gain and others do not, thus lending support to the view that unobserved attributes of 
migrants – such as determination and motivation – are crucial for the welfare outcome 
of migration. This notwithstanding, future follow-up work would explore the usefulness 
of decomposition analyses in unravelling some of the issues raised here.
63
  
 
 
                                                 
63
 I am grateful to Simon Appleton (the external examiner) for this suggestion. 
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6.5.8 Impact of return-migration on migrants’ welfare 
 
Our multivariate analysis has so far focused on in-migrants. Given the availability of 
data on return-migrants, it is instructive to investigate the impact of migration on the 
welfare of persons who have returned to their origin localities after engaging in either 
urban-to-rural or rural-to-urban migration. Thus, as an ancillary exercise, welfare 
regressions (with return-migrant dummies) are used to examine the impact of migration 
on the welfare of those return-migrants whose previous form of migration was urban-to-
rural or rural-to-urban. We therefore estimate the following two welfare equations: 
i) urbwelf: OLS welfare equation for a pooled sample of urban non-migrants 
and rural-to-urban return-migrants (that is, urban-to-rural-to-urban 
migrants); 
ii) rurwelf: OLS welfare equation for a pooled sample of rural non-migrants 
and urban-to-rural return-migrants (that is, rural-to-urban-to-rural migrants); 
In each of the two equations, the sample consists of non-migrants and return-migrants 
residing in the same urban or rural locality. This feature – non-existent in samples for 
our main model – facilitates the use of dummy variables to capture the effect of 
migration on return migrants’ welfare. The dummy variables are defined as follows: 
 du1: 1 if urban-to-rural-to-urban migrant, 0 if urban non-migrant; 
dr1: 1 if rural-to-urban-to-rural migrant, 0 if rural non-migrant. 
The estimates of the above welfare regressions are shown in Table 25. 
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Table 25: Impact of inter-sectoral migration on return migrants' welfare 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                 
                                  urbwelf                      rurwelf                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Male                                -0.05          (0.04)         0.01          (0.03) 
Household size                      -0.10***       (0.01)        -0.12***       (0.01) 
# of children (<15 yrs)             -0.03          (0.02)        -0.00          (0.01) 
# of elderly (>65 yrs)               0.01          (0.04)        -0.01          (0.03) 
MSLC/BECE                            0.09**        (0.04)         0.06**        (0.03) 
Voc., comm., O/A level               0.31***       (0.05)        -0.00          (0.06) 
TT/nursing/tech/prof.                0.33***       (0.06)         0.27***       (0.08) 
Degree holder                        0.33          (0.27)         0.54*         (0.32) 
Unspec. educ                         0.44          (0.27)        -0.08          (0.21) 
No educ qualification (omitted category) 
Empl in agric.                       0.01          (0.07)         0.08          (0.06) 
Empl in industry                     0.04          (0.06)         0.13*         (0.07) 
Empl in services                     0.06          (0.05)         0.18***       (0.07) 
Empl in other                        0.00          (0.00)        -0.18          (0.55) 
Unemployed (omitted category) 
du1                                 -0.03          (0.05)                              
dr1                                                               0.07***       (0.02) 
HH - farm-related activity          -0.06          (0.06)         0.06          (0.05) 
HH - food processing                -0.03          (0.04)        -0.02          (0.03) 
HH - other business                  0.13***       (0.04)         0.13***       (0.03) 
Pipe-borne water                     0.16***       (0.05)         0.04          (0.03) 
Electricity/generator                0.33***       (0.05)         0.16***       (0.04) 
Forest zone                         -0.01          (0.06)         0.04          (0.03) 
Savannah zone                       -0.02          (0.10)         0.02          (0.05) 
Coastal zone (omitted category) 
Western                             -0.02          (0.22)         0.93***       (0.08) 
Central                             -0.41*         (0.22)         0.69***       (0.07) 
Greater Accra                        0.08          (0.22)         1.02***       (0.09) 
Eastern                             -0.13          (0.21)         0.64***       (0.06) 
Volta                               -0.20          (0.22)         0.78***       (0.07) 
Ashanti                              0.12          (0.22)         0.88***       (0.07) 
Brong-Ahafo                         -0.02          (0.21)         0.79***       (0.06) 
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Table 25: Continued … 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                 
                                  urbwelf                      rurwelf                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Northern                            -0.10          (0.20)         0.46***       (0.06) 
Upper West                          -0.18          (0.23)         0.29***       (0.07) 
Upper East (omitted category) 
Constant                            14.30***       (0.22)        13.40***       (0.10) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                                 1165.00                      2322.00                 
r2                                   0.46                         0.41                 
r2_a                                 0.44                         0.40                 
F                                   33.12                        53.26                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
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Our findings generally conform to those of the main model. The strong negative link 
between household size and welfare is confirmed. The strength of this link is about the 
same in both urban and rural areas (see Table 25). The positive welfare impact of 
education is given further support in both rural and urban samples. Furthermore, in rural 
localities, industrial and services sector workers tend to have significantly higher levels 
of welfare than the unemployed. The results for the rural sample further highlight the 
role of unobserved spatial effects in generating relatively low welfare levels in the three 
northern Regions (Northern, Upper West, and Upper East). 
 
We now focus attention on the coefficients of the return-migrant dummies, which are 
the main variables of interest. Even though the coefficient of “du1” (the return-migrant 
dummy for the urban sample) has a negative sign, it is not statistically significant. The 
coefficient of “dr1” (the return-migrant dummy for the rural sample), on the other hand, 
is positive and highly significant. This provides evidence in support of return-migrants 
(that is rural-to-urban-to-rural migrants) being better off than rural non-migrants. This 
finding is consistent with our earlier result suggesting that rural-to-urban migration is, 
on average, very profitable for participants (see Table 24). Our findings in this ancillary 
analysis are consistent with what one might expect. Given that despite the existence of 
heterogeneities within urban and rural communities, urban welfare generally exceeds 
that of rural areas, and that the proportionate welfare gains of rural-to-urban in-migrants 
are, on average, much higher than that of their urban-to-rural counterparts, it is not 
surprising that those rural dwellers who used to live as migrants in urban areas are 
generally better off than rural non-migrants. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has empirically addressed – within the context of Ghana’s rural-urban 
linkages – the following questions: 
i) What are the major influences on migration decisions? 
ii) What is the impact of migration on migrants’ welfare? 
Using data from the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey, as well as a method that 
corrects for selectivity bias, we have identified factors influencing migration decisions 
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between Ghana’s rural and urban areas. Additionally, we have estimated the impact of 
migration on migrants’ consumption welfare. 
 
Our findings underscore the importance of anticipated welfare gains and personal 
attributes in migration decisions. We also find support for the positive selectivity of 
both urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban in-migrants. This particular result suggests that 
these in-migrants gained more than their non-migrant colleagues would have gained if 
they had migrated. The evidence for selectivity further justifies the incorporation of the 
correction for selectivity-bias in the analysis. Regarding our examination of migration’s 
impact on migrants’ welfare, the estimates of migration gains suggest different mean 
welfare impacts on our two types of in-migrants. Although some urban-to-rural in-
migrants derived welfare gains from migrating, urban-to-rural migration had an overall 
negative impact on the welfare of in-migrants. In the case of rural-to-urban migration, a 
small percentage of in-migrants incurred welfare losses, but on average, migration 
enhanced considerably the welfare of in-migrants. Additionally, we find evidence to 
suggest that on the whole, rural non-migrants would have incurred a reduction in 
welfare if they had migrated to urban areas. Finally, by examining return migration, 
further insight has been shed on migration’s welfare impact. All other things being 
equal, the welfare of rural-to-urban-to-rural migrants is generally higher than that of 
rural non-migrants. 
 
This chapter’s analysis represents a significant contribution to the Ghana migration and 
welfare literature, as well as to the wider migration literature. As far as we can ascertain 
from the literature on Ghana, this study is the first ever counterfactual analysis of 
migration’s impact on migrants’ welfare. Furthermore, the chapter’s analysis does not 
only estimate the welfare impact on in-migrants, but also evaluates what the welfare 
impact on non-migrants would have been if they had migrated. 
 
In the next chapter, attention is focused on another aspect of Ghana’s rural-urban 
linkages, namely, remittance flows between rural and urban areas. The discussion on 
remittances should complement the present chapter’s analysis and help strengthen our 
understanding of the various interactions that occur between residents of Ghana’s rural 
and urban areas. 
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Appendix to Chapter Six 
 
 
Table 26: Distribution of migrant type by in- or return-migrant status; 1991/92 
 Share (%) of 
in-migrants 
Share (%) of 
return-migrants 
 
Total 
Urban-to-urban 55.66 44.34 100.00 
Urban-to-rural 41.47 58.53 100.00 
Rural-to-urban 72.05 27.95 100.00 
Rural-to-rural 62.77 37.23 100.00 
Foreign-to-urban 12.79 87.21 100.00 
Foreign-to-rural 25.71 74.29 100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1991/92. 
 
 
Table 27: Distribution of migrant type by in- or return-migrant status, 1998/99 
 Share (%) of 
in-migrants 
Share (%) of 
return-migrants 
 
Total 
Urban-to-urban 68.40 31.60 100.00 
Urban-to-rural 40.33 59.67 100.00 
Rural-to-urban 69.06 30.94 100.00 
Rural-to-rural 54.58 45.42 100.00 
Foreign-to-urban 29.78 70.22 100.00 
Foreign-to-rural 20.93 79.07 100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
Table 28: Extent of migration by gender; 1991/92
64
 
Sex Non-migrant 
share (%) of 
population 
Migrant share 
(%) of population 
Total 
Male   53.35 
  45.97 
  46.65 
  46.26 
100.00 
 46.10 
Female   53.65 
  54.03 
  46.35 
  53.74 
100.00 
 53.90 
Total   53.51 
100.00 
  46.49 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1991/92. 
 
 
                                                 
64
 For each cell in the Table, the first value represents the row percentage, whereas the second represents 
the column percentage. 
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Table 29: Extent of migration, by gender; 1998/99
65
 
Sex Non-migrant 
share (%) of 
population 
Migrant share 
(%) of population 
Total 
Male   61.25 
  46.43 
  38.75 
  45.85 
100.00 
  46.20 
Female   60.70 
  53.57   
  39.30 
  54.15 
100.00 
  53.80 
Total   60.95 
100.00 
   39.05 
 100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
 
 
Table 30: Main reasons for migrating; 1991/92 
Reason Share (%)  of 
responses; males 
Share (%) of 
responses; females 
Total 
Own employment 29.82 5.35 16.66 
Spouse’s employment 9.84 12.29 11.15 
Marriage 1.28 37.54 20.78 
Other family reasons 38.46 37.39 37.89 
School 3.57 2.09 2.77 
Drought/war 0.97 0.19 0.55 
Other 16.06 5.16 10.20 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1991/92. 
 
 
 
Table 31: Main reasons for migrating; 1998/99 
Reason Share (%) of 
responses; males 
Share (%) of 
responses; females 
Total 
Own employment 42.37 8.41 23.99 
Spouse’s employment 3.53 13.83 9.11 
Marriage 2.76 31.16 18.14 
Other family reasons 36.31 38.57 37.53 
School 2.10 0.62 1.30 
Drought/war 1.42 0.79 1.08 
Other 11.51 6.61 8.85 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
                                                 
65
 For each cell in the Table, the first value represents the row percentage, whereas the second represents 
the column percentage. 
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Table 32: Mean consumption welfare (in ‘000 constant cedis) across migrant status 
and locality of residence; 1991/92 
Migrant status Urban Rural 
In-migrant 1,767.1 1,022.1 
Return-migrant 1,936.6 1,146.8 
Non-migrant 1,579.8    883.2 
Source: Author’s computation using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1991/92. 
 
 
 
Table 33: Mean consumption welfare (in ‘000 constant cedis) across migrant status 
and locality of residence; 1998/99 
Migrant status Urban Rural 
In-migrant 1,958.1 1,294.7 
Return-migrant 1,658.6 1,033.6 
Non-migrant 1,710.9    977.4 
Source: Author’s computation using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
 
Table 34: Distribution of internal migrants by age groups; 1991/92 
Distribution (%) of internal migrants 
Age group 
(in years) 
Urban-to-
urban 
Urban-to-
rural 
Rural-to-
urban 
Rural-to-
rural 
Total 
15 ≤age< 25 25.82 34.36 10.55 29.27 100.00 
25 ≤age< 35 24.41 31.67   9.17 34.75 100.00 
35 ≤age< 45 29.64 30.50 10.42 29.45 100.00 
45 ≤age< 55 23.94 34.29   9.21 32.57 100.00 
55 ≤age< 65 18.98 29.94   7.44 43.64 100.00 
Age≥65 18.59 27.53   6.82 47.06 100.00 
Total 24.54 31.65   9.22 34.60 100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1991/92 
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Table 35: Distribution of internal migrants by age groups; 1998/99 
Distribution (%) of internal migrants 
Age group 
(in years) 
Urban-to-
urban 
Urban-to-
rural 
Rural-to-
urban 
Rural-to-
rural 
Total 
15 ≤age< 25 17.58 45.20 11.21 26.01 100.00 
25 ≤age< 35 20.06 38.10   6.79 35.05 100.00 
35 ≤age< 45 22.46 34.19   8.40 34.95 100.00 
45 ≤age< 55 21.27 34.53   7.41 36.79 100.00 
55 ≤age< 65 21.62 34.27   9.33 34.78 100.00 
Age≥65 19.41 29.73 10.73 40.13 100.00 
Total 20.78 35.79   8.44 34.99 100.00 
Source: Author’s computation using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
Table 36:  Test of equality of coefficients in the welfare regressions; urban-to rural 
in-migrants versus urban non-migrants 
 
test [welf1_mean = welf0_mean], common; 
 
 ( 1)  [welf1_mean]hhsize - [welf0_mean]hhsize = 0 
 ( 2)  [welf1_mean]lnage_ad - [welf0_mean]lnage_ad = 0 
 ( 3)  [welf1_mean]hiedq2 - [welf0_mean]hiedq2 = 0 
 ( 4)  [welf1_mean]hiedq3 - [welf0_mean]hiedq3 = 0 
 ( 5)  [welf1_mean]hiedq4 - [welf0_mean]hiedq4 = 0 
 ( 6)  [welf1_mean]hiedq5 - [welf0_mean]hiedq5 = 0 
 ( 7)  [welf1_mean]hiedq6 - [welf0_mean]hiedq6 = 0 
 ( 8)  [welf1_mean]farmliv1 - [welf0_mean]farmliv1 = 0 
 ( 9)  [welf1_mean]foodpr1 - [welf0_mean]foodpr1 = 0 
 (10)  [welf1_mean]othbus1 - [welf0_mean]othbus1 = 0 
 (11)  [welf1_mean]pbw1 - [welf0_mean]pbw1 = 0 
 (12)  [welf1_mean]eg1 - [welf0_mean]eg1 = 0 
 (13)  [welf1_mean]reg1 - [welf0_mean]reg1 = 0 
 (14)  [welf1_mean]reg2 - [welf0_mean]reg2 = 0 
 (15)  [welf1_mean]reg3 - [welf0_mean]reg3 = 0 
 (16)  [welf1_mean]reg4 - [welf0_mean]reg4 = 0 
 (17)  [welf1_mean]reg5 - [welf0_mean]reg5 = 0 
 (18)  [welf1_mean]reg6 - [welf0_mean]reg6 = 0 
 (19)  [welf1_mean]reg7 - [welf0_mean]reg7 = 0 
 (20)  [welf1_mean]reg8 - [welf0_mean]reg8 = 0 
 (21)  [welf1_mean]reg9 - [welf0_mean]reg9 = 0 
 
chi2( 21) =   44.67 
Prob > chi2 (i.e., the p-value of the test) = 0.0019 
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Table 37: Test of equality of coefficients in the welfare regressions: rural-to-urban 
in-migrants versus rural non-migrants 
 
test [welf1_mean = welf0_mean], common; 
 
 (1)  [welf1_mean]hhsize - [welf0_mean]hhsize = 0 
 (2)  [welf1_mean]lnage_ad - [welf0_mean]lnage_ad = 0 
 (3)  [welf1_mean]hiedq2 - [welf0_mean]hiedq2 = 0 
 (4)  [welf1_mean]hiedq3 - [welf0_mean]hiedq3 = 0 
 (5)  [welf1_mean]hiedq4 - [welf0_mean]hiedq4 = 0 
 (6)  [welf1_mean]hiedq5 - [welf0_mean]hiedq5 = 0 
 (7)  [welf1_mean]empcat2 - [welf0_mean]empcat2 = 0 
 (8)  [welf1_mean]empcat3 - [welf0_mean]empcat3 = 0 
 (9)  [welf1_mean]empcat4 - [welf0_mean]empcat4 = 0 
 (10)  [welf1_mean]empcat5 - [welf0_mean]empcat5 = 0 
 (11)  [welf1_mean]othbus1 - [welf0_mean]othbus1 = 0 
 (12)  [welf1_mean]pbw1 - [welf0_mean]pbw1 = 0 
 (13)  [welf1_mean]eg1 - [welf0_mean]eg1 = 0 
 (14)  [welf1_mean]reg1 - [welf0_mean]reg1 = 0 
 (15)  [welf1_mean]reg2 - [welf0_mean]reg2 = 0 
 (16)  [welf1_mean]reg3 - [welf0_mean]reg3 = 0 
 (17)  [welf1_mean]reg4 - [welf0_mean]reg4 = 0 
 (18)  [welf1_mean]reg5 - [welf0_mean]reg5 = 0 
 (19)  [welf1_mean]reg6 - [welf0_mean]reg6 = 0 
 (20)  [welf1_mean]reg7 - [welf0_mean]reg7 = 0 
 (21)  [welf1_mean]reg8 - [welf0_mean]reg8 = 0 
 (22)  [welf1_mean]reg9 - [welf0_mean]reg9 = 0 
 
 
chi2( 22) = 156.22 
Prob > chi2 (i.e., the p-value of the test) = 0.0000 
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Table 38: First stage probit of urban-to-rural migration model 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                 
                                  probit1                 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Age:[15, 25)                        -0.82**        (0.35) 
Age:[25, 35)                        -0.34          (0.24) 
Age:[35, 45)                        -0.07          (0.20) 
Age:[45, 55)                         0.09          (0.19) 
Age:[55, 65)                         0.01          (0.19) 
Age≥65 (omitted category) 
Log mean age of adults              -0.65**        (0.25) 
Asante                               0.27          (0.22) 
Fanti                                0.27          (0.23) 
Other Akan                           0.28          (0.21) 
Ga-Adangbe                           0.31          (0.24) 
Ewe                                  0.62***       (0.24) 
Other tribe                          0.40*         (0.23) 
Northern tribes (omitted category) 
Male                                 0.60***       (0.11) 
Never married                       -0.28          (0.19) 
Household size                      -0.02          (0.02) 
MSLC/BECE                            0.11          (0.12) 
Voc., comm., O/A level               0.11          (0.17) 
TT/nursing/tech/prof.                0.62***       (0.17) 
Degree holder                        0.80          (0.50) 
Unspecified education                0.34          (0.66) 
No educ qualification (omitted category) 
Farm/livestock                       0.17          (0.13) 
Food processing                      0.34***       (0.11) 
Other business                      -0.03          (0.09) 
Pipe-borne water                    -0.98***       (0.12) 
Electricity/generator               -0.81***       (0.12) 
Western                              1.72***       (0.57) 
Central                              1.39**        (0.59) 
Greater Accra                        0.90          (0.58) 
Eastern                              0.33          (0.58) 
Volta                                1.53***       (0.57) 
Ashanti                              1.68***       (0.57) 
Brong-Ahafo                          0.95*         (0.57) 
Northern                            -0.55          (0.59) 
Upper West                          -0.16          (0.70) 
Upper East (omitted category) 
Constant                             0.78          (1.18) 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
N                                 1447.00                 
r2_p                                 0.39                 
chi2                               666.88                 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_p: Pseudo r2 
 
 173 
  
Table 39: First stage probit of rural-to-urban migration model 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                 
                                  probit1                 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Age:[15, 25)                        -1.03**        (0.51) 
Age:[25, 35)                        -0.90***       (0.31) 
Age:[35, 45)                        -0.41*         (0.25) 
Age:[45, 55)                         0.05          (0.23) 
Age:[55, 65)                         0.12          (0.23) 
Age≥65 (omitted category) 
Log mean age of adults              -0.53          (0.33) 
Asante                              -1.19***       (0.35) 
Fanti                               -0.27          (0.35) 
Other Akan                          -0.52*         (0.30) 
Ga-Adangbe                          -3.08***       (0.56) 
Ewe                                 -0.29          (0.32) 
Other tribe                         -0.39          (0.29) 
Northern tribes (omitted category) 
Never married                       -0.18          (0.31) 
Household size                      -0.05*         (0.03) 
MSLC/BECE                            0.12          (0.15) 
Voc., comm., O/A level               0.36          (0.26) 
TT/nursing/tech/prof.                0.26          (0.28) 
Degree holder                       -0.18          (0.87) 
No educ qualification (omitted category) 
Empl in agric.                      -0.65***       (0.25) 
Empl in industry                     0.24          (0.27) 
Empl in services                     0.07          (0.24) 
Unemployed (omitted category) 
Other business                       0.03          (0.13) 
Pipe-borne water                     0.79***       (0.15) 
Electricity/generator                0.74***       (0.16) 
Western                              4.54***       (1.45) 
Central                              4.12***       (1.45) 
Greater Accra                        7.21***       (1.52) 
Eastern                              4.81***       (1.46) 
Volta                                5.15***       (1.46) 
Ashanti                              5.67***       (1.43) 
Brong-Ahafo                          5.34***       (1.43) 
Northern                             5.14***       (1.43) 
Upper East (omitted category) 
Constant                            -3.94          (0.00) 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
N                                 1648.00                 
r2_p                                 0.49                 
chi2                               528.29                 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_p: Pseudo r2 
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Table 40: Factors influencing the outcome of inter-sectoral migration 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       (1)                                  (2)                     
                            Urban-to-rural                       Rural-to-urban                     
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Recvd urban remittance               -0.12              (0.18)            -0.77           (4003.35) 
Recvd rural remittance                0.05              (0.27)            15.83                   . 
Recvd foreign remittance              0.32              (0.33)            -6.09              (0.00) 
Longer-term migrant dummy             0.42              (0.26)            -9.45           (5487.68) 
Migrant married                      -0.02              (0.39)            -4.28              (0.00) 
Migrant in informal union            -0.11              (0.40)             3.13           (4644.91) 
Migrant div/separated                -0.77*             (0.43)            -0.38              (0.00) 
Migrant widowed                      -0.26              (0.44)             9.25                   . 
Migrant never married (omitted category) 
Age:[15, 25)                         -0.00              (0.60)                                      
Age:[25, 35)                         -0.24              (0.44)           -17.18              (0.00) 
Age:[35, 45)                         -0.48              (0.42)            -5.92           (4899.71) 
Age:[45, 55)                         -0.69              (0.43)            -4.74              (0.00) 
Age:[55, 65)                         -0.43              (0.42)            -7.68              (0.00) 
Age≥65 (omitted category) 
Household size                       -0.07              (0.07)             0.69           (1975.38) 
# of children (<15 yrs)               0.06              (0.09)             0.07           (2543.59) 
# of elderly (>65 yrs)               -0.19              (0.37)            -6.61              (0.00) 
Empl in agric.                        0.53              (0.52)            -2.07              (0.00) 
Empl in industry                      0.28              (0.55)             8.39                   . 
Empl in services                     -0.12              (0.52)             6.32           (4850.87) 
Unemployed (omitted category) 
Pipe-borne water                      0.29              (0.28)            21.14                   . 
Electricity/generator                 0.71**            (0.28)             6.99                   . 
Forest zone                           0.36              (0.30)            -3.14              (0.00) 
Savannah zone                        -0.20              (0.65)            14.83                   . 
Western                               4.93***           (0.81)            14.70                   . 
Central                               5.69***           (0.81)           -17.20              (0.00) 
Greater Accra                         6.51***           (0.88)                                      
Eastern                               4.41***           (0.88)             0.54                   . 
Volta                                 5.39***           (0.86)            -0.02              (0.00) 
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 Table 40: Continued … 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       (1)                                  (2)                     
                            Urban-to-rural                       Rural-to-urban                     
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ashanti                               4.40***           (0.85)            12.08                   . 
Brong-Ahafo                           4.34***           (0.91)                                      
Northern                              5.93***           (1.26)                                      
Upper East (omitted category) 
Constant                             -5.91              (0.00)            -3.16              (0.00) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2_p                                  0.19                                 1.00                     
chi2                                 78.98                                95.52                     
N                                   335.00                                96.00                     
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_p: Pseudo r2 
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Table 41: Migration-generated welfare gains, using an alternative model 
specification; urban-to-rural migration
66
 
 Number of 
persons 
Mean 
percentage 
welfare gain 
Percentage 
with welfare 
gain 
Percentage 
without 
welfare gain 
Urban-to-rural 
in-migrants 
337   -8.76 33.53 
(Mean % gain 
= 26.87) 
66.47 
(Mean % loss 
= 26.74) 
Urban non-
migrants 
1,036  -62.77  0 
 
100 
(Mean % loss 
= 62.77) 
 
 
 
Table 42: Migration-generated welfare gains, using an alternative model; rural-to-
urban migration 
 Number of 
persons 
Mean 
percentage 
welfare gain 
Percentage 
with welfare 
gain 
Percentage 
without 
welfare gain 
Rural-to-urban 
in-migrants 
   164  96.53 89.02 
(Mean % gain 
= 111.32) 
10.98 
(Mean % loss 
= 23.40) 
Rural non-
migrants 
1,460   9.86 57.19 
(Mean % gain 
= 34.44) 
42.81 
(Mean loss = 
22.98) 
 
 
                                                 
66
 In this alternative model, the welfare regression includes “number of children” and “number of elderly” 
as regressors. 
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Table 43:  Test of validity of exclusion restriction: urban-to-rural migration model 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                    welf1                        welf0                       Probit                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Male                                 0.04          (0.09)        -0.04          (0.04)         0.44***       (0.16) 
Household size                      -0.12***       (0.01)        -0.11***       (0.01)                              
Longer-term migrant dummy            0.14*         (0.08)                                                           
Log mean age of adults              -0.15          (0.11)         0.04          (0.06)                              
MSLC/BECE                            0.15**        (0.07)         0.07*         (0.04)         0.33*         (0.17) 
Voc., comm., O/A level               0.40***       (0.12)         0.31***       (0.05)         0.03          (0.28) 
TT/nursing/tech/prof.                0.53***       (0.12)         0.32***       (0.07)         0.06          (0.24) 
Degree holder                        1.31***       (0.36)         0.33          (0.27)                              
Unspecified education                0.25          (0.47)         0.43          (0.27)                              
No educ qualification (omitted category) 
Farm/livestock                       0.09          (0.10)        -0.10*         (0.05)                              
Food processing                      0.04          (0.08)        -0.03          (0.05)                              
Other business                       0.01          (0.06)         0.14***       (0.03)                              
Pipe-borne water                    -0.12          (0.15)         0.19**        (0.08)                              
Electricity/generator                0.13          (0.12)         0.33***       (0.06)                              
Western                              0.71          (0.51)        -0.03          (0.23)                              
Central                              0.62          (0.50)        -0.44**        (0.22)                              
Greater Accra                        0.74          (0.49)         0.05          (0.21)                              
Eastern                              0.25          (0.48)        -0.17          (0.21)                              
Volta                                0.58          (0.50)        -0.20          (0.23)                              
Ashanti                              0.73          (0.51)         0.11          (0.22)                              
Brong-Ahafo                          0.55          (0.49)        -0.04          (0.21)                              
Northern                             0.20          (0.52)        -0.10          (0.20)                              
Upper West                          -0.30          (0.61)        -0.18          (0.23)                              
Upper East (omitted category) 
Selectivity                          0.38**        (0.19)        -0.00          (0.14)                              
Age:[15, 25)                                                                                  -0.65*         (0.39) 
Age:[25, 35)                                                                                  -0.47*         (0.25) 
Age:[35, 45)                                                                                   0.15          (0.23) 
Age:[45, 55)                                                                                   0.13          (0.23) 
Age:[55, 65)                                                                                   0.14          (0.24) 
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Table 43: Continued … 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                    welf1                        welf0                       Probit                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age≥65 (omitted category) 
Asante                                                                                         1.76***       (0.24) 
Fanti                                                                                          0.65**        (0.26) 
Other Akan                                                                                     0.58***       (0.22) 
Ga-Adangbe                                                                                     0.62*         (0.37) 
Ewe                                                                                            0.18          (0.24) 
Other tribe                                                                                    1.41***       (0.29) 
Northern tribes (omitted category) 
Never married                                                                                  0.03          (0.29) 
Anticipated welfare gain                                                                       4.59***       (0.28) 
Constant                            13.91***       (0.70)        14.21***       (0.29)         0.88***       (0.30) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                                  403.00                      1044.00                      1372.00                 
r2                                   0.42                         0.45                                              
r2_a                                 0.39                         0.44                                              
F                                   11.50                        36.95                                              
r2_p                                                                                           0.70                 
chi2                                                                                        1066.46                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 r2_a: Adjusted r2 
r2_p: Pseudo r2 
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Table 44: Test of validity of exclusion restriction; rural-to-urban migration model 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                    welf1                        welf0                       Probit                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Other Akan                           0.06          (0.09)        -0.03          (0.04)         0.59***       (0.20) 
Household size                      -0.11***       (0.01)        -0.12***       (0.01)                              
Longer-term migrant dummy           -0.14          (0.12)                                                           
Log mean age of adults               0.10          (0.15)        -0.06          (0.05)                              
MSLC/BECE                            0.11          (0.09)         0.05          (0.03)        -0.15          (0.14) 
Voc., comm., O/A level               0.34***       (0.13)         0.00          (0.08)        -0.61**        (0.27) 
TT/nursing/tech/prof.                0.45***       (0.13)         0.25**        (0.11)         0.15          (0.27) 
Degree holder                       -0.10          (0.48)         0.82**        (0.39)                              
No educ qualification (omitted category) 
Empl in agric.                      -0.19          (0.16)         0.22***       (0.08)                              
Empl in industry                     0.12          (0.14)         0.17*         (0.09)                              
Empl in services                     0.11          (0.13)         0.25***       (0.08)                              
Empl in other                        0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00)                              
Unemployed (omitted category) 
Other business                       0.05          (0.07)         0.13***       (0.03)                              
Pipe-borne water                     0.43***       (0.14)         0.05          (0.05)                              
Electricity/generator                0.48***       (0.11)         0.07          (0.05)                              
Western                              0.35*         (0.21)         0.92***       (0.08)                              
Central                             -0.56*         (0.29)         0.67***       (0.07)                              
Greater Accra                        0.32          (0.20)         0.93***       (0.11)                              
Eastern                              0.09          (0.20)         0.65***       (0.07)                              
Volta                               -0.16          (0.20)         0.74***       (0.07)                              
Ashanti                              0.49**        (0.19)         0.89***       (0.07)                              
Brong-Ahafo                          0.28          (0.22)         0.74***       (0.08)                              
Northern                             0.00          (0.00)         0.42***       (0.07)                              
Upper West                           0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00)                              
Upper East (omitted category) 
Selectivity                          0.20          (0.12)        -0.23          (0.14)                              
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Table 44: Continued … 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                    welf1                        welf0                       Probit                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age:[15, 25)                                                                                  -0.13          (0.48) 
Age:[25, 35)                                                                                   0.04          (0.21) 
Age:[35, 45)                                                                                   0.44**        (0.20) 
Age:[45, 55)                                                                                   0.29          (0.19) 
Age:[55, 65)                                                                                   0.10          (0.20) 
Age≥65 (omitted category) 
Asante                                                                                         0.40*         (0.23) 
Fanti                                                                                          0.18          (0.22) 
Ewe                                                                                            0.29          (0.20) 
Other tribe                                                                                   -0.01          (0.22) 
Northern tribes (omitted category) 
Never married                                                                                 -0.06          (0.30) 
Anticipated welfare gain                                                                       2.83***       (0.18) 
Constant                            13.28***       (0.59)        13.59***       (0.23)        -2.09***       (0.21) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                                  168.00                      1480.00                      1619.00                 
r2                                   0.66                         0.38                                              
r2_a                                 0.61                         0.37                                              
F                                   13.05                        40.80                                              
r2_p                                                                                           0.44                 
chi2                                                                                         452.94                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
r2_p: Pseudo r2 
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Chapter Seven:  
Remittance Flows between Rural and Urban Sectors
67
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter has emphasised the prevalence and importance of migration in 
Ghana. As noted in the fourth chapter, however, migration is often associated with 
remittance flows, and anecdotal evidence suggests that this is true for Ghana. We have 
also identified various themes relating to Ghana’s remittances that merit further 
research. Notable amongst these are the poverty and welfare impacts of remittance 
flows. The present chapter addresses some of the identified gaps in the Ghana 
remittance literature. 
 
The chapter empirically examines aspects of Ghana’s internal remittances by focusing 
on remittance transfers between rural and urban areas. To motivate the analysis, four 
main research questions are posed; within the context of rural-urban interactions, these 
are: 
(i) What are the determinants of remittance outflows? 
(ii) What are the determinants of remittance receipts? 
(iii) What is the impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare? 
 
As a prelude to the main empirical investigation, descriptive statistics are used to 
provide basic information about the profile and magnitudes of Ghana’s remittance 
flows. The substantive analysis, however, consists of the application of regression 
analysis using data from the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey (that is, 
GLSS4)
68
. In this study, a remittance is defined as the transfer of cash, food, or any 
other item from one individual (or household) to another individual (or household), 
where the recipient is not required to pay back. Consequently, the data for the analysis 
                                                 
67
 A paper based on this chapter was presented at the 2007 CSAE (Centre for the Study of African 
Economies) Conference at the University of Oxford. I am very grateful for comments received from 
Conference participants. 
68
 The 1991/92 GLSS data are not included due to the survey’s omission of multiple remittance transfers 
and receipts. 
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exclude loans and intra-household transfers. Even though 5,998 households were 
covered in the survey, 5975 observations remained after all relevant variables had been 
generated. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, descriptive statistics 
are used to present a profile of the patterns and magnitudes of Ghana’s remittance flows 
in 19989/99. The modelling strategy for the empirical analysis is outlined in the third 
section. The empirical analysis is provided in the fourth section, with section five 
concluding the chapter. 
 
7.2 Profile and magnitudes of remittance flows 
 
At this point it is appropriate to identify patterns and magnitudes of Ghana’s remittance 
flows. Out of the 5,998 households covered in the survey, 3,891 (that is, 64.87 percent) 
were either senders or recipients of remittances. As indicated in Table 45, about a 
quarter of households sent remittances without receiving any. Households that only 
received remittances, constituted 21.94 percent of the entire sample, whereas 17.94 
percent of households sent and were sent remittances. These figures suggest remittances 
have considerable potential for affecting households’ living standards, especially if 
remittance sizes are large. 
 
 
Table 45: Distribution of households by remittance status 
Remittance status Frequency Percent Cumulative 
percentage 
Sent only 1,499 24.99 24.99 
Received only 1,316 21.94 46.93 
Sent and Received 1,076 17.94 64.87 
Neither sent nor 
received 
2,107 35.13 100.00 
Total 5,998 100.00  
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
An examination of the data shows some insightful patterns of remittance flows. Out of 
the 2,575 households that sent remittances, the urban and rural sectors accounted for 
36.1 percent and 63.9 percent, respectively (see Table 46). To place this in context, it is 
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instructive to note that the shares of urban and rural households in the entire sample are 
36.7 percent and 63.3 percent, respectively. Most (65.7 percent) remitting households 
sent remittances to the urban sector. The proportion of remitting households that sent 
remittances to rural households is 45.7 percent (see Table 46). In examining Table 46, it 
should be noted that some households sent remittances to more than one sector, and as a 
result, the row totals exceed the figures in the final column. As expected, a very small 
proportion of remitting households sent remittances to persons living outside Ghana. In 
all, 1.4 percent of remitting households sent remittances to persons residing abroad, but 
within Africa, while only nine households – four urban and five rural – sent remittances 
to individuals living outside Africa. 
 
 
Table 46:  Distribution of destination of remittance outflows, by locality of remitter 
(mean transfer – in ‘000 cedis – of senders in parentheses) 
Locality of 
remitting 
household 
Sent to the 
urban 
sector 
Sent to the 
rural 
sector 
Sent 
abroad 
(within 
Africa) 
Sent 
outside 
Africa 
All senders, 
irrespective 
of 
destination 
Urban 699 
(333.5) 
299 
(239.1) 
14 
(162.3) 
4 
(171.1) 
930 
(330.7) 
Rural 994 
(222.1) 
879 
(198.5) 
21 
(157.0) 
5 
(465.0) 
1,645 
(243.7) 
Total 1,693 
(268.1) 
1,178 
(208.8) 
35 
(159.1) 
9 
(334.4) 
2,575 
(275.1) 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
Even though most remitters sent remittances to the urban sector (not necessarily 
exclusively), remittances sent outside Africa registered the highest remitters’ mean 
transfer. This is followed by remittances sent to the urban sector, those sent to rural 
areas, and transfers to persons living abroad (within Africa), in that order (see Table 
46). On the whole, rural remitters’ mean transfer forms roughly 74 percent of that of 
their urban counterparts, an unsurprising result, given the welfare gap between the two 
sectors. 
 
The profile of remittance receipts also provides much insight into Ghana’s remittance 
flows. A total of 2,392 households received remittances, with rural recipients 
accounting for 63.3 percent of this total – a share that corresponds to the proportion of 
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rural households in the survey sample. The discrepancy between the number of 
remitters and that of recipients stems from features of the dataset; apart from the fact 
that the remittance outflow and receipt sections do not pair remitters with recipients, 
some households sent remittances to more than one person, and other recipients had 
multiple remitters. The most common source of remittances is the urban sector; more 
than 70 percent of recipient households received remittances from this sector (see Table 
47). On the other hand, all households that received remittances from any of the other 
three sources – rural, abroad (within Africa), and outside Africa – accounted for less 
than 40 percent of the sample of recipients; a similar pattern is observed amongst each 
of urban and rural recipients. 
 
 
Table 47: Distribution of sources of households’ remittance receipts, by locality of 
recipient (mean remittance – in ‘000 cedis – of recipients in parentheses) 
Locality of 
recipient 
household 
Received 
from the 
urban 
sector 
Received 
from the 
rural 
sector 
Received 
from 
abroad 
(within 
Africa) 
Received 
from 
outside 
Africa 
All 
recipients, 
irrespective 
of source 
Urban 631 
(604.3) 
86 
(291.9) 
35 
(799.3) 
230 
(1,605.7) 
876 
(917.5) 
Rural 1,149 
(256.6) 
336 
(117.3) 
84 
(172.8) 
126 
(704.0) 
1,516 
(288.6) 
Total 1,780 
(379.9) 
422 
(152.9) 
119 
(357.0) 
356 
(1,286.6) 
2,392 
(518.9) 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
A striking feature of the profile of remittance receipts is the huge gap between the urban 
and rural sectors, in terms of recipients’ mean remittance receipt; rural recipients’ mean 
remittance receipt represents 31.5 percent of that of urban recipients (see Table 47). 
Indeed, for each of the four sources of remittances receipts, urban recipients’ mean 
receipt is more than twice that of rural recipients. For the entire sample of recipients, 
remittances from outside Africa yielded overwhelmingly the highest recipients’ mean 
remittance, followed by transfers from the urban sector, abroad (within Africa), and the 
rural sector, in that order. While this overall pattern is mirrored in the rural sector, a 
slightly different pattern emerges within the urban sector. Amongst urban recipients, the 
source yielding the largest recipients’ mean remittance is “outside Africa”, but is 
followed by “abroad (within Africa)”, the urban sector, and the rural sector, in that 
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order. Apart from reflecting the low welfare levels in rural Ghana, these findings echo 
the popular opinion that relatively large remittances (per transfer) are usually sent from 
North America or Europe. 
 
The fact that some of the households in our sample sent remittances to (or received 
remittances from) both rural and urban localities has already been noted. An implication 
of this is the presence of multiple recipients and remitters, although the occurrence of 
multiple recipients or remitters need not be associated with transfers to (or from) both 
rural and urban areas. Although the majority (59.5%) of remitters sent remittances to 
only one person, more than a fifth of remitters had two recipients. The highest number 
of recipients – within each of rural and urban remitters – was six. On the whole, a 
decreasing share of remitters is associated with increasing numbers of recipients (see 
Table 48). This overall pattern is also observed within each of the urban and rural 
sectors. 
 
The distribution of recipients’ number of remitters is quite similar to the patterns 
observed for remitters’ number of recipients (see Table 49). Amongst all recipients, as 
well as within each of the rural and urban sectors, the bulk (more than 60 percent) of 
recipient households received remittances from only one person. Again, declining 
shares of recipients are associated with rising numbers of remitters. The highest number 
of remitters within each of the rural and urban sectors was six, with thirteen urban 
households and nine rural households falling in this category. 
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Table 48: Distribution of remitters’ number of recipients (column percentages in 
parentheses) 
Number of 
recipients Urban 
households 
Rural households All households 
1 586 
(63.01%) 
947 
(57.57%) 
1,533 
(59.53%) 
2 216 
(23.23%) 
387 
(23.53%) 
603 
(23.42%) 
3 76 
(8.17%) 
161 
(9.79%) 
237 
(9.20%) 
4 35 
(3.76%) 
83 
(5.05%) 
118 
(4.58%) 
5 7 
(0.75%) 
42 
(2.55%) 
49 
(1.90%) 
6 10 
(1.08%) 
25 
(1.52%) 
35 
(1.36%) 
Total 930 
(100%) 
1,645 
(100%) 
2,575 
(100%) 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
 
Table 49: Distribution of recipients’ number of remitters (column percentages in 
parentheses) 
 
Number of 
recipients 
Urban 
households 
Rural households All households 
1 565 
(64.50%) 
955 
(62.99%) 
1,520 
(63.55%) 
2 165 
(18.84%) 
338 
(22.30%) 
503 
(21.03%) 
3 78 
(8.90%) 
119 
(7.85%) 
197 
(8.24%) 
4 37 
(4.22%) 
64 
(4.22%) 
101 
(4.22%) 
5 18 
(2.05%) 
31 
(2.04%) 
49 
(2.05%) 
6 13 
(1.48%) 
9 
(0.59%) 
22 
(0.92%) 
Total 876 
(100%) 
1,516 
(100%) 
2,392 
(100%) 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
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7.3 Modelling of remittance flows and of their impact on recipients’ welfare 
 
7.3.1 Analytical framework 
 
The analytical framework for our empirical analysis draws on various aspects of the 
literature on remittances (Banerjee, 1984; Hoddinott, 1992; Adams, 2004), sample 
selection bias (Lee, 1978; Heckman, 1979; Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980) and the 
evaluation of the counterfactual (Lee, 1978; Adams, 2004). We employ the Heckman 
two-step technique to examine factors influencing remittance decisions. A key feature 
of this methodology is the treatment of the remittance decision as comprising two 
sequential decisions, namely, the decision to remit, and the decision on the amount of 
remittances to send. As noted earlier, this has the advantage of facilitating the separate 
analyses of factors underlying the decision to remit, and of those influencing the 
decision about remittance size. 
 
Although Tobit regressions are sometimes used to analyse remittance flows, the method 
restricts the two remittance decisions to be influenced by the same factors and in the 
same manner. Thus, where there is significant interest in exploring subtleties in 
remittance decisions, it is arguably better to employ a methodology – such as the 
Heckman two-step technique – that can highlight differences in factors influencing the 
two remittance decisions. Thus, the Heckman-type two-step approach has the potential 
of providing better insight into remittance behaviour than the use of a probit model. 
Moreover, by using a selectivity-adjusted two-step method, split samples – for example, 
remittance recipients and non-recipients – can be further analysed appropriately. Indeed, 
the application of the Heckman-type technique to the analysis of remittances is now 
firmly established in the literature (see Banerjee, 1984; Hoddinott, 1992; and Adams, 
2006). Even though the present study’s preferred methodology is the selectivity-
adjusted two-step method, corresponding Tobit estimates are reported alongside our 
main results, but will not be the central focus of the discussion. 
 
Following Hoddinott (1992), let: 
The amount of remittances sent by household i be denoted by Ri; and 
Household i’s decision to remit be denoted by Pi, where: 
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Pi is a function of observed (Z) and unobserved (g) variables; 
Pi = 1 if Ri > 0; and 
Pi = 0 if Ri = 0 
 
The amount of remittances sent (Ri) is modelled as a function of observed (X) and 
unobserved (h) variables, but conditional on Pi = 1. 
Thus, Pi = P(Z, g) and Ri = R(X, h) 
 
It has been noted that it is generally inappropriate to estimate a remittance function with 
observations on remitters only. This is because remitters can be viewed as a non-
randomly selected sample, and as a result, the coefficients obtained from such an 
exercise may be biased in a manner similar to what occurs in the ordinary problem of 
omitted variable bias (Banerjee, 1984). 
 
One major technique for circumventing this problem is the application of Heckman’s 
(1979) two-step procedure for the estimation of the coefficients of X. The first step of 
the procedure is the estimation of a probit for the remittance decision. After estimating 
the probit, a variable – the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR) – is generated from the probit’s 
fitted values ( iψˆ ) as follows: 
IMR = f ( iψˆ ) / F( iψˆ ), 
where 
f: the density function of a standard normal random variable; and 
F: the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. 
 
The inverse Mills’ ratio is then inserted as an additional regressor in the function for the 
remittance amount sent. This remittance level equation is then estimated by OLS. The 
described technique is also applied to the analysis of remittance receipts. 
 
In order to estimate the impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare, we employ 
counterfactual scenarios, coupled with the estimation of an index of welfare gain due to 
remittance receipts. Essentially, the counterfactual scenarios attempt to capture – for 
each household, regardless of remittance receipt status – household welfare if the 
household were a recipient, as well as household welfare if the household were a non-
recipient. Since each household in the dataset is either a remittance recipient or a non-
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recipient, we observe each household’s welfare level as a recipient or as a non-recipient, 
but not both. For each household, the particular unobserved welfare level is determined 
by applying the estimated selectivity-adjusted parameters to the household’s relevant 
characteristics. 
 
The index of welfare gain is derived by calculating the mean proportionate increase in 
welfare between remittance receipt and non-receipt scenarios as follows: 
 
For any sub-group (δ) of the entire sample, let N(δ) be the corresponding population 
size; 
Then, for any sub-group (δ), the average proportionate welfare increment attributable to 
the receipt of remittances may be expressed as: 
 
∑
∈
−
=
δi Wni
WniWri
δN
g
)(
1
 
 
Where, Wri and Wni – household i’s welfare levels
69
 as a recipient, and as a non-
recipient, respectively – are proxied by their corresponding fitted values. 
 
7.3.2 Estimation procedure 
 
Steps 1-3 summarise the general approach of our empirical analysis. Since the chapter’s 
focus is on remittance flows between rural and urban sectors, the procedure – 
appropriately tweaked – is applied to each of the following cases: 
a) Urban-to-rural remittances 
b) Rural-to-urban remittances. 
 
1. What are the determinants of remittance outflows? 
The use of Heckman’s two-step method (see Hoddinott, 1992); 
i. Probit equation for the decision concerning whether (or not) to remit, using a 
pooled sample of remitters and non-remitters; 
                                                 
69
 Instead of approximating the proportionate welfare change with the difference in log welfare, we adopt 
Lee’s (1978) approach of deriving the welfare level from log welfare by using the relation x = e
logx
. 
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ii. The derivation of the selectivity variable (i.e., the inverse Mills’ ratio); 
iii. OLS estimation of a remittance outflow function using the sample of 
remitters, with the inclusion of the selectivity variable as an additional 
regressor. 
 
2. What are the determinants of remittance receipts? 
The use of Heckman’s two-step method; 
i. Probit equation for identifying factors influencing whether (or not) a 
household receives any remittance, using a pooled sample of recipients and 
non-recipients; 
ii. The derivation of the selectivity variable (i.e., the inverse Mills’ ratio); 
iii. OLS estimation of a remittance receipt function using the sample of 
recipients, with the inclusion of the selectivity variable as an additional 
regressor. 
 
3. What is the impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare? 
The use of Heckman’s two-step method; 
i. Probit estimation of the reduced-form remittance receipt equation, using a 
pooled sample of recipients and non-recipients; 
ii. The derivation of selectivity variables for the recipient and non-recipient 
welfare regressions as follows; 
 
Selectivity variable for the recipient welfare regression: 
IMR = f ( iψˆ ) / F( iψˆ )  
Selectivity variable for the non-recipient welfare regression: 
IMR = f ( iψˆ ) /[1- F( iψˆ )] 
Where: 
f: the density function of a standard normal random variable; 
F: the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable; and 
iψˆ : a vector of the probit regression’s fitted values. 
 
iii. OLS estimation of a welfare function for the sample of recipients, with the 
inclusion of the appropriate selectivity variable as an additional regressor; 
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iv. OLS estimation of a welfare function for the sample of non-recipients, with 
the inclusion of the appropriate selectivity variable as an additional 
regressor; 
v. Computation of an index of welfare differential between receipt and non-
receipt scenarios. 
 
In adapting steps 1-3 to the cases of urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban remittance flows, 
the following modification is made: 
 
 
 
Urban-to-rural 
What determines whether an urban household will transfer remittances to the rural 
sector? 
Sample: a pooled sample of urban households who did not remit and those who sent 
remittances to rural households. 
 
What determines whether a rural household will receive a remittance from the urban 
sector? 
Sample: a pooled sample of rural households who did not receive remittances and those 
who received remittances from urban households. 
What is the impact of urban-to-rural remittances on recipients’ welfare? 
Sample: a pooled sample of rural households who did not receive remittances and those 
who received remittances from urban households. 
 
Rural-to-urban 
What determines whether a rural household will send remittances to the urban sector? 
Sample: a pooled sample of rural households who did not remit and those who sent 
remittances to urban households. 
 
What determines whether an urban household will receive a remittance from the rural 
sector? 
Sample: a pooled sample of urban households who did not receive remittances and 
those who received remittances from rural households. 
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What is the impact of rural-to-urban remittances on recipients’ welfare? 
Sample: a pooled sample of urban households who did not receive remittances and 
those who received remittances from rural households. 
 
 
7.4 Empirical analysis 
 
7.4.1 The variables 
 
In our remittance expenditure regressions, the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of remittance expenditure, whereas the natural logarithm of remittance 
income is used as the dependent variable in the remittance receipt regressions. In the 
welfare regressions, the dependent variable is the logarithm of a measure of household 
consumption welfare. This measure of household consumption welfare is defined as the 
total real consumption expenditure per adult equivalent. 
 
On the basis of theory and the literature, the regressors used in the analysis consist 
broadly of household characteristics, as well as locational variables. These include the 
presence of an in-migrant, the household head’s attributes, characteristics of remittance 
recipients, characteristics of remitters, dummy variables representing total household 
employment income categories
70
, and regional and ecological zone indicators. It should 
be noted that the various urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban models do not have the same 
set of regressors. This is because the coefficients of some regressors were significant in 
one model, but insignificant in the other. 
 
                                                 
70
 These categories are: 
(i) Zero (no employment income); 
(ii) Low (non-zero, but less than one million cedis per year); 
(iii) Medium (at least one million – but less than two million – cedis per year); 
(iv) High (at least two million cedis per year). 
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An important contribution of this chapter is the inclusion, where appropriate, of a 
regressor that captures the kin-fostering status of a household. In this connection, a kin-
fostered individual is defined as a person who satisfies all of the following criteria
71
: 
i) Less than 18 years old; 
ii) None of the parents is a member of the household; and 
iii) Related to the household head or to the household head’s spouse. 
As observed in the preceding chapter, anecdotal evidence suggests that kin-fostering is 
widespread in Ghana. This is further supported by the kin-fostering component of the 
GLSS4 fostering estimates (see Table 59 in the Appendix to this chapter). 
 
Regarding the method used, a requirement for the identification of a remittance function 
is the presence of at least one regressor in the probit that is excluded from the adjusted 
OLS (see Hoddinott, 1992). The identifying variable(s) – i.e., the exclusion restriction – 
for each remittance function was determined on the basis of a preliminary analysis of 
the data relating to the relevant function. In the tables of regression estimates, these 
identifying variables have been highlighted. In estimating the selectivity-corrected 
welfare regressions, however, a common exclusion restriction (a household head age 
dummy) was found for the two equations. In all cases, tests were carried out to assess 
the validity of the choice of identifying variable(s); these tests have been reported in the 
Appendix to the chapter. Additionally, tests were performed to assess the validity of 
estimating separate welfare regressions for remittance recipients and non-recipients; the 
tests (see Table 61 and Table 62) did not accept the hypothesis that the welfare 
regression coefficients are the same for remittance recipients and non-recipients. This 
further lends credence to the methodology adopted in this study. 
 
Table 50 shows the means and standard deviations of variables used in this chapter’s 
regression analysis. A note about the a priori expectations of some of the key regressors 
is in order. A household’s income category is expected to have an influence on 
remittance flows. Specifically, all else being equal, households belonging to higher 
employment income groups are more likely to send remittances and in larger amounts 
than those without employment income. Similarly, ceteris paribus, a recipient’s income 
category will be inversely related to remittance receipts if altruism is the dominant 
                                                 
71
 The first two criteria define a fostered individual, but kin-fostering is what is of interest here. 
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motivation for the transfers. Given the strong association between remittances and 
migration, we expect the presence of in-migrants to influence remittance flows between 
their previous and current localities. Also, ceteris paribus, the stronger the relationship 
between the remitter and the sender, the larger the amount of remittances will be. 
Finally, we expect the selectivity variable to be statistically significant if selectivity bias 
characterises remittance flows. 
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Table 50: Means and standard deviations of variables 
Variable description Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Household employment income 5975 455094.2 1293850 
U-R migrant present (dummy) 5994 1.90 0.30 
R-U migrant present (dummy) 5994 1.96 0.20 
15≤head's age<25 (dummy) 5975 0.05 0.21 
25≤head's age<35 (dummy) 5975 0.22 0.41 
35≤head's age<45 (dummy) 5975 0.25 0.43 
45≤head's age<55 (dummy) 5975 0.21 0.41 
55≤head's age<65 (dummy) 5975 0.14 0.35 
Head at least 65 years old (dummy) 5975 0.14 0.35 
Male head (dummy) 5975 0.66 0.47 
Head married (dummy) 5975 0.53 0.50 
Head in informal union (dummy) 5975 0.13 0.34 
Head divorced/separated (dummy) 5975 0.15 0.36 
Head widowed (dummy) 5975 0.11 0.31 
Head never married (dummy) 5975 0.08 0.27 
Head - no educ. qualification (dummy) 5975 0.54 0.50 
Head-MSLC/BECE (dummy) 5975 0.32 0.47 
Head-voc/comm/O/A (dummy) 5975 0.07 0.26 
Head-TT/nursing/tech/prof (dummy) 5975 0.05 0.23 
Head-degree holder (dummy) 5975 0.01 0.07 
Head-unspec. educ (dummy) 5975 0.00 0.06 
Head unemployed (dummy) 5975 0.07 0.26 
Head-agriculture (dummy) 5975 0.52 0.50 
Head-industry (dummy) 5975 0.12 0.32 
Head-services (dummy) 5975 0.29 0.45 
Head-other sector (dummy) 5975 0.00 0.02 
Farm-related activity (dummy) 5975 0.67 0.47 
Food processing (dummy) 5975 0.61 0.49 
Other business (dummy) 5975 0.47 0.50 
Pipe-borne water (dummy) 5975 0.41 0.49 
Electricity/generator (dummy) 5975 0.40 0.49 
Coastal ecological zone dummy 5975 0.35 0.48 
Forest ecological zone dummy 5975 0.45 0.50 
Savannah ecological zone dummy 5975 0.20 0.40 
Western Region dummy 5975 0.11 0.31 
Central Region dummy 5975 0.12 0.32 
Greater Accra Region 5975 0.14 0.35 
Eastern Region dummy 5975 0.11 0.31 
Volta Region dummy 5975 0.14 0.34 
Ashanti Region dummy 5975 0.18 0.38 
Brong-Ahafo Region (dummy) 5975 0.09 0.29 
Northern Region dummy 5975 0.06 0.24 
Upper West Region dummy 5975 0.02 0.14 
Upper East Region dummy 5975 0.04 0.20 
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Table 50: Continued … 
Variable description Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Urban remitter is head's parent (dummy) 1767 0.06 0.24 
Urban remitter is head's spouse (dummy) 1767 0.09 0.28 
Urban remitter is head's child (dummy) 1767 0.35 0.48 
Urban remitter is head's sibling (dummy) 1767 0.23 0.42 
Urban remitter is head's other rel (dummy) 1767 0.17 0.37 
Urban remitter not related to head (dummy) 1767 0.10 0.30 
urban remitter is a male (dummy) 1765 0.62 0.49 
Rural remitter is head's parent (dummy) 418 0.14 0.35 
Rural remitter is head's spouse (dummy) 418 0.08 0.28 
Rural remitter is head's child (dummy) 418 0.33 0.47 
Rural remitter is head's sibling (dummy) 418 0.25 0.43 
Rural remitter is head's other rel (dummy) 418 0.15 0.36 
Rural remitter not related to head (dummy) 418 0.06 0.23 
Rural remitter is a male (dummy) 416 0.53 0.50 
Sent remittance to rural sector (dummy) 5975 0.20 0.40 
Sent remittance to urban sector (dummy) 5975 0.28 0.45 
Household size 5975 4.28 2.56 
Number of children/elderly 5975 2.08 1.77 
Member attends school (dummy) 5975 0.61 0.49 
Household kin-fosters (dummy) 5975 0.17 0.38 
Log of U-R remittance outflow 1172 11.45 1.34 
Log of R-U remittance outflow 1688 11.70 1.36 
Log of U-R remittance receipts 1775 11.87 1.47 
Log of R-U remittance receipts 421 11.07 1.37 
Rural recipient is head's parent (dummy) 1150 0.36 0.48 
Rural recipient is head's spouse (dummy) 1150 0.05 0.22 
Rural recipient is head's child (dummy) 1150 0.15 0.36 
Rural recipient is head's sibling (dummy) 1150 0.16 0.36 
Rural recipient is head's other relative 
(dummy) 
1150 0.23 0.42 
Rural recipient not related to head (dummy) 1150 0.05 0.22 
Rural recipient is a male (dummy) 1151 0.30 0.46 
Urban recipient is head's parent (dummy) 1661 0.25 0.43 
Urban recipient is head's spouse (dummy) 1661 0.03 0.17 
Urban recipient is head's child (dummy) 1661 0.30 0.46 
Urban recipient is head's sibling (dummy) 1661 0.19 0.39 
Urban recipient is head's other relative 
(dummy) 
1661 0.18 0.38 
Urban recipient not related to head (dummy) 1661 0.05 0.23 
Urban recipient is a male (dummy) 1658 0.37 0.48 
Received urban remittance (dummy) 5975 0.30 0.46 
Received rural remittance (dummy) 5975 0.07 0.26 
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7.4.2 Factors influencing urban-to-rural remittance outflows 
 
a) The urban-to-rural remittance outflow decision 
 
The probit estimates (see Table 51) highlight the strong linkage between remittance 
outflows and migration; the presence of a rural-to-urban in-migrant increases the 
likelihood of the (urban) household sending remittances to the rural sector. The 
coefficient of the proxy for this linkage is highly significant (the p-value is less than 
0.01), lending considerable support to the existence of a strong connection between 
migration and remittances. Our results further suggest that relative to urban households 
with no employment income, urban households in the medium employment income 
category are more likely to send remittances to rural residents. Somewhat surprisingly, 
the coefficient of the high employment income dummy was small and lacked statistical 
significance. 
 
The probit results further show that all else being equal, the receipt of remittances from 
the rural sector increases an urban household’s likelihood of sending remittances to that 
(i.e., rural) sector. This result could also be an indication that the receipt of an urban 
remittance increases a rural household’s probability of sending remittances to the urban 
sector. This is because the nature of the data precludes a clear determination of the 
sequencing of the two kinds of transfers. This point is buttressed by the results of the 
rural-to-urban remittance outflow model (see Table 52). At any rate, this finding is 
suggestive of the presence of exchange (or self-interest) considerations in the 
motivation for remittance flows between Ghana’s urban and rural areas. This is because 
the finding is consistent with the view that remittances are often sent as a strategic ploy 
for receiving reciprocal remittances. 
 
A number of other findings also conform to a priori expectations. Compared with 
households headed by persons aged 65 years or more, urban households headed by 
persons in the age groups, 25-35, 35-45, and 45-55 are each more likely to send 
remittances to rural households. Furthermore, male headship of an urban household 
increases the household’s likelihood of sending remittances to the rural sector. We also 
find a significant role – in the remittance decision – for the household head’s marital 
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status.  In comparison with the headship of an urban household by a person who has 
never married, the headship of an urban household by a married person increases the 
household’s likelihood of sending remittances to a rural household. The headship of an 
urban household by a person divorced/separated, or by a widow(er), has a similar effect. 
 
The household head’s employment status also exerts an influence on the urban 
household’s likelihood of sending remittances to the rural sector. Compared to an urban 
household headed by the unemployed, the headship of an urban household by an 
agricultural, industrial, or services sector worker raises the chances of the household 
sending remittances to a rural dweller. These findings also conform to a priori 
expectations. 
 
 
 199 
Table 51: Urban-to-rural remittance outflow 
Dependent variables: 
Probit - dummy (1 if urban-to-rural remitter, 0 if urban non-remitter); 
Adjusted-OLS – Log of urban-to-rural remittances sent; 
Tobit – Urban-to-rural remittances (‘000 cedis) sent 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                        Tobit                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
R-U in-migrant present            0.69***       (0.11)                                    270.15***      (47.58) 
Male head                         0.37***       (0.10)         0.34*         (0.20)       181.73***      (47.10) 
Low employment income            -0.10          (0.15)        -0.27          (0.25)       -77.66         (69.27) 
Medium employment income          0.29**        (0.13)         0.13          (0.20)       105.79*        (57.62) 
High employment income            0.08          (0.13)         0.23          (0.19)        61.17         (53.87) 
Zero employment income (omitted category) 
Household size                   -0.02          (0.02)        -0.06*         (0.03)       -13.29          (9.23) 
Received rural remittance         0.36**        (0.18)        -0.78***       (0.27)        79.41         (79.95) 
Household kin-fosters             0.15          (0.12)         0.49**        (0.20)        85.15         (52.67) 
Head's age:[15, 25)               0.25          (0.27)        -0.06          (0.53)        56.94        (122.23) 
Head's age:[25, 35)               0.51***       (0.17)         0.06          (0.32)       198.14**       (77.28) 
Head's age:[35, 45)               0.64***       (0.16)         0.10          (0.31)       264.52***      (71.69) 
Head's age:[45, 55)               0.52***       (0.16)         0.33          (0.30)       233.78***      (72.41) 
Head's age:[55, 65)               0.18          (0.17)        -0.12          (0.31)        51.53         (78.24) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
Head married                      0.52***       (0.17)        -0.04          (0.32)       210.62***      (73.56) 
Head in informal union           -0.05          (0.19)        -0.47          (0.35)       -55.56         (85.25) 
Head divorced/separated           0.40**        (0.19)        -0.05          (0.34)       149.35*        (82.79) 
Head widowed                      0.39*         (0.23)        -0.36          (0.44)       139.21        (102.82) 
Head never married (omitted category) 
Head-agric.                       0.28*         (0.16)        -0.26          (0.32)       122.96         (74.96) 
Head-industry                     0.45***       (0.16)         0.08          (0.32)       200.37***      (72.42) 
Head-services                     0.32**        (0.15)         0.17          (0.30)       168.03**       (67.90) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Forest ecological zone            0.13          (0.15)        -0.21          (0.24)        60.81         (66.46) 
Savannah ecological zone         -0.29          (0.24)        -0.13          (0.45)      -126.62        (107.96) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
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Table 51: Continued … 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                        Tobit                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Western Region                    0.04          (0.53)         0.46          (0.88)        22.28        (247.28) 
Central Region                   -0.45          (0.54)        -0.07          (0.91)      -165.43        (251.43) 
Greater Accra Region             -0.21          (0.53)         1.26          (0.88)        27.49        (246.21) 
Eastern Region                   -0.25          (0.52)         0.92          (0.84)       -66.75        (240.64) 
Volta Region                     -0.15          (0.53)         0.69          (0.87)        -9.39        (243.76) 
Ashanti Region                   -0.18          (0.52)         1.06          (0.85)         7.67        (242.98) 
Brong-Ahafo Region               -0.29          (0.52)         1.03          (0.83)       -71.16        (240.56) 
Northern Region                  -0.15          (0.50)         1.09          (0.82)        11.26        (233.90) 
Upper West Region                -0.43          (0.74)        -0.24          (1.30)      -168.90        (349.76) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
No. of rural recipients                                        0.49***       (0.09)                              
Selectivity                                                    0.07          (0.30)                              
Constant                         -2.14***       (0.58)        10.04***       (1.27)     -1024.56***     (273.21) 
sigma                                                                                     463.36***      (21.55) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                             0.38                                              
r2_a                                                           0.30                                              
F                                                              5.02                                              
chi2                            189.36                                                    189.36                 
N                              1559.00                       297.00                      1559.00                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
r2_p: Pseudo r2 
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b) Factors influencing the amount of urban-to-rural remittances sent 
 
In the selectivity-corrected OLS regression for the amount of remittances sent, our 
exclusion restriction is the variable for the presence of a rural-to-urban in-migrant (see 
Table 51). As shown in the test of the validity of this variable as an exclusion restriction 
(see Table 63), the coefficient of the variable is not statistically significant when 
included in the OLS regression, but is highly significant (as already seen) in the probit. 
 
The selectivity-adjusted regression estimates are consistent with the view that gender 
plays a role in remittances outflows. The headship of an urban household by a male 
tends to increase the amount of remittances the household transfers to the rural sector. 
In other words, compared to their female-headed counterparts, male-headed urban 
households tend to send larger amounts of remittances to rural residents, all other things 
being equal. Significantly, the gender dummy is the only regressor for which the 
corresponding coefficients in the probit, adjusted-OLS, and Tobit are all significant and 
have the same sign. In view of the fact that within the Ghanaian society, greater 
responsibility is placed on men, the performance of the gender dummy is consistent 
with a priori expectations. 
 
For the sample of urban households that sent remittances to the rural sector, those who 
received rural remittances sent smaller amounts – on average – to the rural sector. This 
result is apparently simply reflecting the fact that urban recipients of rural remittances 
have, on average, lower employment incomes and welfare than their counterparts who 
do not receive rural remittances. Our results further suggest that the greater the number 
of rural dwellers an urban household sends remittances to, the higher the total amount of 
remittances sent by the household. Furthermore, in comparison with their non-kin-
fostering counterparts, urban households that engage in kin-fostering tend to transfer 
larger amounts of remittances to the rural sector. This finding is plausible since kin-
fostered individuals might be sending remittances to their rural resident parents or 
relatives. 
 
At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the coefficients in the adjusted-OLS 
regression do not always have the same sign as the corresponding estimates in the probit 
regression. This point highlights the comment made about the use of Tobit models in 
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remittance analyses. Whereas the Tobit estimates do not distinguish between factors 
influencing the remittance decision and those influencing the remittance size, the 
Heckman-type models do. Thus, the selectivity-adjusted models offer the potential for 
gaining more insight into remittance flows. 
 
7.4.3 Factors influencing rural-to-urban remittance outflows 
 
a) The rural-to-urban remittance outflow decision 
 
The probit regression estimates (see Table 52) suggest that the presence of an urban-to-
rural in-migrant increases the likelihood of the rural household sending remittances to 
the urban sector. In addition to being similar to the finding in the urban-to-rural outflow 
model, the result lends credence to the notion that remittances are strongly linked to 
migration. 
 
Male headship of a rural household also increases the household’s probability of 
sending remittances to an urban resident. In the Ghanaian society, where leadership 
roles are culturally assigned to males, this finding is not surprising. Thus, in comparison 
with their female-headed counterparts, male-headed households are likely to have a 
greater obligation to send remittances. Again, this finding mirrors that of the urban-to-
rural outflow model. 
 
The coefficients of the dummy variables for “low employment income” and “high 
employment income” are positive and highly significant. Thus, in comparison with 
households without employment income, both low- and high-earning rural households 
are more likely to send remittances to the urban sector. This result also conforms to a 
priori expectations. Another result worth noting is the performance of the variable 
representing a household’s status regarding the receipt of remittances from the urban 
sector. In comparison with rural households who do not receive urban remittances, rural 
households who do receive such remittances are more likely to transfer remittances to 
the urban sector. This finding supports the exchange (or self-interest) explanation for 
the motivation underlying remittance transfers. 
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Table 52: Rural-to-urban remittance outflow model 
Dependent variables: 
Probit - dummy (1 if rural-to-urban remitter, 0 if rural non-remitter); 
Adjusted-OLS – Log of rural-to-urban remittances sent; 
Tobit – Rural-to-urban remittances (‘000 cedis) sent 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                        Tobit                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
U-R in-migrant present            0.12*         (0.07)                                     86.24***      (25.96) 
Male head                         0.28***       (0.06)                                     92.93***      (24.19) 
Low employment income             0.27***       (0.10)        -0.20          (0.15)        80.37**       (38.16) 
Medium employment income          0.17          (0.13)         0.01          (0.18)        58.14         (48.62) 
High employment income            0.63***       (0.15)         0.07          (0.25)       308.64***      (52.62) 
Zero employment income (omitted category) 
Household size                    0.01          (0.01)         0.02          (0.02)         3.01          (4.18) 
Received urban remittance         0.40***       (0.06)        -0.69***       (0.12)        84.24***      (21.07) 
Head's age:[15, 25)              -0.17          (0.15)         0.12          (0.26)       -81.65         (60.41) 
Head's age:[25, 35)               0.15          (0.09)         0.12          (0.15)        23.95         (36.59) 
Head's age:[35, 45)               0.28***       (0.09)        -0.02          (0.15)        85.06**       (34.66) 
Head's age:[45, 55)               0.28***       (0.09)        -0.04          (0.15)       112.49***      (34.98) 
Head's age:[55, 65)               0.13          (0.09)        -0.07          (0.14)        49.44         (36.36) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
Head-MSLC/BECE                    0.13**        (0.06)         0.16          (0.10)        60.95**       (23.69) 
Head-voc/comm/O/A                 0.25*         (0.14)        -0.04          (0.20)        71.44         (53.00) 
Head-TT/nursing/tech/prof         0.40**        (0.16)        -0.04          (0.22)       131.99**       (56.00) 
Head-degree                       0.55          (0.47)         0.08          (0.52)       261.06*       (154.51) 
Head-unspec. educ                -0.02          (0.42)         0.09          (0.56)        78.48        (151.96) 
Head-no educ qualification (omitted category) 
Head-agric.                       0.59***       (0.17)        -0.97***       (0.36)       158.93**       (67.00) 
Head-industry                     0.46**        (0.19)        -0.89**        (0.37)       113.26         (74.44) 
Head-services                     0.44**        (0.18)        -0.84**        (0.34)       153.86**       (69.48) 
Head-other                                                     0.00          (0.00)     -1980.25          (0.00) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Farm/livestock                    0.30***       (0.11)        -0.33*         (0.18)       133.24***      (40.42) 
Food processing                   0.04          (0.07)         0.07          (0.10)        15.03         (25.72) 
Other business                    0.23***       (0.06)        -0.21**        (0.10)        67.70***      (21.16) 
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Table 52: Continued … 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                        Tobit                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Pipe-borne water                 -0.28***       (0.08)         0.12          (0.14)      -112.47***      (30.26) 
Electricity/generator             0.26***       (0.08)        -0.04          (0.13)       119.42***      (30.12) 
Forest ecological zone            0.48***       (0.08)        -0.24          (0.17)       131.17***      (28.97) 
Savannah ecological zone          0.08          (0.12)        -0.02          (0.19)       -17.42         (46.92) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
Western Region                    1.07***       (0.19)         0.14          (0.49)       355.23***      (77.38) 
Central Region                    1.28***       (0.19)        -0.05          (0.52)       438.82***      (76.71) 
Greater Accra Region              1.42***       (0.22)         0.36          (0.59)       564.98***      (89.16) 
Eastern Region                    0.86***       (0.17)         0.05          (0.43)       317.91***      (70.16) 
Volta Region                      1.07***       (0.18)         0.04          (0.48)       379.94***      (74.41) 
Ashanti Region                    0.86***       (0.18)         0.69          (0.44)       381.50***      (74.92) 
Brong-Ahafo Region                0.71***       (0.17)         0.67          (0.42)       295.73***      (70.86) 
Northern Region                   0.44**        (0.17)         0.58          (0.40)       187.76***      (72.22) 
Upper West Region                                              0.00          (0.00)     -2041.70          (0.00) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
Rec is head's parent                                           0.65***       (0.21)                              
Rec is head's spouse                                           1.54***       (0.28)                              
Rec is head's child                                            0.90***       (0.20)                              
Rec is head's sibling                                          0.27          (0.21)                              
Rec is head's other rel                                        0.21          (0.21)                              
Rec not related to head (omitted category) 
No. of urban recipients                                        0.48***       (0.04)                              
Selectivity                                                   -1.03**        (0.40)                              
Constant                         -3.25***       (0.26)        12.46***       (1.31)     -1178.07***     (105.45) 
sigma                                                                                     415.01***      (10.12) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                             0.35                                              
r2_a                                                           0.32                                              
F                                                             12.33                                              
chi2                            542.95                                                    583.03                 
N                              3044.00                       977.00                      3139.00                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
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We also find that in comparison with households headed by the elderly (aged 65 years 
or more), rural households headed by persons aged between 35 and 55 years are more 
likely to transfer remittances to an urban resident. Given the link between age and 
income generating capacity, this finding is plausible. Furthermore, support is found for 
the influence of education in remittance decisions. In relation to rural households 
headed by persons with no educational qualification, those headed by individuals with 
basic to moderate
72
 education have a higher probability of sending remittances to the 
urban sector. 
 
Our results further suggest a strong impact of employment status on rural households’ 
decisions to send remittances to the urban sector. Compared with rural households 
headed by the unemployed, those headed by agricultural, industrial, or services sector 
workers are more likely to send remittances to urban residents. This result clearly 
conforms to a priori expectations. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, rural households who 
own (or operate) a farm, keep livestock, or are engaged in fishing, have a greater 
likelihood of sending remittances to the urban sector. No such evidence is found for 
rural households engaged in food processing, but similar results hold for those involved 
in some other non-farm business (see the probit estimates in Table 52). 
 
The probit results further suggest that rural households with access to pipe-borne water 
are less likely to transfer remittances to urban residents, but those who use electricity–
powered lighting are more likely to do so. Given the expected strong association 
between wellbeing and access to these amenities, the latter result is consistent with a 
priori expectation, whilst the former requires further investigation. The statistical 
significance and positive signs of most of the regional dummies suggest the presence of 
unobserved spatial effects that result in the following: in comparison with rural 
households in the Upper East Region (the omitted category), rural households in 
virtually
73
 all other Regions are more likely to transfer remittances to urban residents, 
                                                 
72
 That is, any of the following qualifications: vocational, commercial, “O” level, “A” level, teacher 
training, nursing, technical, or professional. 
73
 The dummy for one Region (the Upper West) was dropped during the estimation process. This was 
because no rural household from the Region sent a remittance to an urban resident. 
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ceteris paribus. This finding is also consistent with the Upper East Region’s status as 
one of the poorest in Ghana. 
 
b) Factors influencing the amount of rural-to-urban remittances sent 
 
The relevant estimates for this discussion are those of the adjusted-OLS regression in 
Table 52. As indicated by the highlighted variables, the exclusion restrictions for this 
regression are the dummies for gender and the presence of an urban-to-rural in-migrant. 
The test for the validity of these identifying variables is provided by Table 64.  
 
We observe that the receipt of remittances from the urban sector is associated with a 
lower amount of remittances sent to that sector. This result is consistent with the fact 
that rural households who receive urban remittances have a lower mean employment 
income than their colleagues who do not receive such remittances. 
 
We further find that the larger the number of urban residents a rural household sends 
remittances to, the greater the total amount of remittances sent to the urban sector. 
Additionally, the relationship of the major recipient to the head of the remitting 
household influences the size of remittances transferred. In comparison with the 
amounts sent to non-relatives living in urban areas, rural households sent higher 
amounts of remittances to urban-based parents, spouses, or children. This finding is 
very consistent with a priori expectations. 
 
For the sample of rural households who sent remittances to urban residents, households 
whose heads work in the agricultural, industrial, or services sectors sent smaller 
amounts of remittances, that is, compared to those whose household heads are 
unemployed. Similarly, for the sample of remitters, those who own (or operate) a farm, 
keep livestock, or are engaged in fishing, tend to send smaller remittances to the urban 
sector; similar results were found for those involved in some other non-farm business 
The reasons underlying these results are not easily discernible and would require 
additional research and information to unravel. 
 
The coefficient of the selectivity variable is statistically significant and negative. This 
finding calls for a couple of comments. First of all, the statistical significance of the 
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coefficient lends support to our choice of the Heckman selectivity-adjusted model. 
Secondly, the negative sign of the coefficient suggests the presence of unobserved 
variable(s) which exert contrasting effects on the remittance decision and the amount of 
remittances sent. While it is difficult to know exactly what these unobserved variables 
are, it is plausible that a household’s average geographical distance from relatives is one 
such variable. This is because conceivably, households who are geographically closer to 
relatives are more likely to send remittances, whereas amongst remittance sending 
households, those who are located farther from relatives are more prone to send larger 
amounts of remittances. This is a phenomenon many developing country residents can 
identify with. 
 
7.4.4 Factors influencing urban-to-rural remittance receipts 
 
a) Factors influencing rural households’ receipt of urban remittances 
 
All else being equal, male headship of a rural household reduces the likelihood of the 
household receiving transfers from the urban sector. In other words, female headship of 
a rural household increases that household’s probability of receiving urban remittances 
(see Table 53). We also observe that the presence of a school pupil (or college student) 
in a rural household increases the household’s probability of receiving urban 
remittances, a result which is consistent with both altruism and exchange. This second 
finding further provides insight into the use of remittances by rural households. It is 
reasonable to speculate – on the basis of the results – that urban transfers to rural 
households are often (meant to be) used to finance educational expenses. We also find 
that rural households’ transfer of remittances to the urban sector enhances their 
likelihood of receiving remittances from urban households. Thus, the exchange (or self-
interest) motive cannot be ruled out either. It does appear then, that both altruistic and 
exchange motivations underlie remittance behaviour in Ghana. 
 
Regarding the role of kin-fostering, our results are consistent with the view that they 
influence the receipt of remittances. The coefficient of the kin-fostering variable is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that kin-fostering enhances a rural 
household’s probability of receiving remittances from the urban sector. In Ghana, a 
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rural-to-urban in-migrant might have a child living with a rural-based relative (for 
example, the migrant’s parent) as a livelihood coping strategy. This scenario will 
naturally increase the kin-fostering household’s likelihood of receiving remittances 
from the urban-based migrant. Furthermore, in comparison with households headed by 
the elderly (65 years or older), rural households headed by the non-elderly have a lower 
probability of receiving remittances from the urban sector. Given that in typical 
developing countries the elderly tend to be very needy, this result is consistent with the 
existence of altruistic conduct on the part of urban households who send remittances to 
rural dwellers. 
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Table 53: Urban-to-rural remittance receipt model 
Dependent variables: 
Probit - dummy (1 if recipient of urban-to-rural remittance, 0 if rural non-recipient); 
Adjusted-OLS – Log of urban-to-rural remittances received; 
Tobit – Urban-to-rural remittances (‘000 cedis) received 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                        Tobit                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Male head                        -0.57***       (0.07)                                   -357.44***      (35.89) 
Zero employment income            0.03          (0.14)        -0.07          (0.22)        51.10         (76.31) 
Low employment income             0.05          (0.16)         0.02          (0.25)        32.74         (86.09) 
Medium employment income         -0.05          (0.17)        -0.16          (0.27)       -17.35         (90.23) 
High employment income (omitted category) 
Sent rem to urban sector          0.43***       (0.05)        -0.33***       (0.10)       177.16***      (29.32) 
Household kin-fosters             0.12*         (0.07)        -0.14          (0.10)        26.77         (35.41) 
# of children/elderly            -0.02          (0.02)         0.04*         (0.03)        -2.64          (8.92) 
Member attends school             0.13**        (0.06)         0.18*         (0.09)        75.70**       (32.83) 
Head's age:[15, 25)              -0.54***       (0.15)         0.49**        (0.23)      -171.19**       (79.09) 
Head's age:[25, 35)              -0.68***       (0.09)         0.39**        (0.17)      -299.39***      (49.14) 
Head's age:[35, 45)              -0.77***       (0.09)         0.19          (0.18)      -330.12***      (46.41) 
Head's age:[45, 55)              -0.70***       (0.08)         0.27*         (0.16)      -334.52***      (45.28) 
Head's age:[55, 65)              -0.45***       (0.09)         0.04          (0.13)      -197.31***      (44.47) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
Head married                     -0.26**        (0.12)        -0.19          (0.20)       -92.35         (67.49) 
Head in informal union           -0.16          (0.13)        -0.44**        (0.19)       -60.80         (68.74) 
Head divorced/separated          -0.34**        (0.13)        -0.05          (0.20)      -142.80*        (73.00) 
Head widowed                     -0.27*         (0.15)        -0.22          (0.21)      -171.98**       (79.05) 
Head never married (omitted category) 
Head-MSLC/BECE                    0.11*         (0.06)         0.09          (0.09)        71.86**       (32.42) 
Head-voc/comm/O/A                 0.05          (0.14)         0.54***       (0.20)        67.75         (73.37) 
Head-TT/nursing/tech/prof        -0.10          (0.16)         1.02***       (0.25)        44.33         (85.03) 
Head-degree                       0.24          (0.45)        -1.14          (0.84)       206.56        (244.57) 
Head-unspec. educ                -0.70          (0.47)         0.37          (0.83)      -363.30        (269.34) 
Head-no educ qualification (omitted category) 
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Table 53: Continued … 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                        Tobit                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Head-agric.                      -0.47***       (0.14)        -0.20          (0.18)      -372.96***      (67.38) 
Head-industry                    -0.78***       (0.16)        -0.20          (0.25)      -546.28***      (81.24) 
Head-services                    -0.52***       (0.15)        -0.16          (0.18)      -379.55***      (70.57) 
Head-other                                                     0.00          (0.00)      -143.21        (594.50) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Farm/livestock                   -0.08          (0.09)        -0.06          (0.14)        -4.41         (49.95) 
Food processing                  -0.14**        (0.06)         0.04          (0.09)       -63.86*        (33.33) 
Other business                   -0.09*         (0.05)        -0.07          (0.08)       -48.09*        (28.65) 
Pipe-borne water                 -0.13*         (0.07)         0.15          (0.10)       -27.47         (38.29) 
Electricity/generator             0.21***       (0.07)         0.13          (0.11)       186.83***      (39.07) 
Forest ecological zone            0.00          (0.07)        -0.17          (0.11)        -1.58         (38.63) 
Savannah ecological zone         -0.19*         (0.11)        -0.48***       (0.18)      -123.83**       (61.76) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
Western Region                   -0.72***       (0.16)        -0.31          (0.28)      -352.00***      (88.89) 
Central Region                   -0.29*         (0.16)        -0.51**        (0.24)      -201.40**       (87.26) 
Greater Accra Region             -0.21          (0.19)         0.30          (0.28)       179.92*       (101.87) 
Eastern Region                   -0.45***       (0.14)        -0.15          (0.23)      -239.59***      (77.78) 
Volta Region                     -0.27*         (0.15)        -0.52**        (0.24)      -181.44**       (83.66) 
Ashanti Region                   -0.43***       (0.15)         0.13          (0.24)      -169.32**       (84.83) 
Brong-Ahafo Region               -0.36***       (0.14)         0.23          (0.21)      -178.84**       (75.20) 
Northern Region                  -0.32**        (0.14)         0.25          (0.23)      -153.27**       (76.52) 
Upper West Region                -1.15***       (0.22)        -0.18          (0.47)      -548.53***     (126.66) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
Rem is head's parent                                           0.58***       (0.20)                              
Rem is head's spouse                                           1.51***       (0.19)                              
Rem is head's child                                            0.59***       (0.15)                              
Rem is head's sibling                                          0.30**        (0.14)                              
Rem is head's other rel                                        0.06          (0.15)                              
Rem not related to head (omitted category) 
Urban remitter is a male                                       0.23***       (0.07)                              
No. of urban remitters                                         0.53***       (0.04)                              
Selectivity                                                   -0.62**        (0.25)                          
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Table 53: Continued … 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                        Tobit                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Constant                          1.63***       (0.28)        11.21***       (0.42)       711.72***     (149.02) 
sigma                                                                                     581.20***      (12.94) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                             0.36                                              
r2_a                                                           0.34                                              
F                                                             13.05                                              
chi2                            500.91                                                    526.40                 
N                              3422.00                      1139.00                      3423.00                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
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Compared with rural households headed by persons who have never been married, rural 
households headed by the married, the divorced (or separated), or the widowed are each 
less likely to receive remittances from the urban sector. The exact explanation for this 
finding is unclear and might require further research, possibly with additional data. We 
also observe that in comparison with rural households headed by the unemployed, rural 
households headed by agricultural, industrial, or services sector workers are each less 
likely to receive remittances from the urban sector, another finding that conforms to a 
priori expectations. Finally, the estimates suggest that owing to unobserved regional 
differences, rural households in the Upper East Region are more likely – relative to their 
counterparts in most of the other Regions – to receive urban remittances, ceteris paribus. 
 
b) Factors influencing the amount of urban-to-rural remittances received 
 
The regression for the amount of remittances received is represented by the adjusted-
OLS estimates. As shown in Table 65, although the exclusion restriction (the gender 
dummy) is statistically significant in the remittance decision equation, it lacks 
significance when it is included in the adjusted-OLS regression. Additionally, it is 
useful to note that these selectivity-corrected OLS estimates are based on a sample of 
rural recipients of urban remittances. 
 
The adjusted-OLS estimates suggest that all other things being equal, the higher the 
number of children (less than 15 years old) and the elderly (more than 65 years old) 
present in a rural household, the larger the amount of urban remittances the household 
will receive (see Table 53). Our results also suggest that the presence of a school pupil 
(or college student) tends to increase the size of urban remittances received. 
Furthermore, amongst rural recipients of urban remittances, there is a relationship 
between the amount of remittances received and the status of the rural household 
regarding whether it sends remittances to the urban sector. Rural households who do not 
send remittances to the urban sector tend to receive larger urban transfers. To the extent 
that failure to send remittances to the urban sector might be a reflection of deprivation, 
this result is again consistent with the altruistic motive for remittance flows. 
 
Amongst rural recipients of urban remittances, households headed by persons in some 
non-elderly age groups receive larger amounts than households headed by the elderly. It 
 213 
would be recalled that the probit model predicts the opposite effect of household head’s 
age on the receipt of urban remittances (see Table 53). These contrasting effects show 
that factors influencing the two remittance decisions – the decision to remit and the 
decision about the remittance size – can impact differently. Furthermore, in comparison 
with rural households headed by persons without any educational qualification, rural 
households whose heads have a moderate educational qualification
74
 tend to receive 
larger urban remittances. 
 
Regarding the influence of the number of remitters on remittance size, there is support 
for a positive effect; amongst rural recipients of urban remittances, there is a positive 
association between the size of remittances received and the number of urban remitters 
the recipient household has. We also find that rural recipients of urban remittances tend 
to receive larger amounts if the major remitter is a parent, a spouse, a child, or a sibling 
of the household head, that is, in comparison with those cases where the major remitter 
is not related to the household head; this is also a plausible finding. 
 
It is important to note also that the coefficient of the selectivity variable is negative and 
statistically significant, with the p-value being less than 0.05. In addition to the 
coefficient’s statistical significance providing credibility to the methodology employed, 
the negative sign of the coefficient offers interesting insight into remittance flows in 
Ghana. The negative sign of the selectivity variable suggests that unobserved variable(s) 
influencing rural households’ receipt of urban remittances have an opposite effect on the 
size of urban remittances received by the households. As suggested earlier in this 
chapter, a likely candidate for such a variable is a rural household’s average proximity 
to potential remitters (for example, relatives of household members). The closer the 
location of potential urban remitters, the higher will be the probability that the rural 
households will receive urban remittances. However, amongst rural households who 
receive urban remittances, those with geographically closer remitters are more likely to 
receive smaller amounts of remittances. 
 
                                                 
74
 That is, any of the following qualifications: vocational, commercial, “O” level, “A” level, teacher 
training, nursing, technical, or professional.  
 214 
7.4.5 Factors influencing rural-to-urban remittance receipts 
 
a) Factors influencing urban households’ receipt of rural remittances 
 
The results of the probit and selectivity-adjusted OLS regressions are shown in Table 
54. Regarding the adjusted-OLS regression, the exclusion restriction is the gender 
dummy; a test of the validity of this exclusion restriction is provided by Table 66. Our 
probit estimates provide support for a close link between remittances and migration. 
This is shown by the positive and significant coefficient of the dummy for the presence 
of a rural-to-urban in-migrant. Thus, the presence of a rural-to-urban in-migrant in an 
urban household increases the household’s probability of receiving remittances from the 
rural sector. Furthermore, our results suggest that urban households who send 
remittances to the rural sector are more likely to receive rural remittances, that is, in 
comparison with those who do not send remittances to rural dwellers. 
 
The negative and highly significant coefficient of the dummy variable for male 
household headship provides support for the view that female headship of an urban 
household increases the household’s probability of receiving rural remittances. This 
finding mirrors that of the urban-to-rural remittance inflow model. There is also some 
evidence for the influence of employment status in remittance receipts. Urban 
households whose heads are unemployed have a higher probability of receiving rural 
remittances than their counterparts whose heads are employed in industry or in services. 
Thus, the importance of altruistic considerations is given additional credence. 
 
Another notable finding relates to the role of kin-fostering in remittance flows. The 
coefficient of the kin-fostering variable is positive and statistically significant, thus 
providing evidence to suggest that kin-fostering influences remittance flows. Our results 
suggest that kin-fostering by an urban household tends to increase the likelihood of the 
household receiving remittances from the rural sector. This finding is consistent with 
scenarios where very young rural-to-urban in-migrants are kin-fostered by urban-based 
relatives. Under such circumstances, the urban household is more likely to receive 
remittances from the rural sector. 
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Table 54: Rural-to-urban remittance receipt model 
Dependent variables: 
Probit - dummy (1 if recipient of rural-to-urban remittance, 0 if urban non-recipient); 
Adjusted-OLS – Log of rural-to-urban remittances received; 
Tobit – Rural-to-urban remittances (‘000 cedis) received 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                        Tobit                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Male head                        -0.62***       (0.14)                                   -465.62***     (102.89) 
R-U in-migrant present            0.49***       (0.16)        -1.08**        (0.53)       347.53***     (118.80) 
Zero employment income           -0.16          (0.20)        -0.82          (0.57)       -88.56        (145.90) 
Low employment income             0.06          (0.26)        -0.80          (0.69)         0.45        (191.79) 
Medium employment income         -0.38          (0.30)        -1.46          (1.01)      -279.12        (224.39) 
High employment income (omitted category) 
Sent rem to rural sector          0.39**        (0.15)        -0.08          (0.43)       249.86**      (113.08) 
Household kin-fosters             0.27*         (0.15)        -0.77*         (0.40)       209.53*       (108.68) 
Head's age:[15, 25)              -0.33          (0.30)         0.29          (0.66)      -229.19        (219.76) 
Head's age:[25, 35)              -0.59***       (0.21)         1.09*         (0.61)      -330.67**      (154.59) 
Head's age:[35, 45)              -0.49**        (0.20)         0.10          (0.60)      -301.17**      (147.18) 
Head's age:[45, 55)              -0.59***       (0.21)         0.80          (0.60)      -266.79*       (150.99) 
Head's age:[55, 65)              -0.54**        (0.23)         0.15          (0.58)      -360.88**      (172.39) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
Head-agric.                      -0.31          (0.23)         0.12          (0.54)      -345.01**      (158.31) 
Head-industry                    -0.68***       (0.24)        -0.37          (0.80)      -603.09***     (177.67) 
Head-services                    -0.52**        (0.21)         0.63          (0.58)      -488.76***     (146.05) 
Head-other                                                     0.00          (0.00)     -3342.94          (0.00) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Pipe-borne water                 -0.38**        (0.16)         0.65          (0.45)      -219.51*       (116.85) 
Electricity/generator            -0.01          (0.16)         0.63          (0.40)        54.91        (113.85) 
Forest ecological zone           -0.10          (0.23)         1.15*         (0.61)        10.93        (165.24) 
Savannah ecological zone         -0.86**        (0.40)        -0.27          (1.20)      -555.38*       (298.82) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
Western Region                   -0.99          (0.69)        -5.14**        (1.93)      -944.29*       (489.22) 
Central Region                   -0.78          (0.70)        -3.14          (1.90)      -656.35        (489.75) 
Greater Accra Region             -1.21*         (0.69)        -2.09          (1.90)      -992.87**      (487.17) 
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Table 54: Continued … 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                        Tobit                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Eastern Region                   -0.87          (0.67)        -1.86          (1.82)      -738.75        (468.83) 
Volta Region                     -0.45          (0.66)        -4.44**        (1.79)      -560.28        (461.97) 
Ashanti Region                   -0.80          (0.67)        -3.07          (1.89)      -732.59        (472.17) 
Brong-Ahafo Region               -0.47          (0.67)        -4.40**        (1.87)      -633.07        (468.03) 
Northern Region                  -0.33          (0.61)        -1.13          (1.61)      -391.95        (420.27) 
Upper West Region                                              0.00          (0.00)     -3770.26          (0.00) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
No. of rural remitters                                         0.62**        (0.27)                              
Selectivity                                                   -1.57**        (0.71)                              
Constant                          0.90          (0.75)        15.93***       (1.90)       673.71        (523.81) 
sigma                                                                                     733.23***      (64.53) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                             0.54                                              
r2_a                                                           0.32                                              
F                                                              2.41                                              
chi2                            116.52                                                    113.48                 
N                              1384.00                        86.00                      1401.00                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
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Furthermore, in comparison with urban households headed by the elderly (aged 65 years 
or more), those headed by the non-elderly are generally less likely to receive 
remittances from the rural sector; this constitutes another plausible result. An urban 
household’s access to pipe-borne water also decreases its likelihood of receiving rural 
remittances. To the extent that access to pipe-borne water can reflect a desirable level of 
wellbeing, this finding is reasonable. 
 
 
b) Factors influencing the amount of rural remittances received by urban households 
 
Many of the regressors in the selectivity-adjusted OLS equation do not have significant 
coefficients (see Table 54). The p-value associated with the joint statistical significance 
of the model is, however, less than 0.01.  A possible reason for the lack of significance 
of many of the coefficients is the small number of observations available; only 86 urban 
households received remittances from the rural sector, whereas the number of urban 
households who did not receive remittances is 1,315. 
 
Our results suggest that for those urban households who received rural remittances, the 
household head’s age has some influence on the amount of remittances received. In 
comparison with households headed by the elderly (aged 65 years or more), households 
headed by persons in the 25-35 year range tend to receive larger amounts of rural 
remittances. There is also some evidence to suggest that amongst urban recipients of 
rural remittances, the presence of a rural-to-urban in-migrant decreases the size of rural 
remittances received; a similar result applies to the presence of a kin-fostered child. 
 
Additionally, for those urban households receiving rural remittances, the higher the 
number of rural remitters a household has, the larger the total amount of remittances 
received from the rural sector – a very reasonable result. It should be noted also that the 
coefficient of the selectivity variable is negative and statistically significant, a finding 
that adds support to the use of the selectivity-adjusted model. As noted earlier in 
comments about similar findings, the negative sign of the selectivity variable is 
plausible and interesting. It reflects the conceivably constrasting influence of 
unobserved variables – such as the geographical closeness of households’ potential 
remitters – on remittance receipt and remittance size. 
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7.4.6 Impact of urban-to-rural remittances on the welfare of recipients 
 
Table 55 shows the selectivity-corrected OLS welfare regressions used in the estimation 
of the counterfactual scenarios. The regression labelled “Welf1” represents the set of 
parameter estimates used to compute the recipient welfare levels for those rural 
households who did not receive remittances. The regression labelled “Welf0”, on the 
other hand, represents the set of parameter estimates employed in the computation of 
non-recipient welfare levels for those rural households who received remittances from 
the urban sector. The explanatory variables in both regressions include measures of – or 
proxies for – human capital, physical assets, household characteristics, community 
characteristics, income-generating capacity, and location. On the whole, the signs and 
significance of the coefficients are consistent with a priori expectations. On the basis of 
the values of the adjusted-R-squared (r2_a), F-statistic, and root of mean square error 
(“rmse”), the models perform reasonably well. The identifying variable (i.e., the 
exclusion restriction) for each of the welfare regressions is one of the household head 
age dummies – the dummy for age group 35-45 years. The test of the validity of the 
exclusion restriction is provided by Table 67. 
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Table 55: Recipient (Welf1) and non-recipient (Welf0) welfare regressions, together with first-stage Probit: urban-to-rural model 
Dependent variable: Log of welfare 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                   Probit                        Welf1                        Welf0                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Head's age:[15, 25)                 -0.34**        (0.16)         0.02          (0.10)        -0.01          (0.07) 
Head's age:[25, 35)                 -0.50***       (0.11)        -0.00          (0.05)         0.04          (0.03) 
Head's age:[35, 45)                 -0.58***       (0.11)                                                           
Head's age:[45, 55)                 -0.46***       (0.10)        -0.01          (0.05)        -0.04          (0.03) 
Head's age:[55, 65)                 -0.20*         (0.10)         0.01          (0.05)        -0.07*         (0.04) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
Sent rem to urban sector             0.44***       (0.05)         0.11*         (0.06)         0.03          (0.04) 
Household kin-fosters                0.12*         (0.07)        -0.09*         (0.05)        -0.04          (0.04) 
# of children (<15 yrs)              0.07**        (0.03)        -0.03          (0.02)        -0.04***       (0.01) 
# of elderly (>65 yrs)               0.27***       (0.07)        -0.05          (0.06)        -0.17***       (0.05) 
Member attends school                0.21***       (0.06)        -0.14***       (0.05)        -0.27***       (0.03) 
Low employment income                0.04          (0.10)         0.13*         (0.07)        -0.04          (0.05) 
Medium employment income            -0.03          (0.13)         0.06          (0.09)         0.13**        (0.06) 
High employment income               0.03          (0.14)         0.36***       (0.10)         0.34***       (0.07) 
Zero employment income (omitted category) 
Household size                      -0.10***       (0.02)        -0.08***       (0.02)        -0.05***       (0.01) 
Male head                           -0.53***       (0.07)        -0.08          (0.07)         0.15***       (0.05) 
Head married                        -0.21*         (0.12)         0.09          (0.09)        -0.18***       (0.06) 
Head in informal union              -0.13          (0.13)         0.01          (0.09)        -0.31***       (0.06) 
Head divorced/separated             -0.36***       (0.13)        -0.01          (0.10)        -0.21***       (0.07) 
Head widowed                        -0.27*         (0.15)        -0.01          (0.10)        -0.23***       (0.08) 
Head never married (omitted category) 
Head-MSLC/BECE                       0.10          (0.06)         0.09**        (0.04)         0.03          (0.03) 
Head-voc/comm/O/A                    0.02          (0.14)         0.17*         (0.10)         0.04          (0.06) 
Head-TT/nursing/tech/prof           -0.12          (0.16)         0.17          (0.12)         0.18**        (0.07) 
Head-degree                          0.17          (0.45)         0.30          (0.32)         0.40*         (0.23) 
Head-unspec. educ                   -0.72          (0.48)         0.16          (0.39)         0.07          (0.16) 
Head-no educ qualification (omitted category) 
Head-agric.                         -0.46***       (0.14)         0.22**        (0.09)         0.21**        (0.10) 
Head-industry                       -0.78***       (0.16)         0.28**        (0.14)         0.37***       (0.12) 
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Table 55: Continued … 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                   Probit                        Welf1                        Welf0                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Head-services                       -0.52***       (0.15)         0.27***       (0.10)         0.32***       (0.10) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Farm/livestock                      -0.06          (0.09)         0.08          (0.06)        -0.02          (0.05) 
Food processing                     -0.10          (0.06)        -0.07          (0.04)         0.02          (0.03) 
Other business                      -0.07          (0.05)         0.09**        (0.04)         0.14***       (0.03) 
Pipe-borne water                    -0.13*         (0.07)         0.02          (0.05)         0.11***       (0.04) 
Electricity/generator                0.22***       (0.07)         0.17***       (0.05)         0.03          (0.04) 
Forest ecological zone               0.03          (0.07)        -0.05          (0.05)         0.09**        (0.04) 
Savannah ecological zone            -0.14          (0.11)        -0.16**        (0.08)         0.26***       (0.05) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
Western Region                      -0.68***       (0.16)         0.76***       (0.14)         1.23***       (0.09) 
Central Region                      -0.25          (0.16)         0.52***       (0.11)         0.93***       (0.08) 
Greater Accra Region                -0.20          (0.19)         0.97***       (0.13)         1.18***       (0.10) 
Eastern Region                      -0.41***       (0.14)         0.68***       (0.11)         0.82***       (0.07) 
Volta Region                        -0.24          (0.15)         0.67***       (0.11)         0.98***       (0.07) 
Ashanti Region                      -0.41***       (0.15)         0.77***       (0.12)         1.04***       (0.08) 
Brong-Ahafo Region                  -0.36***       (0.14)         0.83***       (0.10)         0.96***       (0.07) 
Northern Region                     -0.26*         (0.14)         0.33***       (0.11)         0.58***       (0.06) 
Upper West Region                   -1.15***       (0.22)         0.33          (0.24)         0.50***       (0.10) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
Head-other                                                        0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00) 
Selectivity                                                      -0.17          (0.17)         0.70***       (0.15) 
Constant                             1.45***       (0.25)        13.58***       (0.16)        12.76***       (0.24) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                                0.42                         0.45                 
r2_a                                                              0.40                         0.44                 
F                                                                18.48                        41.79                 
rmse                                                              0.53                         0.54                 
N                                 3422.00                      1146.00                      2276.00                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2; rmse: Root of mean square error 
 221 
Table 56: Impact of urban-to-rural remittances on recipients’ welfare 
 Number of 
households 
Mean 
percentage 
welfare gain 
Percentage 
with welfare 
gain 
Percentage 
without 
welfare gain 
Actual rural  
recipients of 
urban 
remittances 
1,147 60.57 95.03 
(Mean % gain 
= 64.22) 
4.97 
(Mean % loss 
= 9.21) 
Rural non-
recipients 
(hypothetical 
scenario) 
2,276 17.51 81.90 
(Mean % gain 
= 23.61) 
18.10 
(Mean % loss 
= 10.06) 
 
 
 
Our findings regarding the impact of urban-to-rural remittances on the welfare of 
recipients are summarised in Table 56. Remittances considerably improved the welfare 
of recipients, with the mean proportionate welfare gain being 60.6 percent. It should be 
noted though, that not every recipient household gained; the proportion of recipients 
that gained was 95.0 percent and the mean proportionate gain for these recipients was 
64.2 percent. Recipients who did not gain incurred an average proportionate loss of 9.2 
percent. We also find that rural non-recipients would have had a mean proportionate 
welfare increment of 17.5 percent if they had received remittances from the urban 
sector. These results lend credence to the importance of urban remittances to rural 
dwellers. To provide some indication of how the results might vary with different 
specifications of the model, the results corresponding to an alternative model 
specification
75
 are shown in Table 60 in the Appendix. 
 
7.4.7 Impact of rural-to-urban remittances on the welfare of recipients 
 
The selectivity-adjusted OLS regressions used in our analysis of the counterfactual 
scenarios are presented in Table 57. Regression “Welf1” shows the parameter estimates 
used to calculate recipient welfare for urban non-recipients. The regression labelled 
“Welf0” represents the set of parameter estimates applied in the computation of non-
recipient welfare for urban recipients of rural remittances. The identifying variable for 
                                                 
75
 For this alternative specification, the welfare regressions exclude regressors for number of children and 
number of elderly individuals. 
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the welfare regressions is the dummy for the household head belonging to the age range 
35-45 years. A test of the validity of this exclusion restriction is provided by Table 68. 
As was done for the previous analysis, the regressors in both regressions include 
measures of – or proxies for – human capital, physical assets, household attributes, 
community characteristics, income-generating capacity, and location. Judging from the 
adjusted-R-squared (r2_a), F-statistic, and root of mean square error (“rmse”), the 
regressions exhibit satisfactory performance. 
 
Table 58 summarises the results of the analysis. Unlike the case of urban-to-rural 
remittances, rural-to-urban remittances have a somewhat negligible impact on 
recipients’ welfare. Urban recipients of rural remittances incurred a mean proportionate 
welfare gain of 1.1 percent, with 33.7 percent of recipients deriving a welfare gain. The 
proportionate welfare gain of the gainers was 50.3 percent on average, whilst the non-
gainers had a mean proportionate welfare loss of 24.0 percent. According to our results, 
urban non-recipients of remittances would have had a 12.4 percent welfare decline if 
they had received rural remittances. On the whole, our findings suggest that rural-to-
urban remittances have little impact on the welfare of recipients. 
 
On the issue of how the receipt of remittances can lead to a fall in welfare, it is 
important to note that our analysis is not based on a “before and after” comparison, but 
rather, it is based on the evaluation of the “with and without” counterfactual scenarios. 
Thus, it is conceivable for a remittance recipient to be better off without the remittances. 
As mentioned earlier, this can occur, for instance, if the remittances are substitutes for 
what a current migrant would have contributed if he/she had not migrated, but remained 
a member of the current recipient household. It is also possible for remittance receipts to 
lead to welfare losses if they result in recipients becoming overly dependent on them. 
 
 
 223 
Table 57: Recipient (Welf1) and non-recipient (Welf0) welfare regressions, together with first-stage Probit: rural-to-urban model 
Dependent variable: Log of welfare 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                   Probit                        Welf1                        Welf0                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Head's age:[15, 25)                 -0.31          (0.32)        -0.04          (0.22)        -0.04          (0.06) 
Head's age:[25, 35)                 -0.58***       (0.22)        -0.07          (0.20)         0.06          (0.04) 
Head's age:[35, 45)                 -0.52**        (0.21)                                                           
Head's age:[45, 55)                 -0.62***       (0.21)         0.03          (0.21)         0.05          (0.04) 
Head's age:[55, 65)                 -0.52**        (0.23)        -0.43**        (0.21)         0.09*         (0.05) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
R-U in-migrant present               0.47***       (0.16)        -0.25          (0.26)        -0.06          (0.05) 
Household size                       0.05          (0.03)        -0.22***       (0.04)        -0.10***       (0.01) 
Sent rem to rural sector             0.41***       (0.15)         0.08          (0.18)         0.10**        (0.04) 
Member attends school               -0.11          (0.17)        -0.10          (0.16)        -0.07*         (0.04) 
Low employment income                0.18          (0.23)         0.42**        (0.19)        -0.11**        (0.05) 
Medium employment income            -0.25          (0.29)         0.18          (0.42)        -0.09*         (0.05) 
High employment income               0.16          (0.23)         0.21          (0.22)         0.11**        (0.05) 
Zero employment income (omitted category) 
Male head                           -0.65***       (0.14)         0.15          (0.24)        -0.06          (0.05) 
Head-MSLC/BECE                      -0.07          (0.16)         0.02          (0.16)         0.08**        (0.04) 
Head-voc/comm/O/A                   -0.01          (0.24)         0.70***       (0.25)         0.21***       (0.05) 
Head-TT/nursing/tech/prof           -0.12          (0.27)        -0.03          (0.31)         0.26***       (0.05) 
Head-degree                          0.17          (0.58)         0.89          (0.56)         0.50***       (0.13) 
Head-unspec. educ                                                 0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00) 
Head-no educ qualification (omitted category) 
Head-agric.                         -0.34          (0.26)        -0.15          (0.25)         0.02          (0.07) 
Head-industry                       -0.70***       (0.26)        -0.34          (0.32)         0.15**        (0.07) 
Head-services                       -0.49**        (0.22)        -0.20          (0.26)         0.15**        (0.07) 
Head-other                                                        0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Pipe-borne water                    -0.39**        (0.16)         0.51**        (0.21)         0.15***       (0.05) 
Electricity/generator               -0.00          (0.16)         0.34**        (0.14)         0.32***       (0.04) 
Farm/livestock                      -0.02          (0.18)         0.24          (0.18)        -0.04          (0.04) 
Food processing                      0.15          (0.15)         0.08          (0.13)        -0.10***       (0.04) 
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Table 57: Continued … 
Dependent variable: Log of welfare 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                   Probit                        Welf1                        Welf0                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Other business                      -0.07          (0.14)         0.31**        (0.14)         0.07**        (0.03) 
Forest ecological zone              -0.06          (0.23)         0.04          (0.22)         0.12**        (0.06) 
Savannah ecological zone            -0.80**        (0.40)        -0.82          (0.49)         0.21**        (0.09) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
Western Region                      -0.89          (0.70)        -0.84          (0.76)         0.26          (0.17) 
Central Region                      -0.66          (0.71)        -1.18          (0.76)        -0.11          (0.17) 
Greater Accra Region                -1.06          (0.70)        -0.78          (0.79)         0.36**        (0.17) 
Eastern Region                      -0.86          (0.67)        -0.46          (0.71)         0.08          (0.16) 
Volta Region                        -0.41          (0.67)        -0.74          (0.70)        -0.05          (0.16) 
Ashanti Region                      -0.76          (0.68)        -0.57          (0.74)         0.29*         (0.17) 
Brong-Ahafo Region                  -0.41          (0.67)        -0.97          (0.71)         0.21          (0.16) 
Northern Region                     -0.41          (0.61)         0.32          (0.61)        -0.09          (0.15) 
Upper West Region                                                 0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
Selectivity                                                       0.10          (0.42)         0.18          (0.25) 
Constant                             0.60          (0.73)        14.87***       (0.74)        13.99***       (0.22) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                                0.80                         0.51                 
r2_a                                                              0.66                         0.49                 
F                                                                 5.65                        36.74                 
rmse                                                              0.40                         0.48                 
N                                 1376.00                        86.00                      1290.00                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
rmse: Root of mean square error 
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Table 58: Impact of rural-to-urban remittances on recipients’ welfare 
 Number of 
households 
Mean 
percentage 
welfare gain 
Percentage 
with welfare 
gain 
Percentage 
without 
welfare gain 
Actual urban 
recipients of 
rural 
remittances 
86 1.07 33.72 
(Mean % gain 
= 50.32) 
66.28 
(Mean % loss 
= 23.98) 
Urban 
non-recipients 
(hypothetical 
scenario) 
1,315 -10.30 31.48 
(Mean % gain 
= 46.37) 
68.52 
(Mean % loss 
= 36.34) 
 
 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted the prevalence and importance of remittances in the 
livelihoods of Ghana’s rural and urban households. Several factors influencing 
remittance flows between rural and urban sectors have been identified. These include 
employment income, the presence of an in-migrant, kin-fostering, the relationship 
between remitters and recipients, and gender. Our results provide support for the 
presence of both altruism and self-interest in remittance decisions. Furthermore, the 
results are consistent with the view that it is appropriate to treat the remittance decision 
as comprising two decisions, namely, the decision to remit, and the decision about the 
remittance size. 
 
Regarding the evaluation of the impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare, the overall 
results indicate a positive welfare impact, especially of urban-to-rural remittance; even 
though rural-to-urban remittances had little impact on the welfare of recipients, rural 
recipients of urban remittances were found to derive considerable welfare gains. Thus, 
our findings support the view that inter-sectoral remittances generally play an important 
role in the livelihoods of Ghana’s rural and urban households. For rural residents in 
particular, these remittances represent a major avenue for improvements in living 
standards. 
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The analysis and findings of this chapter represent a valuable addition to the remittance 
literature in general, and to the Ghana remittance literature in particular. With the 
exception of Adams (2006), this appears to be the only Ghana remittance study that 
employs counterfactual analyses to evaluate welfare impacts. Moreover, our 
methodological approach offers a more comprehensive analysis of remittances’ welfare 
impact than is provided by Adams (2006). This is because we are able to determine not 
only the mean proportionate welfare impact of remittances, but also the proportionate 
welfare impact of remittances for each recipient household; this facilitates the 
evaluation of each recipient’s welfare-gain status. 
 
Although we have examined key welfare impacts of migration and of remittances in the 
preceding and present chapters, the poverty impacts of these livelihood strategies have 
not been addressed. Given the widely documented prevalence of poverty in Ghana, it is 
pertinent to extend our analyses to investigate the poverty impacts of migration and 
remittances within the context of rural-urban linkages. These issues are addressed in the 
next chapter. 
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Appendix to Chapter Seven 
 
 
Table 59: Incidence of fostering in Ghana; 1998/99 
Location of 
household 
Proportion 
of under-
18s that 
were kin-
fostered 
Proportion 
of under-
18s that 
were 
fostered 
Proportion of 
households that 
were kin-
fostering 
Proportion of 
households that 
were fostering 
Urban 16.84% 17.63% 17.01% 17.74 
Rural 13.72% 14.1% 18.22% 18.61 
All 14.67% 15.18% 17.77% 18.29% 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey. 
 
 
 
Table 60: Impact of urban-to-rural remittances on recipients’ welfare, using an 
alternative model specification
76
 
 Number of 
households 
Mean 
percentage 
welfare gain 
Percentage 
with welfare 
gain 
Percentage 
without 
welfare gain 
Actual 
Recipients 
1,147 32.22 87.88 
(Mean % gain 
= 38.04) 
12.12 
(Mean % loss 
= 9.99) 
Non-recipients 
(hypothetical 
scenario) 
2,276 13.36 77.68 
(Mean % gain 
= 20.32) 
22.32 
(Mean % loss 
= 10.86) 
 
 
                                                 
76
 The welfare regressions in this alternative specification do not have regressors for the number of 
children and the number of elderly individuals. 
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Table 61: Test of equality of coefficients in welfare regressions: rural recipients of 
urban remittances versus rural non-recipients 
 
test [welf1_mean = welf0_mean]; 
 
 ( 1)  [welf1_mean]agegphd1 - [welf0_mean]agegphd1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [welf1_mean]agegphd2 - [welf0_mean]agegphd2 = 0 
 (3)  [welf1_mean]agegphd4 - [welf0_mean]agegphd4 = 0 
 (4)  [welf1_mean]agegphd5 - [welf0_mean]agegphd5 = 0 
 (5)  [welf1_mean]urts1 - [welf0_mean]urts1 = 0 
 (6)  [welf1_mean]kf1 - [welf0_mean]kf1 = 0 
 (7)  [welf1_mean]n15 - [welf0_mean]n15 = 0 
 (8)  [welf1_mean]n65 - [welf0_mean]n65 = 0 
 (9)  [welf1_mean]ps1 - [welf0_mean]ps1 = 0 
 (10)  [welf1_mean]empig2 - [welf0_mean]empig2 = 0 
 (11)  [welf1_mean]empig3 - [welf0_mean]empig3 = 0 
 (12)  [welf1_mean]empig4 - [welf0_mean]empig4 = 0 
 (13)  [welf1_mean]hhsize - [welf0_mean]hhsize = 0 
 (14)  [welf1_mean]sexhd1 - [welf0_mean]sexhd1 = 0 
 (15)  [welf1_mean]marhd1 - [welf0_mean]marhd1 = 0 
 (16)  [welf1_mean]marhd2 - [welf0_mean]marhd2 = 0 
 (17)  [welf1_mean]marhd3 - [welf0_mean]marhd3 = 0 
 (18)  [welf1_mean]marhd4 - [welf0_mean]marhd4 = 0 
 (19)  [welf1_mean]hiedqhd2 - [welf0_mean]hiedqhd2 = 0 
 (20)  [welf1_mean]hiedqhd3 - [welf0_mean]hiedqhd3 = 0 
 (21)  [welf1_mean]hiedqhd4 - [welf0_mean]hiedqhd4 = 0 
 (22)  [welf1_mean]hiedqhd5 - [welf0_mean]hiedqhd5 = 0 
 (23)  [welf1_mean]hiedqhd6 - [welf0_mean]hiedqhd6 = 0 
 (24)  [welf1_mean]empcathd2 - [welf0_mean]empcathd2 = 0 
 (25)  [welf1_mean]empcathd3 - [welf0_mean]empcathd3 = 0 
 (26)  [welf1_mean]empcathd4 - [welf0_mean]empcathd4 = 0 
 (27)  [welf1_mean]empcathd5 - [welf0_mean]empcathd5 = 0 
 (28)  [welf1_mean]farmliv1 - [welf0_mean]farmliv1 = 0 
 (29)  [welf1_mean]foodpr1 - [welf0_mean]foodpr1 = 0 
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 (30)  [welf1_mean]othbus1 - [welf0_mean]othbus1 = 0 
 (31)  [welf1_mean]pbw1 - [welf0_mean]pbw1 = 0 
 (32)  [welf1_mean]eg1 - [welf0_mean]eg1 = 0 
 (33)  [welf1_mean]ez2 - [welf0_mean]ez2 = 0 
 (34)  [welf1_mean]ez3 - [welf0_mean]ez3 = 0 
 (35)  [welf1_mean]reg1 - [welf0_mean]reg1 = 0 
 (36)  [welf1_mean]reg2 - [welf0_mean]reg2 = 0 
 (37)  [welf1_mean]reg3 - [welf0_mean]reg3 = 0 
 (38)  [welf1_mean]reg4 - [welf0_mean]reg4 = 0 
 (39)  [welf1_mean]reg5 - [welf0_mean]reg5 = 0 
 (40)  [welf1_mean]reg6 - [welf0_mean]reg6 = 0 
 (41)  [welf1_mean]reg7 - [welf0_mean]reg7 = 0 
 (42)  [welf1_mean]reg8 - [welf0_mean]reg8 = 0 
 (43)  [welf1_mean]reg9 - [welf0_mean]reg9 = 0 
 
chi2( 43) =  83.35 
Prob > chi2 (i.e., the p-value for the test) = 0.0002 
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Table 62: Test of equality of coefficients in welfare regressions: urban recipients of 
rural remittances versus urban non-recipients 
 
test [welf1_mean = welf0_mean]; 
 
 ( 1)  [welf1_mean]agegphd1 - [welf0_mean]agegphd1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [welf1_mean]agegphd2 - [welf0_mean]agegphd2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [welf1_mean]agegphd4 - [welf0_mean]agegphd4 = 0 
 ( 4)  [welf1_mean]agegphd5 - [welf0_mean]agegphd5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [welf1_mean]inmig3yes1 - [welf0_mean]inmig3yes1 = 0 
 ( 6)  [welf1_mean]hhsize - [welf0_mean]hhsize = 0 
 ( 7)  [welf1_mean]rrts1 - [welf0_mean]rrts1 = 0 
 ( 8)  [welf1_mean]ps1 - [welf0_mean]ps1 = 0 
 ( 9)  [welf1_mean]empig2 - [welf0_mean]empig2 = 0 
 (10)  [welf1_mean]empig3 - [welf0_mean]empig3 = 0 
 (11)  [welf1_mean]empig4 - [welf0_mean]empig4 = 0 
 (12)  [welf1_mean]sexhd1 - [welf0_mean]sexhd1 = 0 
 (13)  [welf1_mean]hiedqhd2 - [welf0_mean]hiedqhd2 = 0 
 (14)  [welf1_mean]hiedqhd3 - [welf0_mean]hiedqhd3 = 0 
 (15)  [welf1_mean]hiedqhd4 - [welf0_mean]hiedqhd4 = 0 
 (16)  [welf1_mean]hiedqhd5 - [welf0_mean]hiedqhd5 = 0 
 (17)  [welf1_mean]hiedqhd6 - [welf0_mean]hiedqhd6 = 0 
 (18)  [welf1_mean]empcathd2 - [welf0_mean]empcathd2 = 0 
 (19)  [welf1_mean]empcathd3 - [welf0_mean]empcathd3 = 0 
 (20)  [welf1_mean]empcathd4 - [welf0_mean]empcathd4 = 0 
 (21)  [welf1_mean]empcathd5 - [welf0_mean]empcathd5 = 0 
 (22)  [welf1_mean]pbw1 - [welf0_mean]pbw1 = 0 
 (23)  [welf1_mean]eg1 - [welf0_mean]eg1 = 0 
 (24)  [welf1_mean]farmliv1 - [welf0_mean]farmliv1 = 0 
 (25)  [welf1_mean]foodpr1 - [welf0_mean]foodpr1 = 0 
 (26)  [welf1_mean]othbus1 - [welf0_mean]othbus1 = 0 
 (27)  [welf1_mean]ez2 - [welf0_mean]ez2 = 0 
 (28)  [welf1_mean]ez3 - [welf0_mean]ez3 = 0 
 (29)  [welf1_mean]reg1 - [welf0_mean]reg1 = 0 
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 (30)  [welf1_mean]reg2 - [welf0_mean]reg2 = 0 
 (31)  [welf1_mean]reg3 - [welf0_mean]reg3 = 0 
 (32)  [welf1_mean]reg4 - [welf0_mean]reg4 = 0 
 (33)  [welf1_mean]reg5 - [welf0_mean]reg5 = 0 
 (34)  [welf1_mean]reg6 - [welf0_mean]reg6 = 0 
 (35)  [welf1_mean]reg7 - [welf0_mean]reg7 = 0 
 (36)  [welf1_mean]reg8 - [welf0_mean]reg8 = 0 
 (37)  [welf1_mean]reg9 - [welf0_mean]reg9 = 0 
 
chi2( 37) =  280.08 
Prob > chi2 (i.e., the p-value for the test) = 0.0000 
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Table 63: Test of validity of exclusion restriction; urban-to-rural remittance outflow 
Dependent variables: 
Probit - dummy (1 if urban-to-rural remitter, 0 if urban non-remitter); 
Adjusted-OLS – Log of urban-to-rural remittances sent; 
Tobit – Urban-to-rural remittances (‘000 cedis) sent 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                 
                                   Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
R-U in-migrant present               0.69***       (0.11)         1.53          (1.10) 
Male head                            0.37***       (0.10)         1.23*         (0.67) 
Low employment income               -0.10          (0.15)        -0.50*         (0.30) 
Medium employment income             0.29**        (0.13)         0.77          (0.50) 
High employment income               0.08          (0.13)         0.38*         (0.22) 
Zero employment income (omitted category) 
Household size                      -0.02          (0.02)        -0.11**        (0.05) 
Received rural remittance            0.36**        (0.18)         0.04          (0.65) 
Household kin-fosters                0.15          (0.12)         0.84**        (0.32) 
Head's age:[15, 25)                  0.25          (0.27)         0.47          (0.65) 
Head's age:[25, 35)                  0.51***       (0.17)         1.28          (0.94) 
Head's age:[35, 45)                  0.64***       (0.16)         1.60          (1.13) 
Head's age:[45, 55)                  0.52***       (0.16)         1.62*         (0.97) 
Head's age:[55, 65)                  0.18          (0.17)         0.35          (0.46) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
Head married                         0.52***       (0.17)         1.18          (0.94) 
Head in informal union              -0.05          (0.19)        -0.56          (0.35) 
Head divorced/separated              0.40**        (0.19)         0.87          (0.75) 
Head widowed                         0.39*         (0.23)         0.50          (0.76) 
Head never married (omitted category) 
Head-agric.                          0.28*         (0.16)         0.44          (0.60) 
Head-industry                        0.45***       (0.16)         1.14          (0.83) 
Head-services                        0.32**        (0.15)         0.95          (0.63) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Forest ecological zone               0.13          (0.15)         0.10          (0.33) 
Savannah ecological zone            -0.29          (0.24)        -0.80          (0.66) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
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Table 63: Continued … 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                 
                                   Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Western Region                       0.04          (0.53)         0.45          (0.88) 
Central Region                      -0.45          (0.54)        -1.18          (1.21) 
Greater Accra Region                -0.21          (0.53)         0.74          (0.96) 
Eastern Region                      -0.25          (0.52)         0.29          (0.95) 
Volta Region                        -0.15          (0.53)         0.30          (0.91) 
Ashanti Region                      -0.18          (0.52)         0.61          (0.91) 
Brong-Ahafo Region                  -0.29          (0.52)         0.30          (0.99) 
Northern Region                     -0.15          (0.50)         0.70          (0.86) 
Upper West Region                   -0.43          (0.74)        -1.29          (1.50) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
No. of rural recipients                                           0.47***       (0.09) 
Selectivity                                                       3.19          (2.27) 
Constant                            -2.14***       (0.58)         2.61          (5.51) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                                 1559.00                       297.00                 
r2                                                                0.38                 
r2_a                                                              0.31                 
F                                                                 4.94                 
r2_p                                 0.12                                              
chi2                               189.36                                              
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
r2_p: Pseudo r2 
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Table 64: Test of validity of exclusion restrictions; rural-to-urban remittance outflow 
Dependent variables: 
Probit - dummy (1 if rural-to-urban remitter, 0 if rural non-remitter); 
Adjusted-OLS – Log of rural-to-urban remittances sent; 
Tobit – Rural-to-urban remittances (‘000 cedis) sent 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                   Probit                    Adj. OLS1                    Adj. OLS2                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
U-R in-migrant present               0.12*         (0.07)         0.10          (0.10)                              
Male head                            0.28***       (0.06)                                     -0.17          (0.19) 
Low employment income                0.27***       (0.10)        -0.17          (0.16)        -0.31          (0.20) 
Medium employment income             0.17          (0.13)         0.02          (0.18)        -0.07          (0.20) 
High employment income               0.63***       (0.15)         0.14          (0.26)        -0.17          (0.37) 
Zero employment income (omitted category) 
Household size                       0.01          (0.01)         0.02          (0.02)         0.02          (0.02) 
Received urban remittance            0.40***       (0.06)        -0.64***       (0.14)        -0.86***       (0.23) 
Head's age:[15, 25)                 -0.17          (0.15)         0.11          (0.26)         0.20          (0.28) 
Head's age:[25, 35)                  0.15          (0.09)         0.15          (0.15)         0.06          (0.17) 
Head's age:[35, 45)                  0.28***       (0.09)         0.02          (0.15)        -0.14          (0.20) 
Head's age:[45, 55)                  0.28***       (0.09)        -0.00          (0.15)        -0.17          (0.20) 
Head's age:[55, 65)                  0.13          (0.09)        -0.05          (0.14)        -0.13          (0.16) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
Head-MSLC/BECE                       0.13**        (0.06)         0.18*         (0.10)         0.11          (0.11) 
Head-voc/comm/O/A                    0.25*         (0.14)        -0.00          (0.21)        -0.13          (0.23) 
Head-TT/nursing/tech/prof            0.40**        (0.16)         0.02          (0.23)        -0.18          (0.28) 
Head-degree                          0.55          (0.47)         0.15          (0.53)        -0.13          (0.57) 
Head-unspec. educ                   -0.02          (0.42)         0.11          (0.56)         0.12          (0.56) 
Head-no educ qualification (omitted category) 
Head-agric.                          0.59***       (0.17)        -0.90**        (0.37)        -1.27**        (0.50) 
Head-industry                        0.46**        (0.19)        -0.84**        (0.37)        -1.13**        (0.46) 
Head-services                        0.44**        (0.18)        -0.80**        (0.34)        -1.08**        (0.44) 
Head-other                                                        0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Farm/livestock                       0.30***       (0.11)        -0.28          (0.19)        -0.46**        (0.23) 
Food processing                      0.04          (0.07)         0.08          (0.10)         0.05          (0.10) 
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Table 64: Continued … 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                   Probit                    Adj. OLS1                    Adj. OLS2                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Other business                       0.23***       (0.06)        -0.18*         (0.10)        -0.30**        (0.15) 
Pipe-borne water                    -0.28***       (0.08)         0.08          (0.15)         0.23          (0.19) 
Electricity/generator                0.26***       (0.08)        -0.01          (0.13)        -0.16          (0.18) 
Forest ecological zone               0.48***       (0.08)        -0.19          (0.18)        -0.45          (0.29) 
Savannah ecological zone             0.08          (0.12)        -0.01          (0.19)        -0.05          (0.19) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
Western Region                       1.07***       (0.19)         0.29          (0.51)        -0.41          (0.79) 
Central Region                       1.28***       (0.19)         0.14          (0.55)        -0.68          (0.90) 
Greater Accra Region                 1.42***       (0.22)         0.57          (0.62)        -0.34          (1.00) 
Eastern Region                       0.86***       (0.17)         0.18          (0.45)        -0.42          (0.69) 
Volta Region                         1.07***       (0.18)         0.20          (0.51)        -0.51          (0.80) 
Ashanti Region                       0.86***       (0.18)         0.82*         (0.46)         0.23          (0.70) 
Brong-Ahafo Region                   0.71***       (0.17)         0.78*         (0.43)         0.28          (0.62) 
Northern Region                      0.44**        (0.17)         0.66          (0.41)         0.33          (0.50) 
Upper West Region                                                 0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
Rec is head's parent                                              0.64***       (0.21)         0.65***       (0.21) 
Rec is head's spouse                                              1.54***       (0.28)         1.54***       (0.28) 
Rec is head's child                                               0.89***       (0.20)         0.89***       (0.20) 
Rec is head's sibling                                             0.26          (0.21)         0.27          (0.21) 
Rec is head's other rel                                           0.20          (0.21)         0.20          (0.21) 
Rec not related to head (omitted category) 
No. of urban recipients                                           0.48***       (0.04)         0.48***       (0.04) 
Selectivity                                                      -0.83*         (0.45)        -1.67**        (0.84) 
Constant                            -3.25***       (0.26)        11.86***       (1.45)        14.52***       (2.71) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                                0.35                         0.35                 
r2_a                                                              0.32                         0.32                 
F                                                                12.05                        12.04                 
chi2                               542.95                                                                           
N                                 3044.00                       977.00                       977.00                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2
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Table 65: Test of validity of exclusion restriction; urban-to-rural remittance receipt 
Dependent variables: 
Probit - dummy (1 if recipient of urban-to-rural remittance, 0 if rural non-recipient); 
Adjusted-OLS – Log of urban-to-rural remittances received; 
Tobit – Urban-to-rural remittances (‘000 cedis) received 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                 
                                   Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Male head                           -0.57***       (0.07)         0.57          (0.42) 
Zero employment income               0.03          (0.14)        -0.10          (0.22) 
Low employment income                0.05          (0.16)        -0.03          (0.25) 
Medium employment income            -0.05          (0.17)        -0.12          (0.27) 
High employment income (omitted category) 
Sent rem to urban sector             0.43***       (0.05)        -0.74**        (0.32) 
Household kin-fosters                0.12*         (0.07)        -0.24**        (0.12) 
# of children/elderly               -0.02          (0.02)         0.06**        (0.03) 
Member attends school                0.13**        (0.06)         0.06          (0.13) 
Head's age:[15, 25)                 -0.54***       (0.15)         1.01**        (0.45) 
Head's age:[25, 35)                 -0.68***       (0.09)         1.04**        (0.51) 
Head's age:[35, 45)                 -0.77***       (0.09)         0.93          (0.57) 
Head's age:[45, 55)                 -0.70***       (0.08)         0.93*         (0.51) 
Head's age:[55, 65)                 -0.45***       (0.09)         0.44          (0.32) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
Head married                        -0.26**        (0.12)         0.08          (0.28) 
Head in informal union              -0.16          (0.13)        -0.28          (0.23) 
Head divorced/separated             -0.34**        (0.13)         0.31          (0.33) 
Head widowed                        -0.27*         (0.15)         0.10          (0.31) 
Head never married (omitted category) 
Head-MSLC/BECE                       0.11*         (0.06)        -0.02          (0.12) 
Head-voc/comm/O/A                    0.05          (0.14)         0.48**        (0.21) 
Head-TT/nursing/tech/prof           -0.10          (0.16)         1.13***       (0.26) 
Head-degree                          0.24          (0.45)        -1.39          (0.86) 
Head-unspec. educ                   -0.70          (0.47)         0.99          (0.94) 
Head-no educ qualification (omitted category) 
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Table 65: Continued … 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                 
                                   Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Head-agric.                         -0.47***       (0.14)         0.17          (0.32) 
Head-industry                       -0.78***       (0.16)         0.49          (0.56) 
Head-services                       -0.52***       (0.15)         0.25          (0.35) 
Head-other                                                        0.00          (0.00) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Farm/livestock                      -0.08          (0.09)         0.02          (0.15) 
Food processing                     -0.14**        (0.06)         0.17          (0.13) 
Other business                      -0.09*         (0.05)         0.02          (0.10) 
Pipe-borne water                    -0.13*         (0.07)         0.27**        (0.14) 
Electricity/generator                0.21***       (0.07)        -0.05          (0.18) 
Forest ecological zone               0.00          (0.07)        -0.18*         (0.11) 
Savannah ecological zone            -0.19*         (0.11)        -0.31          (0.22) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
Western Region                      -0.72***       (0.16)         0.39          (0.59) 
Central Region                      -0.29*         (0.16)        -0.22          (0.32) 
Greater Accra Region                -0.21          (0.19)         0.51          (0.32) 
Eastern Region                      -0.45***       (0.14)         0.28          (0.39) 
Volta Region                        -0.27*         (0.15)        -0.25          (0.31) 
Ashanti Region                      -0.43***       (0.15)         0.55          (0.39) 
Brong-Ahafo Region                  -0.36***       (0.14)         0.58*         (0.33) 
Northern Region                     -0.32**        (0.14)         0.57*         (0.33) 
Upper West Region                   -1.15***       (0.22)         1.01          (0.99) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
Rem is head's parent                                              0.58***       (0.20) 
Rem is head's spouse                                              1.52***       (0.19) 
Rem is head's child                                               0.60***       (0.15) 
Rem is head's sibling                                             0.30**        (0.14) 
Rem is head's other rel                                           0.07          (0.15) 
Rem not related to head (omitted category) 
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Table 65: Continued … 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                 
                                   Probit                 Adjusted-OLS                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Urban remitter is a male                                          0.23***       (0.07) 
No. of urban remitters                                            0.54***       (0.04) 
Selectivity                                                      -2.04*         (1.07) 
Constant                             1.63***       (0.28)        10.85***       (0.49) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                                0.37                 
r2_a                                                              0.34                 
F                                                                12.83                 
chi2                               500.91                                              
N                                 3422.00                      1139.00                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
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Table 66: Test of validity of exclusion restriction; rural-to-urban remittance inflow 
Dependent variables: 
Probit - dummy (1 if recipient of rural-to-urban remittance, 0 if urban non-recipient); 
Adjusted-OLS – Log of rural-to-urban remittances received; 
Tobit – Rural-to-urban remittances (‘000 cedis) received 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                 
                                   Probit                    Adj. OLS1                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Male head                           -0.62***       (0.14)         0.97          (3.44) 
R-U in-migrant present               0.49***       (0.16)        -1.85          (2.80) 
Zero employment income              -0.16          (0.20)        -0.59          (0.99) 
Low employment income                0.06          (0.26)        -0.91          (0.80) 
Medium employment income            -0.38          (0.30)        -0.80          (2.55) 
High employment income (omitted category) 
Sent rem to rural sector             0.39**        (0.15)        -0.69          (2.21) 
Household kin-fosters                0.27*         (0.15)        -1.21          (1.60) 
Head's age:[15, 25)                 -0.33          (0.30)         0.79          (1.90) 
Head's age:[25, 35)                 -0.59***       (0.21)         1.99          (3.26) 
Head's age:[35, 45)                 -0.49**        (0.20)         0.85          (2.71) 
Head's age:[45, 55)                 -0.59***       (0.21)         1.71          (3.30) 
Head's age:[55, 65)                 -0.54**        (0.23)         0.96          (2.93) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
Head-agric.                         -0.31          (0.23)         0.60          (1.80) 
Head-industry                       -0.68***       (0.24)         0.70          (3.90) 
Head-services                       -0.52**        (0.21)         1.43          (2.93) 
Head-other                                                        0.00          (0.00) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Pipe-borne water                    -0.38**        (0.16)         1.22          (2.07) 
Electricity/generator               -0.01          (0.16)         0.66          (0.41) 
Forest ecological zone              -0.10          (0.23)         1.31          (0.84) 
Savannah ecological zone            -0.86**        (0.40)         1.14          (5.19) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
Western Region                      -0.99          (0.69)        -3.51          (6.15) 
Central Region                      -0.78          (0.70)        -1.84          (5.03) 
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Table 66: Continued … 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                 
                                   Probit                    Adj. OLS1                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Greater Accra Region                -1.21*         (0.69)        -0.07          (7.43) 
Eastern Region                      -0.87          (0.67)        -0.44          (5.39) 
Volta Region                        -0.45          (0.66)        -3.60          (3.49) 
Ashanti Region                      -0.80          (0.67)        -1.71          (5.18) 
Brong-Ahafo Region                  -0.47          (0.67)        -3.54          (3.61) 
Northern Region                     -0.33          (0.61)        -0.60          (2.49) 
Upper West Region                                                 0.00          (0.00) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
No. of rural remitters                                            0.62**        (0.28) 
Selectivity                                                      -3.50          (6.90) 
Constant                             0.90          (0.75)        15.87***       (1.93) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                                0.54                 
r2_a                                                              0.31                 
F                                                                 2.29                 
chi2                               116.52                                              
N                                 1384.00                        86.00                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
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Table 67: Test of validity of exclusion restriction; urban-to-rural remittance-welfare model 
Dependent variable: Log of welfare 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                   Probit                        Welf1                        Welf0                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Head's age:[15, 25)                 -0.34**        (0.16)        -0.09          (0.15)        -0.00          (0.10) 
Head's age:[25, 35)                 -0.50***       (0.11)        -0.15          (0.17)         0.05          (0.09) 
Head's age:[35, 45)                 -0.58***       (0.11)        -0.17          (0.19)         0.00          (0.10) 
Head's age:[45, 55)                 -0.46***       (0.10)        -0.14          (0.16)        -0.04          (0.09) 
Head's age:[55, 65)                 -0.20*         (0.10)        -0.05          (0.08)        -0.07          (0.06) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
Sent rem to urban sector             0.44***       (0.05)         0.22          (0.14)         0.03          (0.07) 
Household kin-fosters                0.12*         (0.07)        -0.07          (0.05)        -0.04          (0.04) 
# of children (<15 yrs)              0.07**        (0.03)        -0.01          (0.03)        -0.04**        (0.02) 
# of elderly (>65 yrs)               0.27***       (0.07)         0.00          (0.09)        -0.17***       (0.05) 
Member attends school                0.21***       (0.06)        -0.08          (0.08)        -0.27***       (0.04) 
Low employment income                0.04          (0.10)         0.14*         (0.07)        -0.04          (0.05) 
Medium employment income            -0.03          (0.13)         0.05          (0.09)         0.13**        (0.06) 
High employment income               0.03          (0.14)         0.37***       (0.10)         0.34***       (0.07) 
Zero employment income (omitted category) 
Household size                      -0.10***       (0.02)        -0.10***       (0.03)        -0.05***       (0.02) 
Male head                           -0.53***       (0.07)        -0.21          (0.17)         0.15*         (0.08) 
Head married                        -0.21*         (0.12)         0.03          (0.11)        -0.18***       (0.07) 
Head in informal union              -0.13          (0.13)        -0.03          (0.10)        -0.31***       (0.07) 
Head divorced/separated             -0.36***       (0.13)        -0.12          (0.15)        -0.21**        (0.08) 
Head widowed                        -0.27*         (0.15)        -0.10          (0.14)        -0.23***       (0.08) 
Head never married (omitted category) 
Head-MSLC/BECE                       0.10          (0.06)         0.12**        (0.05)         0.02          (0.03) 
Head-voc/comm/O/A                    0.02          (0.14)         0.18*         (0.10)         0.04          (0.06) 
Head-TT/nursing/tech/prof           -0.12          (0.16)         0.14          (0.12)         0.18**        (0.07) 
Head-degree                          0.17          (0.45)         0.35          (0.32)         0.40*         (0.23) 
Head-unspec. educ                   -0.72          (0.48)        -0.01          (0.43)         0.07          (0.17) 
Head-no educ qualification (omitted category) 
Head-agric.                         -0.46***       (0.14)         0.13          (0.14)         0.21*         (0.11) 
Head-industry                       -0.78***       (0.16)         0.10          (0.24)         0.38***       (0.14) 
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Table 67: Continued … 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                   Probit                        Welf1                        Welf0                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Head-services                       -0.52***       (0.15)         0.16          (0.15)         0.33***       (0.12) 
Head-other                                                        0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Farm/livestock                      -0.06          (0.09)         0.06          (0.07)        -0.02          (0.05) 
Food processing                     -0.10          (0.06)        -0.09*         (0.05)         0.02          (0.03) 
Other business                      -0.07          (0.05)         0.07*         (0.04)         0.14***       (0.03) 
Pipe-borne water                    -0.13*         (0.07)        -0.01          (0.06)         0.11***       (0.04) 
Electricity/generator                0.22***       (0.07)         0.23***       (0.08)         0.03          (0.05) 
Forest ecological zone               0.03          (0.07)        -0.04          (0.05)         0.09**        (0.04) 
Savannah ecological zone            -0.14          (0.11)        -0.20**        (0.09)         0.26***       (0.06) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
Western Region                      -0.68***       (0.16)         0.59**        (0.24)         1.23***       (0.11) 
Central Region                      -0.25          (0.16)         0.46***       (0.14)         0.93***       (0.08) 
Greater Accra Region                -0.20          (0.19)         0.92***       (0.14)         1.18***       (0.10) 
Eastern Region                      -0.41***       (0.14)         0.57***       (0.16)         0.82***       (0.08) 
Volta Region                        -0.24          (0.15)         0.61***       (0.13)         0.98***       (0.08) 
Ashanti Region                      -0.41***       (0.15)         0.66***       (0.17)         1.04***       (0.09) 
Brong-Ahafo Region                  -0.36***       (0.14)         0.74***       (0.15)         0.96***       (0.08) 
Northern Region                     -0.26*         (0.14)         0.26**        (0.13)         0.58***       (0.07) 
Upper West Region                   -1.15***       (0.22)         0.02          (0.43)         0.51***       (0.13) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
Selectivity                                                       0.21          (0.46)         0.71***       (0.27) 
Constant                             1.45***       (0.25)        13.64***       (0.17)        12.75***       (0.43) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                                0.42                         0.45                 
r2_a                                                              0.40                         0.44                 
F                                                                18.08                        40.82                 
rmse                                                              0.53                         0.54                 
N                                 3422.00                      1146.00                      2276.00                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2; rmse: Root of mean square error 
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Table 68: Test of validity of exclusion restriction; rural-to-urban remittance-welfare model 
Dependent variable: Log of welfare 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                   Probit                        Welf1                        Welf0                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Head's age:[15, 25)                 -0.31          (0.32)         0.01          (0.66)        -0.11          (0.09) 
Head's age:[25, 35)                 -0.58***       (0.22)         0.03          (1.20)        -0.02          (0.07) 
Head's age:[35, 45)                 -0.52**        (0.21)         0.09          (1.08)        -0.09          (0.07) 
Head's age:[45, 55)                 -0.62***       (0.21)         0.13          (1.31)        -0.03          (0.08) 
Head's age:[55, 65)                 -0.52**        (0.23)        -0.34          (1.08)         0.01          (0.08) 
Head’s age≥65 (omitted category) 
R-U in-migrant present               0.47***       (0.16)        -0.33          (1.02)        -0.04          (0.05) 
Household size                       0.05          (0.03)        -0.23**        (0.11)        -0.10***       (0.01) 
Sent rem to rural sector             0.41***       (0.15)         0.01          (0.88)         0.11**        (0.04) 
Member attends school               -0.11          (0.17)        -0.08          (0.25)        -0.07*         (0.04) 
Low employment income                0.18          (0.23)         0.39          (0.43)        -0.11**        (0.05) 
Medium employment income            -0.25          (0.29)         0.23          (0.75)        -0.10**        (0.05) 
High employment income               0.16          (0.23)         0.19          (0.36)         0.11**        (0.05) 
Zero employment income (omitted category) 
Male head                           -0.65***       (0.14)         0.26          (1.36)        -0.09*         (0.05) 
Head-MSLC/BECE                      -0.07          (0.16)         0.03          (0.23)         0.09**        (0.04) 
Head-voc/comm/O/A                   -0.01          (0.24)         0.70**        (0.26)         0.22***       (0.05) 
Head-TT/nursing/tech/prof           -0.12          (0.27)        -0.00          (0.42)         0.27***       (0.05) 
Head-degree                          0.17          (0.58)         0.84          (0.75)         0.51***       (0.13) 
Head-unspec. educ                                                 0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00) 
Head-no educ qualification (omitted category) 
Head-agric.                         -0.34          (0.26)        -0.09          (0.77)         0.02          (0.07) 
Head-industry                       -0.70***       (0.26)        -0.22          (1.50)         0.14*         (0.07) 
Head-services                       -0.49**        (0.22)        -0.12          (1.05)         0.14**        (0.07) 
Head-other                                                        0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00) 
Head unemployed (omitted category) 
Pipe-borne water                    -0.39**        (0.16)         0.57          (0.81)         0.12**        (0.05) 
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Table 68: Continued … 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      (1)                          (2)                          (3)                 
                                   Probit                        Welf1                        Welf0                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Electricity/generator               -0.00          (0.16)         0.34**        (0.15)         0.32***       (0.04) 
Farm/livestock                      -0.02          (0.18)         0.24          (0.18)        -0.04          (0.04) 
Food processing                      0.15          (0.15)         0.05          (0.34)        -0.09**        (0.04) 
Other business                      -0.07          (0.14)         0.33*         (0.19)         0.07**        (0.03) 
Forest ecological zone              -0.06          (0.23)         0.05          (0.26)         0.12**        (0.06) 
Savannah ecological zone            -0.80**        (0.40)        -0.67          (1.85)         0.18*         (0.09) 
Coastal ecological zone (omitted category) 
Western Region                      -0.89          (0.70)        -0.67          (2.20)         0.22          (0.17) 
Central Region                      -0.66          (0.71)        -1.05          (1.75)        -0.14          (0.17) 
Greater Accra Region                -1.06          (0.70)        -0.57          (2.58)         0.32*         (0.17) 
Eastern Region                      -0.86          (0.67)        -0.29          (2.06)         0.04          (0.16) 
Volta Region                        -0.41          (0.67)        -0.65          (1.30)        -0.07          (0.16) 
Ashanti Region                      -0.76          (0.68)        -0.42          (1.93)         0.26          (0.17) 
Brong-Ahafo Region                  -0.41          (0.67)        -0.88          (1.31)         0.19          (0.16) 
Northern Region                     -0.41          (0.61)         0.39          (1.11)        -0.11          (0.15) 
Upper West Region                                                 0.00          (0.00)         0.00          (0.00) 
Upper East Region (omitted category) 
Selectivity                                                      -0.11          (2.61)        -0.04          (0.30) 
Constant                             0.60          (0.73)        14.91***       (0.88)        14.16***       (0.26) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                                                                0.80                         0.51                 
r2_a                                                              0.65                         0.49                 
F                                                                 5.38                        35.78                 
rmse                                                              0.40                         0.48                 
N                                 1376.00                        86.00                      1290.00                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
r2_a: Adjusted r2 
rmse: Root of mean square error 
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Chapter Eight:  
Impacts of Migration and Remittances on Poverty 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter six, we examined the impact of migration between Ghana’s rural and urban 
sectors on the welfare of migrants. The seventh chapter, on the other hand, focused on 
the impacts of remittances (urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban) on the welfare of 
recipients. Thus, on the basis of GLSS4 data, and in the context of rural-urban linkages, 
these two chapters have provided useful insight into the extent to which Ghana’s 
migration and remittance flows influenced living standards. Although knowledge about 
the welfare impacts of migration and remittances is very useful, it is often more 
desirable to know how the lower end of the welfare distribution is affected. This is 
because poverty reduction is arguably more desirable than an improvement in living 
standards not shared by the poor. Since our analysis so far has not focused on the 
poverty implications of migration and remittances, it is pertinent to address this 
important issue. In the context of rural-urban linkages, is there evidence in support of 
migration and remittances helping households to escape poverty? 
 
This chapter focuses on the impacts of migration and remittances on poverty. In the 
context of rural-urban linkages, the following research questions are addressed: 
(i) What is the impact of migration on the poverty status of in-migrants? 
(ii) What is the impact of remittances on the poverty status of recipients? 
(iii) What is the impact of migration on aggregate measures of poverty? 
(iv) What is the impact of remittances on aggregate measures of poverty? 
The next section employs descriptive statistics to examine the relationship between 
migration and poverty on one hand, and migration and remittances on the other. The 
third section empirically examines the poverty impacts of migration, and of remittance 
receipts, both in the context of rural-urban linkages. The fourth section concludes the 
chapter. 
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8.2 Poverty, migration and remittances: some descriptive statistics 
 
Before analysing – in the context of rural-urban linkages – the poverty effects of 
migration and remittances, it is useful to examine some relevant descriptive statistics. 
These statistics should provide some preliminary pointers to help augment the chapter’s 
substantive analysis. Two sets of statistics are presented; the first relates to migration 
and poverty, and the second focuses on remittances and poverty. These figures are all 
based on data from the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS). At this point it 
would be useful to make a few remarks about the poverty lines used in the analysis. 
 
We use two poverty lines adopted from the Ghana poverty literature: an upper poverty 
line of 900,000 cedis and a lower (food) poverty line of 700,000 cedis (see GSS, 2000c; 
and Coulombe and McKay, 2003). Both lines are defined per adult equivalent per 
annum, and are in Accra January 1999 prices. The decision to adopt these poverty lines 
was influenced by a number of factors. These include the thoroughness of the 
methodology employed, coupled with the involvement of policymakers and researchers 
in discussions leading to the setting of the lines (see Coulombe and McKay, 2003). 
Moreover, these poverty lines are widely used in the Ghana poverty literature, and as a 
result their adoption would facilitate the comparison of our findings with those of other 
Ghana poverty studies. 
 
As noted by Coulombe and McKay (2003), the adopted poverty lines were constructed 
with the cost-of-basic-needs (CBN) methodology, after having considered the food-
energy-intake (FEI) approach. The upper poverty line may be regarded as the main 
poverty threshold, whilst the lower (food) poverty line separates persons who are 
extremely poor from those who are not that poor. In particular, for persons whose 
standard of living – as proxied by consumption expenditure – is less than the lower 
poverty line, their minimum calorie requirements cannot be satisfied even if their entire 
budget is allocated to food. 
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8.2.1 Migration and poverty 
 
Table 69 shows the respective proportions of in-migrants and non-migrants that fall 
within some poverty groupings. These poverty groupings are “extremely poor”, “poor, 
but not extremely poor”, and “non-poor”. Naturally, the “extremely poor” category 
consists of persons whose consumption welfare levels are less than the lower poverty 
line, whilst the second category captures those persons whose welfare levels lie in-
between the lower and upper poverty lines. About a fifth of urban-to-rural in-migrants 
are extremely poor, whilst 13.6 percent are poor, but not in extreme poverty. A similar 
examination of urban non-migrants suggests the extent of poverty is much less amongst 
these. The sample proportion of urban non-migrants that are poor is 20.8 percent, with 
more than half of the poor being in extreme poverty (see Table 69). 
 
 
Table 69: Distribution (%) of the poverty status of inter-sectoral in-migrants 
versus that of non-migrants; 1998/99 
Poverty status Urban-to-rural 
in-migrants 
Urban non-
migrants 
Rural-to-urban 
in-migrants 
Rural non-
migrants 
Extremely 
poor 
  19.65   12.45   15.69   36.54 
Poor, but not 
extremely poor 
  13.56     8.38     5.54   15.81 
Non-poor   66.79   79.17   78.77   47.65 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey. 
 
 
Table 69 further shows that whereas 21.2 percent of rural-to-urban in-migrants are poor, 
more than a quarter of these poor individuals are extremely poor. For the sample of rural 
non-migrants, on the other hand, the poor constitutes 52.4 percent, with those in 
extreme poverty accounting for 36.5 percent of the sample. Examining the figures for 
all the four migrant-categories shown in Table 69, the category with the highest 
proportion (52.5 percent) of the poor is rural non-migrants. This category is followed by 
urban-to-rural in-migrants (33.2 percent), urban non-migrants (20.8 percent), and rural-
to-urban in-migrants (21.2 percent), in that order. 
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8.2.2 Remittances and poverty 
 
Table 70 shows the extent (proportion-wise) of poverty amongst four categories of 
households, namely, rural recipients of urban remittances, rural non-recipients of 
remittances, urban recipients of rural remittances, and urban non-recipients of remittances. 
Amongst rural recipients of urban remittances, 23.4 percent of households are extremely 
poor, whereas 13.8 percent are poor, but not extremely; the corresponding figures for rural 
non-recipients are 29.8 percent and 12.4 percent, respectively. Regarding urban recipients 
of rural remittances, the extent of poverty is lower; 18.6 percent of households are 
extremely poor, whilst the proportion of households that are poor, but not extremely, is 5.8 
percent. Furthermore, urban non-recipients of remittances have the lowest extent of 
poverty, with the poor constituting 15.3 percent of households. 
 
 
Table 70: Distribution (%) of the poverty status of inter-sectoral remittance 
recipients versus that of non-recipients; 1998/99 
Poverty status Urban-to-rural 
remittance 
recipients 
Rural non-
recipients 
Rural-to-urban 
remittance 
recipients 
Urban non-
recipients 
Extremely 
poor 
23.37 29.75 18.60 8.97 
Poor, but not 
extremely poor 
13.78 12.35  5.81 6.31 
Non-poor 62.86 57.91 75.58 84.71 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey. 
 
 
Once again, within each category of households, the composition of poor households is 
dominated by those whose mean consumption expenditure is less than the lower (food) 
poverty line. Additionally, rural non-recipients have the highest extent of poverty, 
followed by rural recipients of urban remittances, urban recipients of rural remittances, 
and urban non-recipients, in that order. Whist the statistics in Table 70 are consistent 
with the influence of the rural-urban welfare gap, they are silent on the poverty impact 
of remittance receipts – an issue addressed in the next section. 
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8.3 Empirical analysis 
  
The strategy employed in tackling the research questions is a “with and without” 
comparison of poverty transition profiles and FGT poverty indices, using counterfactual 
welfare scenarios. Since in the analyses carried out in the preceding two chapters, the 
counterfactual welfare levels were generated and the associated methodology was 
discussed, there is no need to repeat these here. It suffices to note that these 
counterfactual welfare levels are based on the application of a Heckman-type 
selectivity-adjusted method. All the analyses are based on the 1998/99 GLSS data. 
 
8.3.1 Poverty transitions 
 
The poverty impact of inter-sectoral migration (or of inter-sectoral remittances) can be 
observed by examining how the activity affects aggregate measures of poverty, such as 
the FGT poverty measures. However, in order to gain insight into the poverty impact of 
the activity on individual participants, it is useful to know how a participant’s poverty 
status is affected by the activity (that is, migration or remittance receipt).  In this latter 
case, it is convenient to summarise the poverty effects with a poverty transition matrix. 
 
In this chapter therefore, poverty transition matrices are used to group individuals (or 
households) into four categories. For want of a better description, these categories are 
labelled “always poor”, “escapes poverty”, “falls into poverty”, and “never poor”. 
Owing to the fact that our analysis is not based on a before-and-after comparison, the 
labelling of the four categories can be misleading; it gives the impression that these 
poverty transition categories are describing comparisons of poverty statuses before and 
after the onset of the relevant phenomenon or activity. An explanation of the precise 
meaning of each of the poverty transition categories is therefore necessary. 
 
In order to clarify the exact meanings of these poverty transition categories, their 
descriptions are summarised in Table 71. As shown in the Table, the transition 
categories describe comparisons between two current poverty statuses: 
i) The poverty status in the presence of the phenomenon (that is, the current 
poverty status); and 
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ii) What the current poverty status would have been in the absence of the 
phenomenon (that is, the counterfactual current poverty status). 
 
 
Table 71: Poverty transition categories 
Current status in the presence of phenomenon 
(actual scenario) 
Current status in the 
absence of phenomenon 
(counterfactual scenario) Poor Not poor 
Poor Always poor Escapes poverty 
Not poor Falls into poverty Never poor 
 
 
The four poverty transition categories may be described as follows: 
“Always poor”:  Poor individuals (or households) who would still have been 
poor if they had not undertaken the activity in question; 
“Escapes poverty”: Non-poor individuals (or households) who would have been 
poor if they had not undertaken the activity in question; 
“Falls into poverty”: Poor individuals (or households) who would have been 
non-poor if they had not participated in the activity in question; 
“Never poor”:  Non-poor individuals (or households) who would still have been 
non-poor in the absence of the activity. 
 
As an illustration, if the phenomenon of interest is rural-to-urban migration, then the 
“escapes poverty” category will comprise non-poor rural-to-urban in-migrants who 
would have been poor if they had not migrated. Similarly, for the case of urban-to-rural 
remittances, the “falls into poverty” category will consist of poor rural recipients of 
urban remittances who will have been non-poor if they had not received these 
remittances. In connection with this, it is worth noting here that it is feasible for a 
remittance recipient to “fall into poverty”. This can occur, for instance, if the 
remittances are being received from a rural-to-urban in-migrant; in this case, the 
remittances constitute an inadequate substitute for the migrant’s income contribution if 
he/she had remained in the rural area. 
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(a) Urban-to-rural migration 
 
A poverty transition matrix for urban-to-rural in-migrants is shown in Table 72 below. 
On the basis of the upper poverty line (900,000 cedis), 75.4 percent of urban-to-rural in-
migrants are in the “never poor” category (see third column of the Table). Thus, a 
sizable number of these migrants are not poor, and would not have been poor even if 
they had not migrated to the rural sector. About a tenth of urban-to-rural in-migrants 
are, however, in the “always poor” category; these poor migrants would still have been 
poor even if they had not migrated from the urban to the rural sector. 10.4 percent of the 
in-migrants are poor, but would have been non-poor if they had not migrated. On the 
other hand, 4.5 percent of the in-migrants “escaped poverty”; they are non-poor, but 
would have been poor if they had not migrated. On the whole, for about 85 percent of 
urban-to-rural in-migrants, there was no difference between their current poverty status 
and what their current poverty status would have been if they had not migrated. 
 
In terms of the lower poverty line (700,000 cedis), the majority (88.7 percent) of urban-
to-rural in-migrants are in the “never poor” category, whereas 5.0 percent are “always 
poor” (see sixth column of Table 72). Given the corresponding figures in the case of the 
upper poverty line, these statistics are not surprising; with a reduced poverty threshold, 
an increased number of these migrants are likely to be categorised as “never poor”, 
whereas less are likely to be tagged “always poor”. The proportion of urban-to-rural in-
migrants that “escaped poverty” is 3.9 percent, whilst 2.4 percent are poor, but would 
have been non-poor if they had stayed in the urban sector. An observation similar to 
what was noted in the case of the upper poverty line is the large proportion (about 94 
percent) of urban-to-rural in-migrants whose current poverty status is not different from 
what it would have been if they had not migrated. In other words, a large proportion of 
urban-to-rural in-migrants are in the “always poor” or “never poor” categories. 
 
 252 
Table 72: Poverty transition statistics for urban-to-rural in-migrants 
 Upper poverty line (900,000 cedis) Lower poverty line (700,000 cedis) 
Poverty 
transition 
status 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Always 
poor 
33 9.79 68.75 17 5.04 56.67 
Escapes 
poverty 
15 4.45 31.25 13 3.86 43.33 
Sub-
Total 
(poor) 
48  100.00 30  100.00 
Falls into 
poverty 
35 10.39 12.11 8 2.37 2.61 
Never 
poor 
254 75.37 87.89 299 88.72 97.39 
Sub-
Total 
(non-
poor) 
289  100.00 307  100.00 
Total 337 100.00  337 100.00  
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
Does the observation that a large majority of urban-to-rural in-migrants are in the 
“always poor” or “never poor” categories imply that urban-to-rural migration has little 
impact on the poverty status of the in-migrants? To address this question, it is worth 
noting a couple of points. Firstly, most urban-to-rural in-migrants would have been non-
poor in the absence of migration
77
; 85.8 percent if the upper poverty line is used, and 
91.1 percent in the case of the lower poverty line. Secondly, in assessing the extent to 
which migration affects the poverty status of in-migrants, it is more useful to split the 
assessment into two: 
i) A comparison of the number of those who would have been poor in the 
absence of migration with the number of such migrants who are no longer 
poor; 
ii) A comparison of the number of migrants who would have been non-poor (in 
the absence of migration) with the number of such migrants who are now 
poor. 
 
                                                 
77
 These are those in the “falls into poverty” and “never poor” categories. 
 253 
Applying this modified approach yields the poverty transition statistics shown in the 
fourth and last columns of Table 72. These figures suggest that on the basis of the upper 
poverty line, 31.3 percent of those urban-to-rural in-migrants who would have been 
poor in the absence of migration were able to escape poverty by migrating. On the other 
hand, 12.1 percent of those who would have been non-poor in the absence of migration 
are currently poor. The corresponding figures in the case of the lower poverty line are 
43.3 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively. To give an idea of the sensitivity of these 
statistics to model specification, they have been estimated for an alternative model
78
, 
and these can be found in the Appendix to the chapter (see Table 82). It will be noticed 
that the two sets of poverty transition statistics are similar. 
 
 (b) Rural-to-urban migration 
 
Poverty transition statistics corresponding to rural-to-urban migration are shown in 
Table 73. In terms of the upper poverty line, 9.8 percent of rural-to-urban in-migrants 
are “always poor”, 26.8 percent “escaped poverty”, and 4.3 percent are in the “falls into 
poverty” category (see column 3). The “never poor” category accounted for the highest 
proportion (59.2 percent) of rural-to-urban in-migrants. Using the lower poverty line, 
the observed pattern of statistics is generally similar to that found for the upper poverty 
line. The vast majority (76.8 percent) of rural-to-urban in-migrants are “never poor”, 
whereas 3.7 percent are poor, but would have been non-poor if they had not migrated 
(see column 6 of Table 73). Furthermore, 14.0 percent of the in-migrants “escaped 
poverty”, and 28.1 percent are in the “always poor” category. 
 
 
 
                                                 
78
 In this alternative model, the welfare regressions include regressors capturing the number of children 
and the number of elderly individuals in the household. 
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Table 73: Poverty transition statistics for rural-to-urban in-migrants 
 Upper poverty line (900,000 cedis) Lower poverty line (700,000 cedis) 
Poverty 
transition 
status 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Always 
poor 
16 9.76 26.67 9 5.49 28.13 
Escapes 
poverty 
44 26.83 73.33 23 14.02 71.88 
Sub-
Total 
(poor) 
60  100.00 32  100.00 
Falls into 
poverty 
7 4.27 6.73 6 3.66 4.55 
Never 
poor 
97 59.15 93.27 126 76.83 95.45 
Sub-
Total 
(non-
poor) 
104  100.00 132  100.00 
Total 164 100.00  164 100.00  
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
As suggested earlier, more meaningful statistics are obtained if the percentages shown 
in the third and sixth columns of Table 73 are re-calculated as proportions, not of the 
total size of in-migrants, but rather the total size of relevant sub-groups of in-migrants. 
Using this modified version of poverty transition statistics, the incidence of “poverty 
escape” is 73.3 percent – using the upper poverty threshold – and 71.9 percent when the 
lower poverty line is employed (see the fourth and last columns of Table 73). Thus, our 
findings suggest that about 73 percent of poor rural-to-urban in-migrants were able to 
“escape poverty” by migrating; in other words, these in-migrants are non-poor, but they 
would have been poor if they had not migrated. For the poverty transition statistics 
corresponding to an alternative model, see Table 83 in the Appendix to this chapter. 
Again, the two sets of statistics are generally similar. 
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(c): Urban-to-rural remittance receipts 
 
Poverty transition statistics for urban-to-rural remittance recipients have been provided 
in Table 74. Clearly, for both poverty lines, the category with the lowest proportion of 
recipients is “falls into poverty”; 0.4 percent and 0.2 percent for the upper and lower 
poverty lines, respectively. This result is not surprising; from our analysis of urban-to-
rural remittances (chapter seven), 95.0 percent of recipients reaped welfare gains, with 
the mean proportionate welfare gain of all recipients being 60.6 percent. Thus, a very 
high proportion of rural recipients of urban remittances did not experience a welfare 
loss. 
 
 
Table 74: Poverty transition statistics for rural recipients of urban remittances 
 Upper poverty line (900,000 cedis) Lower poverty line (700,000 cedis) 
Poverty 
transition 
status 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Always 
poor 
304 26.50 37.67 156 13.60 28.06 
Escapes 
poverty 
503 43.85 62.33 400 34.87 71.94 
Sub-
Total 
(poor) 
807  100.00 556  100.00 
Falls into 
poverty 
4 0.35 1.18 2 0.17 0.34 
Never 
poor 
336 29.29 98.82 589 51.35 99.66 
Sub-
Total 
(non-
poor) 
340  100.00 591  100.00 
Total 1,147 100.00  1,147 100.00  
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
The modified poverty transition statistics are very informative (see the fourth and last 
columns of Table 74). On the basis of the upper poverty line, our findings show that 
amongst those urban-to-rural remittance recipients who would have been poor in the 
absence of remittances, 62.3 percent are non-poor owing to their receipt of remittances. 
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The lower poverty line yields a corresponding figure of 71.9 percent. These findings 
suggest that urban-to-rural remittances played a very important poverty-alleviation role in 
1998/99. It is also worth mentioning that amongst those recipients who would have been 
non-poor in the absence of the remittances, 1.2 percent of the households are poor. The set 
of transition statistics for an alternative specification of the model are provided in the 
Appendix (see Table 84). 
 
(d): Rural-to-urban remittance receipts 
 
The poverty transition statistics for rural-to-urban remittance recipients are shown in Table 
75. It is important to note that owing to the small size of our sample of rural-to-urban 
remittance recipients, conclusions arising from the examination of the calculated statistics 
are tentative. Using the upper poverty line, most (65.1 percent) of the remittance recipients 
are in the “never poor” category whilst the “escapes poverty” category had the smallest 
proportion (5.8 percent) of recipients (see the third column of Table 75). On the basis of 
the lower poverty line, 1.2 percent of rural-to-urban remittance recipients escaped poverty, 
whilst the “never poor” category accounted for 84.9 percent of the sample (see column 6 of 
Table 75). 
 
The modified poverty transition statistics are shown in the fourth and last columns of 
Table 75. In terms of the upper poverty line, 33.3 percent of recipients who would have 
been poor without the remittances are non-poor. In other words, these urban households 
“escaped poverty” as a result of their receipt of rural remittances; on the basis of the 
lower poverty line, however, 20.0 percent of urban households “escaped poverty”. It 
should be noted also that amongst households who would have been non-poor in the 
absence of remittance receipts, the proportions that “fell into poverty” are 21.1 percent 
(using the upper poverty line) and 9.9 percent (for the lower poverty line). These figures 
are higher than the corresponding figures for rural recipients of urban remittances: 1.2 
percent and 0.3 percent, respectively (see fourth and last columns of Table 74). Using 
an alternative model specification, the poverty transition statistics for rural-to-urban 
remittance recipients are shown in Table 85. 
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Table 75: Poverty transition statistics for urban recipients of rural remittances 
 Upper poverty line (900,000 cedis) Lower poverty line (700,000 cedis) 
Poverty 
transition 
status 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Always 
poor 
10 11.63 66.67 4 4.65 80.00 
Escapes 
poverty 
5 5.81 33.33 1 1.16 20.00 
Sub-
Total 
(poor) 
15  100.00 5  100.00 
Falls into 
poverty 
15 17.44 21.13 8 9.30 9.88 
Never 
poor 
56 65.12 78.87 73 84.88 90.12 
Sub-
Total 
(non-
poor) 
71  100.00 81  100.00 
Total 86 100.00  86 100.00  
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
8.3.2 Impact of inter-sectoral migration on aggregate poverty 
 
In this sub-section, a number of aggregate poverty measures are used to assess the 
impact of migration (urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban) on Ghana’s poverty in 1998/99. 
These measures include the FGT class of poverty indices and the mean poverty gap. As 
noted in chapter two, the FGT index yields indicators of poverty incidence, depth, or 
severity, depending on whether a non-negative parameter takes the value 0, 1, or 2, 
respectively (see Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984). The mean poverty gap, on the 
other hand, represents the average gap between the poverty line and a poor person’s 
welfare; alternatively, the mean poverty gap can be interpreted as the gap between the 
poverty line and the mean welfare amongst the poor. In this chapter, the FGT measures 
reported are FGT (0) and FGT (1). Given the close link between poverty and inequality, 
measures for the Gini coefficient are also reported. 
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In order to assess the impact of migration on aggregate poverty and inequality, we first 
obtain estimates of the various poverty and inequality measures using data from the 
entire sample of households. We then re-estimate these measures for counterfactual 
scenarios utilising the results from the migration-welfare analysis carried out in chapter 
six. It is worth mentioning that in determining the “actual” poverty and inequality 
measures, predicted – instead of the actual – welfare values are employed for those 
observations whose counterfactual values are subsequently predicted. This ensures that 
the poverty impact evaluation is based on a comparison of predicted welfare values; a 
poverty impact evaluation that is based on a comparison of predicted and actual welfare 
might lead to a biased conclusion. On the basis of the upper poverty line, Table 76 and 
Table 77 summarise the findings for the impacts of urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban 
migration, respectively, with Table 78 showing that of inter-sectoral migration. 
Corresponding Tables for the lower poverty line are in the Appendix. 
 
  
 
Table 76: Poverty and inequality impacts of urban-to-rural migration, using the 
upper poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 900,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
urban-to-
rural 
migration  
0.385 0.137 1,416.4 580.2 319.8 0.383 
With 
urban-to-
rural 
migration 
0.390 0.137 1,398.5 584.3 315.7 0.382 
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Table 77: Poverty and inequality impacts of rural-to-urban migration, using the 
upper poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 900,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
inter-
sectoral 
migration  
0.404 0.141 1,385.00 585.4 314.6 0.387 
With inter-
sectoral 
migration 
0.393 0.139 1,409.3 582.8 317.2 0.386 
 
 
 
 
Table 78: Poverty and inequality impacts of inter-sectoral migration, using the 
upper poverty line 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 900,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
Migration 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
inter-
sectoral 
migration  
0.395 0.139 1,388.9 582.5 317.5 0.382 
With inter-
sectoral 
migration 
0.389 0.137 1,395.7 583.7 316.3 0.380 
 
 
 
Using the upper poverty line, urban-to-rural migration led to a 0.5 percentage point 
increase in the incidence of poverty, whilst the lower poverty line yields a reduction of 
0.3 percentage points. Rural-to-urban migration, on the other hand, resulted in a 1.1 
percentage point reduction in poverty incidence in the case of the upper poverty line, 
with the adoption of the lower poverty line resulting in a fall of 0.5 percentage points. 
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As shown in Table 78 and Table 88, the overall impact of inter-sectoral migration on 
Ghana’s poverty incidence was a fall of 0.6 percentage points, while the effect on 
extreme poverty was a reduction of 0.8 percentage points. An examination of the other 
reported poverty measures suggest that inter-sectoral migration did not have 
considerable impact on poverty. Similarly, the values of the Gini coefficient indicate 
that welfare inequality was hardly affected by inter-sectoral migration.  
 
On the whole, the results suggest that although neither urban-to-rural nor rural-to-urban 
migration had a notable impact on poverty in Ghana, rural-to-urban migration was 
relatively more effective in reducing poverty. Indeed, in the case of urban-to-rural 
migration, it seemed to have led to a marginal increase in poverty incidence. While 
inter-sectoral migration may not have exerted much influence on poverty in Ghana 
during 1998/99, it is important to acknowledge that these findings relate to the direct 
impact of migration. Thus, inter-sectoral migration could still have an important indirect 
role in reducing Ghana’s poverty. The subject of the next sub-section has particular 
relevance to this issue. 
 
8.3.3 Impact of inter-sectoral remittances on aggregate poverty 
 
In examining the impact of inter-sectoral remittances on aggregate poverty, we adopt 
the same approach used to assess the impact of inter-sectoral migration on aggregate 
poverty. Thus, the analysis utilises the results of the remittance-welfare analysis carried 
out in chapter seven. In terms of the upper poverty line, the impact – on aggregate 
poverty (and inequality) – of remittance inflows between rural and urban sectors has 
been summarised in the three Tables below; the findings for the combined impact of 
inter-sectoral remittance inflows are provided in Table 81, while the separate impacts of 
urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban remittance receipts are shown in Table 79 and 
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Table 80, respectively. The corresponding results for the case of the lower poverty line 
can be found in the Appendix. Urban-to-rural remittance receipts resulted in a 6.6 
percentage point reduction in the incidence of poverty, whereas the incidence of 
extreme poverty decreased by 6.5 percentage points as a result (see Table 79 and Table 
89). Furthermore, owing to urban-to-rural remittance inflows, the Gini coefficient 
registered a 2.1 percentage point decline, suggesting that Ghana’s urban-to-rural 
remittance inflow had a notable favourable impact on welfare inequality. 
 
An examination of Table 80 shows that the impacts of rural-to-urban remittances on 
poverty and inequality were marginal; each of the poverty and inequality measures 
virtually remained unchanged. These results suggest that the poverty and inequality 
impacts of urban-to-rural remittance receipts were much bigger than those of rural-to-
urban remittance inflows. Additionally, these findings are consistent with the 
corresponding analysis of poverty transitions. It would be recalled that in our 
examination of poverty transitions, the “poverty escape” incidence associated with 
urban-to-rural remittance receipts was much larger than the corresponding figure for 
rural-to-urban remittances (see Table 74 and Table 75). 
 
 
 
Table 79: Poverty and inequality impacts of urban-to-rural remittance receipts, 
using upper poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 900,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Remittance 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
receipts of 
urban-to-
rural 
remittances  
0.454 0.163 1,327.0 576.8 323.2 0.399 
With receipts 
of urban-to-
rural 
remittances 
0.388 0.133 1,387.7 591.8 308.2 0.378 
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Table 80: Poverty and inequality impacts of rural-to-urban remittance receipts, 
using upper poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 900,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Remittance 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
receipts of 
rural-to-
urban 
remittances  
0.394 0.138 1,412.0 584.2 315.8 0.387 
With receipts 
of rural-to-
urban 
remittances 
0.395 0.139 1,411.5 584.1 315.9 0.388 
 
 
 
Table 81: Poverty and inequality impacts of inter-sectoral remittance receipts, 
using the upper poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 900,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Remittance 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
receipts of 
inter-sectoral 
remittances  
0.453 0.162 1,326.9 577.5 322.5 0.398 
With receipts 
of inter-
sectoral 
remittances 
0.389 0.133 1,387.1 592.5 307.5 0.378 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
 
In view of the notable impact of urban-to-rural remittances on poverty and inequality, 
coupled with the negligible poverty and inequality impacts of rural-to-urban 
remittances, it is not surprising that Table 81 is almost identical to Table 79. In other 
words, the poverty and inequality impacts of inter-sectoral remittance receipts are 
almost entirely dominated by the impacts of urban-to-rural remittances. On the whole, 
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our results suggest that remittance flows have a larger impact on poverty and inequality, 
relative to the impact of migration. However, since there is often a strong link between 
migration and remittances, it is helpful to treat the relatively low poverty (and 
inequality) impact of migration in the context of the likelihood that whilst its direct 
impact may be small, its indirect effect may be substantial. In other words, the poverty 
impacts of inter-sectoral migration extend beyond the impacts on the migrants. To the 
extent that many of these migrants tend to send remittances to relatives, it is important 
to recognise the indirect poverty impacts of migration through remittances. 
 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to extend – in the context of Ghana’s rural-
urban linkages – the analysis of the welfare impacts of migration and remittances to the 
specific subject of poverty. To this end, the following questions have been addressed: 
(i) What is the impact of migration on the poverty status of in-migrants? 
(ii) What is the impact of remittances on the poverty status of recipients? 
(iii) What is the impact of migration on aggregate measures of poverty? 
(iv) What is the impact of remittances on aggregate measures of poverty? 
Throughout the analysis, relevant counterfactual measures of welfare (derived from the 
preceding two chapters) have been employed. 
 
Our results indicate that migration (urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban) has often had an 
impact on the poverty status of individuals
79
. With both urban-to-rural and rural-to-
urban migration, sizeable proportions of migrants who would have been poor in the 
absence of migration were able to “escape poverty” in the sense that they are currently 
non-poor. It should be noted though, that some poor migrants would have been non-
poor if they had not migrated. Regarding the impact of migration on aggregate poverty 
(and inequality), the evidence suggests there is little direct impact, although a more 
significant indirect impact (especially through remittance flows) is likely. On the whole, 
these results regarding the impact of migration on poverty are consistent with the 
findings of Litchfield and Waddington (2003). 
                                                 
79
 That is, in the absence of migration, the individual’s current poverty status would have been different 
from what it is now. 
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Inter-sectoral remittance flows also had impacts on the poverty status of recipients. 
Regarding rural recipients of urban remittances, 62.3 percent of households who would 
have been poor in the absence of the remittances were able to escape poverty; the 
corresponding statistic for urban recipients of rural remittances is 33.3 percent. Relative 
to inter-sectoral migration, inter-sectoral remittances (effectively, urban-to-rural) had a 
higher and more favourable impact on aggregate poverty (and inequality). Notably, our 
findings on the poverty impacts of inter-sectoral remittances are consistent with those of 
Adams’ (2006) study on Ghana. 
 
Although this chapter has addressed important issues relating to the poverty impacts of 
migration and remittances, further research into related issues would be useful. Related 
research themes with scope for fruitful research include the poverty impacts of other 
forms of internal migration and remittance flows, as well as the poverty dimensions of 
international migration and remittances. For example, it would be useful to know the 
poverty impacts of rural-to-rural and urban-to-urban migration. Similarly, knowledge 
about the poverty dimension of international remittances vis-à-vis any links to internal 
remittances would be very informative. The GLSS4 dataset should be adequate for at 
least a preliminary investigation of these issues. 
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Appendix to Chapter Eight 
 
 
Table 82: Poverty transition statistics for urban-to-rural in-migrants using an 
alternative model specification
80
 
 Upper poverty line (900,000 cedis) Lower poverty line (700,000 cedis) 
Poverty 
transition 
status 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Always 
poor 
36 10.68 70.59 18 5.34 58.06 
Escapes 
poverty 
15 4.45 29.41 13 3.86 41.94 
Sub-
Total 
(poor) 
51  100.00 31  100.00 
Falls into 
poverty 
29 8.61 10.14 7 2.08 2.29 
Never 
poor 
257 76.26 89.86 299 88.72 97.71 
Sub-
Total 
(non-
poor) 
286  100.00 306  100.00 
Total 337 100.00  337 100.00  
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
                                                 
80
 In this alternative model, the welfare regressions include regressors for the number of children and the 
number of elderly individuals in the household. 
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Table 83: Poverty transition statistics for rural-to-urban in-migrants using the 
alternative model specification
81
 
 Upper poverty line (900,000 cedis) Lower poverty line (700,000 
cedis) 
Poverty 
transition 
status 
Freq. Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Freq. Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Always 
poor 
18 10.98 29.51 10 6.10 38.46 
Escapes 
poverty 
43 26.22 70.49 16 9.76 61.54 
Sub-
Total 
(poor) 
61  100.00 26  100.00 
Falls into 
poverty 
6 3.66 5.83 6 3.66 4.35 
Never 
poor 
97 59.15 94.17 132 80.49 95.65 
Sub-
Total 
(non-
poor) 
103  100.00 138  100.00 
Total 164 100.00  164 100.00  
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
                                                 
81
 In this alternative model, the number children and the number of elder individuals in the household are 
included in the set of regressors for the welfare equations. 
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Table 84: Poverty transition statistics for urban-to-rural remittance recipients 
using an alternative model
82
 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1998/99. 
 
 
                                                 
82
 In this model the regressors for the welfare equations do not include the number of children and the 
number of elderly persons. 
 Upper poverty line (900,000 
cedis) 
Lower poverty line (700,000 cedis) 
Poverty 
transition 
status 
Freq. Percent 
(of total) 
Percent 
(of sub-
total) 
Freq. Percent 
(of total) 
Percent 
(of sub-
total) 
Always 
poor 
306 26.68 48.80 153 13.34 45.40 
Escapes 
poverty 
321 27.99 51.20 184 16.04 54.60 
Sub-
Total 
(poor) 
627  100.00 337  100.00 
Falls into 
poverty 
5 0.44 0.96 7 0.61 0.86 
Never 
poor 
515 44.90 99.04 803 70.01 99.14 
Sub-
Total 
(non-
poor) 
520  100.00 810  100.00 
Total 1,147 100.00  1,147 100.00  
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Table 85: Poverty transition statistics for urban recipients of rural remittances, 
using an alternative model specification
83
 
 Upper poverty line (900,000 cedis) Lower poverty line (700,000 cedis) 
Poverty 
transition 
status 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Frequency Percentage 
(of total) 
Percentage 
(of sub-
total) 
Always 
poor 
9 10.47 81.82 3 3.49 80.00 
Escapes 
poverty 
2 2.33 18.18 1 1.16 20.00 
Sub-
Total 
(poor) 
11  100.00 4  100.00 
Falls into 
poverty 
15 17.44 20.00 9 10.47 10.98 
Never 
poor 
60 69.77 80.00 73 84.88 89.02 
Sub-
Total 
(non-
poor) 
75  100.00 82  100.00 
Total 86 100.00  86 100.00  
 
 
 
 
Table 86: Poverty and inequality impacts of urban-to-rural migration, using lower 
poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 700,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
urban-to-
rural 
migration  
0.267 0.083 1,416.4 483.3 216.7 0.383 
With 
urban-to-
rural 
migration 
0.264 0.082 1,398.5 481.8 218.2 0.382 
 
 
 
                                                 
83
 In this model specification, the regressors for the welfare equation include the number of children and 
the number of elderly individuals in the household. 
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Table 87: Poverty and inequality impacts of rural-to-urban migration, using lower 
poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 700,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
inter-
sectoral 
migration  
0.272 0.084 1,385.0 483.0 217.0 0.387 
With inter-
sectoral 
migration 
0.267 0.083 1,409.3 482.0 218.0 0.386 
 
 
 
Table 88: Poverty and inequality impacts of inter-sectoral migration, using lower 
poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 700,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
Migration 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
inter-
sectoral 
migration  
0.271 0.084 1,388.9 483.6 216.4 0.382 
With inter-
sectoral 
migration 
0.263 0.082 1,395.7 481.1 218.9 0.380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 270 
 
 
Table 89: Poverty and inequality impacts of urban-to-rural remittance receipts, 
using lower poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 700,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Remittance 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
receipts of 
urban-to-
rural 
remittances  
0.323 0.097 1,327.0 488.8 211.2 0.399 
With receipts 
of urban-to-
rural 
remittances 
0.258 0.079 1,387.7 485.7 214.3 0.378 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 90: Poverty and inequality impacts of rural-to-urban remittance receipts, 
using lower poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 700,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Remittance 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
receipts of 
rural-to-
urban 
remittances  
0.267 0.083 1,412.0 482.8 217.2 0.387 
With receipts 
of rural-to-
urban 
remittances 
0.268 0.083 1,411.5 482.7 217.3 0.388 
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Table 91: Poverty and inequality impacts of inter-sectoral remittance receipts, 
using lower poverty line; 1998/99 
Poverty/inequality statistic 
(Poverty line: 700,000 cedis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Remittance 
scenario 
FGT (0): 
headcount 
ratio 
FGT (1): 
average 
normalised 
poverty 
gap 
Mean 
welfare 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
welfare of 
the poor 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Mean 
poverty 
gap 
(‘000 
cedis) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Without 
receipts of 
inter-sectoral 
remittances  
0.322 0.097 1,326.9 488.9 211.1 0.398 
With receipts 
of inter-
sectoral 
remittances 
0.257 0.079 1,387.1 485.7 214.3 0.378 
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Chapter Nine:  
Conclusion 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The present study has employed data from the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey 
to examine the welfare impacts of a couple of Ghana’s rural-urban linkages: migration 
and remittance flows. In the process, the determinants of these linkages have also been 
explored. A key feature of the study’s methodological approach has been the application 
of econometric techniques to construct counterfactual scenarios. Using this approach, 
we have adequately addressed – in the context of Ghana’s rural-urban linkages – all the 
core research questions, namely: 
i) What factors influence migration? 
ii) What is the impact of migration on the welfare of in-migrants? 
iii) What factors influence remittance flows? 
iv) What is the impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare? 
v) What are the poverty impacts of migration and remittances? 
 
Before highlighting the study’s main findings, it is important to mention that the 
discussions in other (auxiliary) chapters – especially the first three chapters – have 
underscored the prevalence of disparities in Ghana’s rural-urban welfare and 
livelihoods. These disparities provide insight into the context within which migration 
and remittance flows occur between rural and urban areas. 
 
9.2 Main findings 
 
The study’s findings highlight the importance of anticipated welfare gains and personal 
attributes in migration decisions. There is also support for the positive selectivity of 
both urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban in-migrants; in-migrants gained more than their 
non-migrant colleagues would have gained if they had migrated. The estimates of 
migration gains show different mean welfare impacts on our two types of in-migrants. 
Although some urban-to-rural in-migrants derived welfare gains from migrating, urban-
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to-rural migration generally had a negative impact on the welfare of in-migrants. In the 
case of rural-to-urban migration, a small percentage of in-migrants incurred welfare 
losses, but on the whole, migration enhanced considerably the welfare of in-migrants. 
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that on the whole, rural non-migrants would 
have incurred a reduction in welfare if they had migrated to urban areas. Furthermore, 
by examining return migration, further insight has been shed on migration’s welfare 
impact; all else being equal, the consumption welfare of rural-to-urban-to-rural 
migrants is generally higher than that of rural non-migrants. 
 
With regard to the impact of remittances on recipients’ welfare, there is evidence for a 
positive impact. Although rural-to-urban remittances had little welfare impact, rural 
recipients of urban remittances reaped sizeable proportionate welfare gains. Our results 
also show that factors influencing remittance flows include employment income, the 
presence of an in-migrant, kin-fostering, the relationship between remitters and 
recipients, and gender. Additionally, there is support for the presence of both altruism 
and self-interest in remittance decisions. On the whole, the prevalence and importance 
of remittance flows have been underscored. 
 
This study’s findings regarding the poverty impacts of migration and remittances are 
notable. Our results indicate that migration has often affected the poverty status of 
individuals. With regard to both urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration, sizeable 
proportions of in-migrants who would have been poor in the absence of migration were 
able to escape poverty. According to our estimates, however, some poor migrants would 
have been non-poor if they had not migrated. Our findings further suggest that although 
there is little direct impact of inter-sectoral migration on aggregate poverty, the indirect 
impact – through remittance flows – is important. Indeed, for many remittance 
recipients, inter-sectoral remittances had an impact on their poverty status. In the 
particular case of rural recipients of urban remittances, more than 60 percent of 
households who would have been poor in the absence of the remittances were able to 
escape poverty. Relative to inter-sectoral migration, inter-sectoral remittances had a 
more favourable direct impact on aggregate poverty. Whereas inter-sectoral migration 
resulted in a 0.6 percentage point reduction in poverty incidence, inter-sectoral 
remittances reduced the incidence of poverty by 6.4 percentage points. 
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It is important to note that notwithstanding the limitations of the data, they are very 
useful and adequate for tackling the study’s research questions. Confidence in the 
credibility of the findings is further enhanced by the fact that most of the conclusions 
remained intact when alternative model specifications were employed. The study has 
also obtained findings consistent with other migration and/or remittance studies (see 
Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980; Litchfield and Waddington, 2003; and Adams, 2006). 
 
9.3 Recommendations for further research 
 
On the basis of this study’s findings, there are prospects for further research work. In 
particular, it would be worthwhile to extend the study’s analysis to cover the rural-to-
rural, urban-to-urban, and international dimensions, and to investigate whether there 
are any links between the internal and international components of migration and 
remittance flows. Notably, the 1998/99 GLSS dataset should be enough for at least 
some preliminary investigation of these issues. 
 
Regarding the acquisition of further insight into factors influencing the gains from 
migration (or remittances), there is scope for exploring the application of decomposition 
analyses, such as the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (see Blinder, 1973; and Oaxaca, 
1973)
84
. This is a potentially interesting area for future work. Additionally, alternative 
approaches to estimating the impact of remittances can be investigated in follow-up 
studies. Such alternative methods might include the use of remittance size as an 
endogenous regressor
85
. 
 
An extension of the present study’s analysis – and that of potential follow-ups – to non-
consumption welfare should also be illuminating. Additionally, it would be useful to 
know the impacts of the various forms of migration and remittances on Ghana’s welfare 
distribution. Furthermore, consideration should be given to the carrying out of a 
specialised national survey on migration and remittances. Such a survey would facilitate 
a study of seasonal and temporary migration and their welfare impacts, and help fill a 
void in the Ghana welfare literature.  
 
                                                 
84
 I am thankful to my External Examiner (Simon Appleton) for this suggestion. 
85
 I am again thankful to Simon Appleton for this proposal. 
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9.4 Conclusion 
 
On the whole, this study has made a significant contribution to the literature on various 
topics: migration, remittances, rural-urban linkages, welfare, and Ghana. The focus on 
rural-urban linkages is particularly important for a couple of reasons. Firstly, there is a 
dearth of quantitative economic analyses of such linkages for Ghana. Secondly, since 
urban-to-rural migration is often not analysed, our analysis of urban-to-rural migration 
and the associated poverty and welfare impacts is very significant. 
 
The application of counterfactual analyses and the adjustment for selectivity bias further 
represent valuable contributions to the Ghana empirical literature. Additionally, the 
estimation of not only the welfare impacts on participants (migrants or remittance 
recipients), but also the welfare impacts on non-participants (that is, if they had 
participated) is very insightful. It is also notable that fostering – especially kin-fostering 
– has received some attention in this study. In spite of the fact that livelihoods in Ghana 
are often characterised by fostering, discussions about this practice rarely feature in the 
Ghana economics literature. This study’s recognition of the role of fostering in rural-
urban linkages is therefore significant. 
 
The findings of this thesis will hopefully enhance knowledge and understanding of 
migration and remittance flows between rural and urban sectors, and help formulate more 
effective rural and urban development policies in Ghana and other developing countries. 
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